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VKurzfassung
Multi-Hop Broadcast-U¨bertragung ist eine wichtige Anwendung in drahtlosen
Netzwerken. Sie kann u.a. zum Austausch von Dateien, zur Aktualisierung von
Software oder zur Verteilung von Benachrichtigungen eingesetzt werden. Beim
Multi-Hop Broadcast teilt ein Knoten des drahtlosen Netzwerks, der als Quelle
agiert, seine Nachricht durch Multi-Hop U¨bertragung mit anderen Knoten. Aufgrund
der Bedeutung des Energieverbrauchs in drahtlosen Netzwerken, wird in dieser
Dissertation die Minimierung des Energieverbrauchs in Multi-Hop Netzwerken
untersucht. Der Nachrichtenfluss von der Quelle zu den Empfa¨ngern kann als
Baumdiagramm dargestellt werden, welches als Broadcast-Tree (BT) bezeichnet
wird. Das entsprechende Problem, die Nachricht mit minimalem Energieaufwand im
Netzwerk zu verbreiten, wird als Minimum-Power Broadcast-Tree (MPBT) Problem
bezeichnet. Das MPBT-Problem ist NP-vollsta¨ndig, was bedeutet, dass es sich
vermutlich nicht effizient lo¨sen la¨sst. Daher wurden viele zentralisierte und verteilte
Algorithmen vorgeschlagen, die das MPBT-Problem approximieren. Verteilte Ansa¨tze
sind dabei in drahtlosen Netzwerken passender, weil die Verwaltung eines Netzwerks
durch eine zentrale Steuereinheit nicht immer mo¨glich ist.
Der prima¨re Fokus dieser Dissertation liegt auf der Entwicklung verteilter Algorithmen,
die das MPBT-Problem angehen. Wenn das MPBT-Problem aus der Sichtweise
eines verteilten Optimierungsproblems gesehen wird, muss jeder Knoten im Netzwerk
eine eigene Rolle zur Bildung des BT spielen und Kommunikationsverbindungen zu
anderen Knoten aufbauen. Dies kann passenderweise u¨ber Methoden der Spieltheorie
modelliert werden, bei denen die Spieler miteinander um die Minimierung der eigenen
Kosten konkurrieren. In dieser Dissertation wird ein Modell fu¨r das MPBT-Problem
basierend auf Spieltheorie vorgeschlagen. In diesem Modell wa¨hlt jeder Knoten,
der eine Nachricht empfangen mo¨chte, einen anderen Knoten als entsprechenden
Sendeknoten aus. In diesem Fall wird der sendende Knoten als Parent Node (PN) und
der empfangende Knoten als Child Node (CN) bezeichnet. Eine solche Entscheidung
erlegt dem gewa¨hlten PN eine Sendeleistung auf. Der Grundgedanke des Modells ist
die Zuordnung von Kosten zu jedem CN in Abha¨ngigkeit der auferlegten Sendeleistung
an den von ihm gewa¨hlten PN, um durch Kostenminimierung an den CNs auch die
Leistung im Netzwerk zu minimieren. Die Gesamtleistung, die von einem drahtlosen
Sender beno¨tigt wird, setzt sich aus (i) der beno¨tigten Sendeleistung des Versta¨rkers zur
U¨bertragung u¨ber die drahtlose Verbindung und (ii) die Schaltkreisleistung, die von
den passiven Kommunikationshardwarekomponenten beno¨tigt wird, zusammen. Die
konventionellen Algorithmen fu¨r das MPBT-Problem beschra¨nken sich meist auf die
Minimierung der Leistung zur drahtlosen U¨bertragung, wa¨hrend das hier vorgestellte
VI
Modell beide Leistungen beru¨cksichtigt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Schaltkreisleistung
bemerkenswerten Einfluss auf die Netzwerkleistung hat.
Das modellierte Spiel ist ein nicht-kooperatives Kostenteilungsspiel. In einem solchen
Spiel werden die Kosten der Nutzung eines PNs von allen CNs, die diesen PN
wa¨hlen, u¨ber ein sogenanntes Kostenteilungsschema geteilt. Durch die Nutzung eines
Kostenteilungsspiels, werden die CNs zum Zusammenschluss durch Bildung einer
Multicast-Empfangsgruppe motiviert, um die Anzahl der notwendigen U¨bertragungen
im Netzwerk zu reduzieren. Mehrere Kostenteilungsschemata und die jeweiligen
Eigenschaften in Bezug auf die Performanz des erreichten BT sowie die Konvergenz hin
zu einem Nash-Gleichgewicht (engl. Nash equilibrium, NE) werden diskutiert. Es wird
gezeigt, dass mit dem Kostenteilungsschema des Deckungsbeitrags (engl. Marginal
Contribution, MC) die Kostenminimierung der Knoten exakt auf die Minimierung des
Energieverbrauchs im Netzwerk angepasst ist. Dies bedeutet, dass eine Reduzierung
der Kosten an einem Knoten in der gleichen Reduzierung des Energieverbrauchs im
Netzwerk resultiert und daher die globale Zielsetzung durch lokale Entscheidungen
verbessert werden kann. Hieraus folgt, dass beim MC-Schema der optimale BT
immer ein NE des Spiels darstellt. Neben dem MC-Schema werden noch die ha¨ufig
verwendeten, Schemata der ausgeglichenen Kostenteilung (engl. Equal Share, ES)
und des Shapley-Werts (engl. Shapley Value, SV) untersucht. Es wird gezeigt,
dass (i) MC die besten Ergebnisse fu¨r die verteilte MPBT-Erzeugung liefert, (ii) das
ES-Schema keine Konvergenz des Spiels zu einem NE garantiert und (iii) bei den
ES- und SV-Schemata im Gegensatz zum MC-Schema lokale und globale Ziele nicht
aufeinander angepasst sind, weshalb der optimale BT nicht notwendigerweise dem NE
des Spiels entspricht.
Typischerweise ist beim MPBT-Problem ein CN beim Empfang von Daten vom PN
abha¨ngig, aber durch die Mo¨glichkeit eines Broadcasts bei drahtloser U¨bertragung
ko¨nnen die Signale mehrerer Sender an einem CN empfangen werden. Um Signale
von mehreren sendenden Knoten im Netzwerk ausnutzen zu ko¨nnen, wird die
Implementierung von Maximal-Ratio Combining (MRC) an den Empfangsknoten
vorgeschlagen. Das vorgestellte spieltheoretische Modell wird zusa¨tzlich erweitert und
eine gemischt-ganzzahlig lineare Optimierung (engl. mixed integer-linear program,
MILP) wird vorgeschlagen, so dass ein CN mehrere PNs auswa¨hlen und gleichzeitig
die Sendeleistung der gewa¨hlten PNs bestimmen kann. Da ein CN bei einem solchen
Ansatz die gesendeten Signale von mehreren PNs ausnutzen und akkumulieren kann,
kann die beno¨tigte Energie im Netzwerk zur Verbreitung von Nachrichten beachtlich
reduziert werden.
Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass die Datenmenge in kommenden Netzwerkgenerationen
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vor allem durch Videoanwendungen bestimmt wird. Außerdem ha¨ngt gerade der Erfolg
von Multi-Hop Broadcast fu¨r Videoanwendungen sehr stark von der Zusammenarbeit
der Endnutzer ab. In dieser Dissertation wird daher das vorgestellte spieltheoretische
Grundgeru¨st weiter auf Videostreaming in nutzerzentrierten Netzwerken (engl.
User-Centric Networks, UCNs) optimiert. Es wird angenommen, dass das betrachtete
Video mit der Scalable Video Coding (SVC) Technik kodiert ist. Ein SVC Video
besteht aus mehreren Schichten, und es wird angenommen, dass jede Schicht des
Videos u¨ber einen anderen BT verbreitet wird. Um eine bestimmte Videoqualita¨t zu
erhalten, muss ein Knoten dem entsprechenden BTs beitreten. Um den beitragenden
Knoten einen Anreiz zu bieten nehmen wir an, dass empfangende Knoten als
Belohnung einen sogenannten Token an die sendenden Knoten zahlen, der von der
von den PNs verbrauchten Energie abha¨ngig ist. Indem ein teilnehmender Knoten
Tokens fu¨r das Weiterleiten von Videos sammelt, erha¨lt er die Mo¨glichkeit an einer
gro¨ßeren Anzahl BTs teilzunehmen und eine bessere Videoqualita¨t zu erhalten. Bei
Multi-Hop Broadcast haben in der Na¨he der Quelle sitzende Knoten eine hohe
Bedeutung fu¨r den Rest des Netzwerks. Um die Performanz zu erho¨hen schlagen
wir daher ein Verteilungsmodell vor, das speziell den Knoten nahe der Quelle ho¨here
Belohnungen verspricht. Die Nutzenfunktion des vorgeschlagenen spieltheoretischen
Modells beru¨cksichtigt (i) die Bedeutung der Videoqualita¨t fu¨r den Nutzer, (ii) die
Kosten, die ein Nutzer zahlt, (iii) die Bereitschaft eines Nutzers, einen Beitrag zum
Netzwerk zu leisten und (iv) die Belohnung, die ein Nutzer fu¨r das Weiterleiten
von Videos an andere Nutzer erha¨lt. Durch die Maximierung seiner Nutzenfunktion
bestimmt ein Nutzer dafu¨r gleichzeitig, wie vielen BTs er beitritt, den entsprechenden
PN jedes BT und ob erhaltene Videos an andere Nutzer weitergeleitet werden sollen. Es
wird gezeigt, dass das vorgestellte spieltheoretische Anreizmodell zu einer signifikanten
Steigerung der wahrgenommenen Videoqualita¨t bei den Nutzern bei gleichzeitiger
Beibehaltung der Energieeffizienz des Netzwerks fu¨hrt.
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Abstract
Multi-hop broadcast is an important application in wireless networks. It can be
employed for file sharing, software update, notification distribution, video streaming,
etc. In a multi-hop broadcast, a node of a wireless network, as the source, shares its
message with other nodes in a multi-hop fashion. Due to the importance of power
management in wireless networks, in this dissertation, we study power minimization
in multi-hop broadcast. In a multi-hop broadcast, the message flow from the source
to the receivers can be modeled as a tree-graph, called the broadcast-tree (BT) and
the problem of disseminating the message in the network with minimum-power is
called the minimum-power broadcast-tree (MPBT) problem. The MPBT problem is
NP-complete, meaning that a polynomial-time algorithm unlikely exists for it. Hence,
many centralized and decentralized approximation algorithms are proposed in order
to approximate the MPBT problem. Since managing the network traditionally from a
centralized controller may not be always possible, decentralized approaches are more
suitable to be employed in wireless networks.
The primary focus of this dissertation is on developing decentralized methods for
tackling the MPBT problem. Seeing the MPBT problem from a decentralized
optimization point of view, every individual node has to play its own role in forming
the BT by establishing a communication link to another node. This can be suitably
modeled by game theory, in which the players compete with each other in minimizing
their own cost. In this dissertation, we first propose a game-theoretic model for the
MPBT problem. In the proposed game, every node, in order to receive the message,
chooses another node as its respective transmitting node. In this case, a receiving node
and its respective transmitting node are called the child node (CN) and the parent node
(PN), respectively. Such a decision by a CN imposes transmit power on its chosen PN.
The key idea here is to assign a cost to every CN according to the power it imposes on
its chosen PN so that the network power is minimized via cost minimization at the CNs.
The total power required at a wireless transmitter consists of (i) the transmit power of
the amplifier required for the transmission over a radio link and (ii) the circuitry power
needed for passive communication hardware modules. The conventional algorithms for
the MPBT problem mostly focus merely on the minimization of the power required for
the radio link, but in our model, we take both powers into account and show that the
circuitry power remarkably impacts the network power.
The game that we design is a non-cooperative cost sharing game. In such a game, via
a so-called cost sharing scheme, the cost of using a PN is shared among the CNs that
choose it. By employing a cost sharing game, the CNs are motivated to join together
Xand form a multicast receiving group and this reduces the number of transmissions
in the network. We study several cost sharing schemes and discuss their properties
in terms of the performance of the obtained BT and the convergence of the game
to a Nash equilibrium (NE). It is shown that, with the marginal contribution (MC)
cost sharing scheme, the cost minimization of the nodes is exactly aligned with the
network power minimization. This means that cost reduction at a node results in the
same reduction in the network power and hence, the global objective can be improved
via local decision making. As a consequence, with MC, the optimum BT is always
an NE of the game. Besides MC, we study equal-share (ES) and the Shapley value
(SV) as two other widely-adopted budget-balanced cost sharing schemes. It is shown
that (i) the MC performs the best for the decentralized MPBT construction, (ii) the
equal-share (ES) scheme does not guarantee the convergence of the game to an NE for
the MPBT problem and (iii) with budget-balanced cost sharing schemes, unlike for the
MC, the local and global objectives are not aligned and hence, the optimum BT is not
necessarily an NE.
Typically for the MPBT problem, a CN relies on one PN for receiving data, however,
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the signals from multiple
transmitters can be received at a CN. In order to exploit the signals transmitted
by multiple transmitting nodes, maximal-ratio combining (MRC) is proposed to be
employed at the receiving nodes. The proposed game-theoretic framework is further
extended and a mixed integer-linear program (MILP) is proposed to find the global
optimum solution. By the proposed algorithm a CN selects multiple PNs for itself and
at the same time determines the transmit power of its chosen PNs. Since by such an
approach a CN is able to exploit and accumulate the signals transmitted from multiple
PNs, the required power for message dissemination in the network reduces.
It is known that video is the dominant application in the next generation of
communication networks. Moreover, the success of multi-hop broadcast for video
application depends highly on the collaboration of the end users. In this dissertation,
the proposed game-theoretic framework is further optimized for video streaming in
user-centric networks (UCNs). The considered video is assumed to be encoded by the
scalable video coding (SVC) technique. An SVC video consists of several layers and
in our work, it is assumed that every layer of the video is streamed by a separate
BT. To receive a certain video quality, a node has to join the corresponding BTs. In
order to provide an incentive for the PNs, we assume that the PNs are paid by their
corresponding CNs via tokens. The payment depends on the energy consumed by the
PNs. By collecting tokens in exchange for forwarding the video, a contributing node is
able to receive a higher video quality. Further, in multi-hop broadcast, the contribution
of the nodes who are located closer to the source is vital for the rest of the network. To
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address this issue, we propose a taxation mechanism that specifically provides higher
rewards for the nodes closer to the source. The utility function of the nodes in the
proposed game-theoretic model captures (i) the importance of video quality for the
user, (ii) the cost the user pays, (iii) the willingness of the user for contribution to the
network and (iv) the reward a user receives if it forwards the video to others. A user, by
maximizing her utility function, simultaneously determines how many BTs she should
join to, her corresponding PN for each BT, and if she should forward the received
video to others. It is shown that the proposed game-theoretic incentive mechanism
significantly improves the video quality perceived by the users while preserving the
energy-efficiency of the network.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Wireless communications have experienced a rapid growth during the past years.
First, the number of wireless-enabled devices has substantially increased due to their
affordability and this made the wireless networks dense. The density of wireless
networks is going to increase even more by emerging new applications such as the
Internet of things (IoT), machine to machine (M2M) communications, etc., see Fig.
1.1.(a). Second, due to the advances in technology and design of chips, running complex
signal processing algorithms is now feasible in low-cost devices. As a consequence,
the data rate achieved by the end users has significantly increased. Nowadays,
accessing bandwidth-hungry applications is feasible via hand-held devices. Video, as
a bandwidth-hungry application, is currently the most popular application for the end
users [Eri18]. According to a recent report by Ericson [Eri18], video applications, as
shown in Fig. 1.1.(b), are expected to occupy around 74 percent of mobile data traffic
by 2024 while this amount in 2018 was about 60 percent. Moreover, the volume of
video traffic is going to increase from 16 Exabytes in 2018 to 101 Exabytes in 2024. In
a nutshell, high density and video dominance are two main characteristics of the future
generations of communication networks.
Given the limited and scarce wireless resources, meeting the expectations of the
end users in future dense wireless networks is challenging. Multi-hop broadcast is
envisioned as a technique for tackling this problem by improving the capacity of future
communication networks [WWH+18]. With multi-hop broadcast, for instance, a user
in a wireless network can share her already-cached content with other users in order
to prevent the load on a centralized server [JHJ+17]. In another scenario, which is
applicable to streaming of live events, one of the users of the network can receive
the content from the base station, as the head of a group of nodes, and serve the
other nodes [FASWK15]. This dissertation is centered around multi-hop peer-to-peer
communication in wireless networks as an important communication technique for the
future generations of communication networks.
In order to clarify the multi-hop broadcast transmission scheme, an illustrative example
is provided in in Fig. 1.2 with one source S and multiple receivers. The source, as the
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Figure 1.1. The number of connected devices and the prediction of mobile data traffic
for different applications by 2024 [Eri18].
transmitting node, has a common message for all the other nodes and can serve them by
different transmission schemes. (a) Unicast: In unicast transmission, the source has just
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Figure 1.2. Different transmission schemes for data dissemination. The arrows with
similar color represent the transmission in the same time-slot.
one intended receiver in a time-slot. To serve all the receiving nodes, the source requires
a dedicated time-slot for every receiver. (b) Multicast: In multicast transmission, more
than one receiver is served by the source in a time-slot. (c) Broadcast: In a broadcast,
all the nodes of the network receive the source’s message in a single-hop transmission.
Although the single-hop broadcast seems to be the simplest way as it requires only
one transmission by the source in one time-slot, it has two main drawbacks. Firstly,
it may not be energy-efficient as the transmit power required at a transmitter grows
polynomially with respect to the distance between a transmitter and receiver. Secondly,
due to physical limitations, a transmitting node has a limited coverage area and it may
not be possible for it to cover all the receiving nodes in a single-hop transmission. A
solution to this problem is using multi-hop broadcast, shown in Fig. 1.2.(d), by which
some of the nodes of the network act as a relay and re-transmit the source’s message.
This approach not only improves the coverage area of the network, but also can help
in network energy-efficiency [WNE02,vHE02]. The application of multi-hop broadcast
ranges from IoT and sensor networks [WNE02,ZGC+15] to video streaming [ESS+13].
Usually, the goal in such networks is determined by the quality-of-service (QoS)
constraints which, for instance, could be network throughput maximization [ZGC+15]
or network energy minimization [MASW+15,MASK19,WNE02].
In a multi-hop broadcast, some of the nodes of the network, usually the ones in the
middle, may need to act as re-transmitting nodes. Due to the critical role of energy
efficiency in wireless networks, in this dissertation, we study the energy efficiency of
multi-hop broadcast. The transmission flow from a source to the receiving nodes of
the network, in a multi-hop broadcast, forms a tree-graph, rooted at the source, called
the broadcast-tree (BT), in which every receiving node has a respective transmitting
node. A receiving node an its respective transmitting node are called the child node
(CN) and the parent node (PN), respectively. Numerous BTs can be constructed for
multi-hop broadcast, however, they may be remarkably different in terms of the power
they require for disseminating the source’ message. The power of a BT, which is referred
to as the network power, is the summation of the power required by the PNs of the
network, including the source, for message transmission. The problem of finding the BT
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that requires the minimum power for disseminating the source’s message is called the
minimum-power broadcast-tree (MPBT) problem. It has been shown that the MPBT
problem is NP-complete [Lia02]. This means that a polynomial-time algorithm to
find the optimum BT unlikely exists and thus, an approximation algorithm is required.
Although many approximation algorithms have been proposed for the MPBT problem,
most of them are centralized heuristics [WNE02,vHE02,CFM13,HB09,HCF13,SB11].
The main drawback of the centralized algorithms is their dependency on a central
entity. In fact, to run a centralized algorithm, the important properties of the network
such as the channel quality between any two nodes must be collected by a central entity.
The process of collecting the information, finding the broadcast-tree and informing the
nodes of the network about how to construct the broadcast-tree is time-consuming
and requires a high amount of overhead. More importantly, as the central entity
plays a critical role, the network becomes vulnerable if the nodes lose their connection
to the central entity. This makes decentralized algorithms, by which the nodes can
construct an adaptive network, independent of a central entity, more suitable for the
MPBT problem [AWB+19,FHK+16]. Hence, the first challenge for an energy-efficient
multi-hop broadcast is having a simple yet efficient decentralized algorithm.
The primary focus of this dissertation is to develop decentralized methods for the
MPBT problem which will be further optimized for video applications. Seeing the
MPBT problem from a decentralized optimization point of view, every individual node
has to play its own role in forming the BT by establishing a communication link to
another node. This can be suitably modeled by game theory, in which the players of
the game, here the nodes, are typically modeled as selfish agents seeking to minimize
(maximize) their own cost (revenue). The key idea here is to assign a cost to every
node according to its action. In our work, the action of a node is to choose another
node in the network as its respective transmitting node in order to receive the source’s
message. As a consequence of its decision, a cost is assigned to the node based on
the power it imposes on its chosen node. In a multicast transmission where multiple
receiving nodes can benefit from a single transmission, the cost of transmission, here
the power required at a transmitting node, can be shared among the receiving nodes.
The game in which the goal of the players is to minimize their own cost, while the cost
of using a resource or transmitting node is shared among the players who choose the
same resource, is called a cost sharing game (CSG) [JM07, SLB08]. In CSG, the cost
is shared among the users via a so-called cost sharing scheme. The Nash equilibrium
(NE) is a suitable solution concept for such a game. At the NE, none of the nodes
can change its action and be better-off while the action of the other nodes remains
unchanged [SLB08].
It is well-known that the future generations of communication networks are highly
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human-centric in which the end users play a more active role. According to studies,
energy (battery) consumption is one of the main concerns of mobile users [ASKJ+19].
The energy consumption of the applications like video streaming is relatively high
for the users who re-transmit the video. Unlike for the traditional networks where
the system optimizer decides about the role of a node, in the future generations
of communication networks the end users may decide whether to contribute to the
network. Hence, it is critical to provide proper incentives for the users so that they will
contribute to the network and forward the message to others. Such networks in which
the end users play an active role and impact the performance of the network are called
the user-centric networks (UCNs). In UCNs, network optimization without taking the
users satisfaction into account is not feasible. Hence, multi-hop broadcast in UCNs is
challenging and has to be studied.
The success of a technique like multi-hop transmission in a UCN depends highly on
the users’ willingness to contribute to the network [PPZ+17]. For instance, in video
streaming, the contribution of a user who is located closer to the source than the
others, in forwarding the video, can determine the quality of the video received by
other users. This brings us to the second challenge; the design of incentive mechanism
for user’s contribution. Studies show that users are reluctant to contribute to networks
without receiving a proper reward [WAF+16, FDGR+14]. Unlike traditional networks
where the users did not have many degrees of freedom in deciding on the behavior
of their device in a network, thanks to the advances in software engineering and the
popularity of smart devices, the level at which users nowadays interact with their
devices significantly increased. The users are now able to simply set their personal
preferences and determine their willingness to contribute to the network.
As an incentive for the contributing users, payment via virtual currency or tokens has
been proposed and developed by researchers during the past two decades as one of the
best candidates to be used in UCNs [BH03, IGHT14a, IGHT14b, CGFH17]. Although
virtual currency is a promising tool for providing incentives for the users in UCNs,
two important issues need to be answered in adopting such an approach. First, the
number of tokens a receiver has to pay to its transmitting node has to be related to
the energy consumption of the transmitter. Second, the way that the cost is shared
among the receiving users in a multicast transmission has to be fair. A common goal
in such scenarios is to minimize the total costs the users pay in order to receive the
video, called the social cost.
While the first two challenges are independent of the application, there are other
issues that need to be further considered specifically for video applications. In a video
streaming scenario, the user’s satisfaction regarding the video quality is critical. One
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of the main drawbacks of the existing video streaming algorithms is that they treat
the users as a homogeneous set. Typically these approaches target a certain level of
QoS for everyone and ignore the preference of individual users [ESS+13, HGL11]. In
reality, besides the willingness to contribute, each user of the network, depending on
different parameters such as the content of the video, user’s age, size of the device’s
screen, etc., may have a different preference regarding the video quality. Hence, the
third challenge is to incorporate the preferences of individual users in our decentralized
BT construction used in video streaming.
1.2 State-of-the-art
1.2.1 Minimum-power Multi-hop Broadcast
In this section, we review the state of the art for the MPBT problem. The MPBT
problem has been studied by researchers extensively during the past two decades
[WNE02, vHE02, CFM13, HB09, HCF13, SB11, MP09, CSS03, RVF08, KMG08, CK13,
CCLE+07]. NP-completeness of the MPBT problem can be shown by reducing the
Steiner tree problem to it [Lia02]. The approximation algorithms proposed for the
MPBT are usually not able to find the optimum BT, especially when the number of
nodes in the network is large, but they can find a low-power BT in polynomial-time.
A well-known heuristic called the broadcast incremental power (BIP) algorithm is
proposed in [WNE02]. The BIP algorithm is a centralized greedy heuristic. To build
a BT, it starts from the source and iteratively connects the nodes to the source or
to the other nodes already connected to the BT. Considering the transmit power
of the nodes which are already connected to the BT, in each iteration, the node
which requires the minimum incremental transmit power is chosen as the new node to
connect to the BT [WNE02]. The ratio of the worst case performance of an algorithm
and the optimum solution, here in terms of the required power for the BT, is called
the approximation ratio of the algorithm. It has been shown in [WCLF02] that the
approximation ratio of the BIP algorithm is constant and independent of the number of
nodes. Since the BIP algorithm fails in exploiting the benefit of multicast transmission
in the wireless medium, the authors of [WNE02] further propose a procedure called
sweeping in order to improve their algorithm. We refer to the BIP algorithm along
with the sweeping procedure as the BIPSW algorithm. When the BT is initialized by
the BIP algorithm, the BIPSW prunes the links to the nodes which can be covered
by other transmitting nodes and prevents unnecessary transmissions. Other heuristics
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based on minimum spanning tree [vHE02, CFM13], ant colony optimization [HB09],
particle swarm optimization [HCF13], and genetic algorithm [SB11] have also been
proposed during the past years for the MPBT problem which all are centralized and
may perform better than the BIP algorithm at the expense of a higher complexity.
As stated before, a centralized approach is not suitable for dense and crowded future
wireless networks as controlling every single device via a central entity may not be
feasible. Hence, decentralized algorithms [RVF08, MP09, CSS03], by which the nodes
construct the BT just based on their local information, are a better choice for real-world
implementations. Since in a decentralized algorithm the nodes update their action
independently, to find a valid tree-graph as a BT, the algorithm may require to be
initialized to restrict the decisions of the nodes. The authors of [RVF08] suggest an
algorithm called the broadcast decremental power (BDP) which first initializes the BT
by a centralized algorithm (Bellman-Ford), and then, every node changes its respective
transmitting node if the change leads to a lower transmit power. A decentralized
algorithm is also suggested in [CSS03], but it requires the geographical position of
all the nodes of the network at every single node. Decentralized approaches for the
MPBT problem have received less attention, and in general, lack a good performance
compared to the centralized ones.
Game theory, as a powerful mathematical tool, has been widely used for designing
games for distributed optimization [MW13a,CCLE+07,CK13,MASW+15] or resource
sharing in competitive situations [BLSS16, HMR17]. For instance, the authors
of [KMG08] exploit a potential game to control the topology and maintain the
connectivity of a multi-hop wireless network. Their proposed approach does not
consider multicast transmission and requires the information from several hops to be
collected at every single node. Using game theory to establish a network is known as
network creation game [vTW07] [CLL15]. In such games, the elements of the game are
designed in a way that when the game is played by rational players, the decisions made
by them are in favor of the desired objective from the game designer’s perspective.
CSG is a suitable model for network creation. Using a CSG, the nodes are motivated
to form multicast receiving groups and choose a common transmitting node. This can
lead to network power reduction by reducing the number of transmissions. The cost
that needs to be paid by the members of the coalition has to be shared among them
via a so-called cost sharing scheme. Different cost sharing schemes, each with different
properties in terms of implementation difficulties or convergence to an NE, can be
employed within a CSG . The authors of [SA11] studied some of the schemes that can
be used for multicast receiving group formation for a single-hop transmission.
An important class of sharing schemes for CSGs is the class of budget-balanced schemes
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[GMW14,CRV10,DMRS08]. A cost sharing scheme is budget-balanced if the sum of the
cost allocated to each of the receiving nodes of a multicast transmission is equal to the
transmit power of the transmitting node. One of the widely-adopted budget-balanced
schemes is the Equal-share (ES) scheme in which the cost is simply shared equally
among the nodes. Due to difficulties of designing a decentralized approach to the
MPBT problem, simplified versions of this problem have also been studied in the
literature which we call the minimum-transmission BT (MTBT) and the minimum
fixed-power BT (MFPBT) problems. In the MFPBT problem, the nodes have fixed
but not necessarily equal transmit powers while in the MTBT problem, the transmit
powers of the nodes are not only assumed to be fixed but also equal for all the nodes.
In fact, the MTBT problem is a special case of the MFPBT problem and both of them
are simplified versions of the MPBT problem. The ES cost sharing scheme has been
employed in [CK13] and [CCLE+07] for the MTBT and MFPBT problems, respectively.
The algorithm in [CK13] is called game-based broadcast-tree construction (GBBTC)
algorithm and the authors, by assuming a fixed transmit power at the nodes, minimize
the number of transmissions in the network as a way to minimize the network power.
The GBBTC algorithm studied in [CK13] has three main drawbacks. Firstly, it does
not perform power control at the transmitting nodes. Secondly, the cost sharing scheme
employed in [CK13], which is ES, does not guarantee the convergence of the state of
the BT to an NE. In fact, as we will show in Chapter 4, to ensure the convergence
to an NE when using the ES cost sharing scheme, the power control feature at the
nodes cannot be exploited and a fixed transmit power must be used instead. Indeed,
the application of the proposed approach in [CK13] is limited to the MFPBT problem
with fixed transmit power at the nodes. Thirdly, to find a valid tree-graph as BT,
GBBTC in [CK13] requires initialization.
Besides addressing these drawbacks in our proposed algorithm, we use a power model
for the nodes which is more realistic than the models commonly used in the literature
[WNE02, vHE02, MP09, CSS03, CFM13, HB09, HCF13, RVF08, SB11, KMG08, CK13,
CCLE+07]. Our proposed cost model consists of both the transmit power for the radio
link and the circuitry power of a transmitting node as the total power required at
a transmitting node. Here, the circuitry power is referred to the power required for
proper operation of passive modules in a wireless transmitter, such as, digital-to-analog
converter (DAC), mixer, etc. While most of the existing works ignore the circuitry
power of wireless devices and just focus on the power required for the radio link,
the circuitry power imposed on a transmitter has a significant impact on the energy
consumption in a wireless network [AGD+11]. In practice, not only the circuitry power
is not negligible compared to the transmit power required for the radio links, but
also it can dominate when the distance between the transmitter and receiver is short
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Table 1.1. Comparison between different algorithms proposed for the MPBT problem.
BIPSW [WNE02] BDP [RVF08] MFPBT [CCLE+07] GBBTC [CK13] [MY04] This work
Decentralized 5 3 3 3 5 3
Transmit power control 3 3 5 5 3 3
Circuitry power consideration 5 5 5 5 5 3
Different max. transmit power 3 3 3 5 3 3
Without initialization phase 5 5 3 5 3 3
Diversity combining 5 5 5 5 3 3
[CGB05,WHY06]. For instance, if the network is dense, having a single-hop broadcast
would be more energy-efficient than having multiple short hops. Note that the impact
of circuitry powers cannot be seen as a fixed value on top of the result obtained by an
algorithm that ignores the circuitry power. In fact, as we will show, taking the circuitry
power into account may significantly change the structure of the BT and having an
algorithm that captures both the device’s circuitry power and radio link power jointly
in BT construction is of high importance.
Note that in all the aforementioned works, every receiving node chooses just one
transmitting node for itself. Exploiting direversity combining and receiving the message
from multiple transmitting node has not been explored much. The authors of [MY04]
propose a heuristic algorithm using the maximal ratio combining (MRC) technique.
The proposed algorithm is centralized and the central controller chooses multiple nodes
in the network, including the source, as transmitting nodes and the receiving nodes
combine the signal received from multiple transmitters. Besides being centralized,
the algorithm in [MY04] does not consider the circuitry power of the transmitters in
network power optimization. Table 1.1 compares our work with the main algorithms
discussed in this section.
1.2.2 Multi-hop video streaming in user-centric networks
In this section, we introduce the state of the art in incentive mechanism design and
multi-hop video streaming, applicable to the UCNs discussed in Section 1.1. As stated
earlier, video applications occupy most of the traffic in today’s communication networks
and addressing the ever-growing user requirements in such networks is challenging.
Prior research on multimedia transmission over wireless networks has mostly focused
the QoS constraints [BCN15, DHV14], while there has been a shift in recent years
towards the quality of experience (QoE) as a more suitable metric for performance
evaluation of multimedia contents [CWZ15] via measures like the mean opinion score
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(MOS) [QPSV17] or pseudo-subjective quality assessment (PSQA) [DHV14]. Unlike
QoS that focuses on objective parameters of a network, such as throughput, energy
or delay, QoE is subjective and mainly reflects the user satisfaction. For example,
in [QPSV17] the authors use a PSQA [MR02] to target maximization of the mean
opinion score (MOS) of the users, by minimizing the packet loss in an ad hoc network
with lossy links. The authors of [DHV14] propose an algorithm for peak-signal-power
to noise-power ratio (PSNR) maximization in a hybrid network composed of cellular
and wireless Ad Hoc network, such that some users of the Ad Hoc network are chosen
by a cellular network as gateways for video delivery to other users. Although the
networks studied in [DHV14] [QPSV17] are multi-hop, the algorithms are centralized
and the incentive mechanism has not been addressed.
Despite a variety of works on QoE-based network optimization, the consideration of the
individual user preferences has been largely ignored. Researchers have recently started
taking this point into account, e.g., in video caching [LM17] or content oﬄoading
[PPZ+17]. The most relevant work to our present work is [PPZ+17] where the authors
consider the willingness of the users in helping each other for data oﬄoading. In
their work, users form different groups based on their content preferences and share
the content with inter-group and intra-group users at different sharing probabilities
to maximize the oﬄoading gain. The model presented in [PPZ+17] depends on
probabilistic decisions, while in a video application, we need to optimize the network
based on users’ deterministic preferences. Moreover, the proposed approach does not
address the incentive mechanism issue.
Clearly, the success of a user-centric network depends on the contribution of the users
for which a variety of incentive mechanisms have been proposed. These approaches are
either based on tit-for-tat [PL13], reputation [RZZS15], taxation [HGL11] or payment
via virtual currency [IGHT14a]. The tit-for-tat is simple but has a limited application
[ZZSF11]. In reputation-based mechanisms, a node cannot ask the other nodes for
relaying her message if her reputation is lower than a threshold. She needs to help
others and obtain positive reputation [ZZSF11]. In [HGL11], a taxation mechanism
has been proposed for video streaming in a wired peer-to-peer network in which the
users experience a higher download rate if they transmit to a higher number of nodes.
The main drawback of the existing incentive mechanisms is that they try to balance
the incoming and outgoing QoS measures for a node, like the download and the upload
rates [HGL11]. As mentioned earlier, in a tree structure, the contributions of different
nodes have different impacts on the service quality the users experience even if they
receive and forward the same number of packets. In one of the early works on incentive
mechanisms in tree-based multi-hop transmission in [LL05], the authors propose a
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simple reward function by which a given forwarding user is rewarded based on the
number of nodes that rely on her contribution for receiving data. Although in this way
the nodes closer to the source receive a higher reward, the proposed solution can just
be applied to a pre-constructed network via an access point. Moreover, it ignores the
level of resource consumption at the nodes. In this dissertation, we will address how
the contributing users can be rewarded according to the energy they spend and the
impact of their contribution on the network.
1.3 Open issues
In this section, considering the prior works, we describe the main questions that will
be answered in this dissertation.
In this dissertation, we first focus on the energy efficiency of multi-hop broadcast in
wireless networks with one source and multiple receivers. The aim is to disseminate
the packets, available at the source, to all the nodes with minimum power. The
network is managed in a decentralized way such that the set of transmitters and their
corresponding receivers have to be found without the help of a central entity. To this
end, every node chooses a respective transmitting node, including the source, from
which it receives the intended message. The nodes can repeatedly change their chosen
transmitting node until the convergence which is a point at which none of the nodes
changes its decision. The major questions that arise here are as follows.
Q1. How can a decentralized algorithm for the MPBT problem be designed with
guaranteed convergence?
Q2. How can one address the energy-efficiency in a decentralized way with better
performance compared to the conventional heuristics?
Q3. How can one develop an algorithm by which the nodes exploit the multicast
transmission in decentralized construction of the BT?
Q4. What is the best/worst case performance of the designed decentralized algorithm
compared to the global optimum?
Q5. How can one find the network’s optimum structure?
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Most of the existing algorithms for the MPBT problem merely focus on minimization
of the power required for the radio link. However, in practice, there exist other passive
modules inside a wireless transmitter like DAC, mixer, etc., which all require energy
for proper operation. When the energy efficiency of the network as a whole is the goal,
one should also consider the circuitry power required for other modules, which leads
to the following open issue.
Q6. How to design a decentralized algorithm that takes both the circuitry power and
the radio link power jointly into account for network formation? How much does
such a design improve the energy efficiency of the network?
We assume the contributing users receive tokens in exchange for their contributions.
The tokens are sent from the receiving nodes to transmitting nodes. We design our
mechanism for decentralized network formation using CSG. In multicast transmission
where multiple nodes can benefit from a single transmission, the cost, or indeed, the
number of tokens that needs to be paid from the multicast receiving nodes to the
transmitting node, have to be shared among the receivers. This arises the following
question.
Q7. What is a fair payment and how to address fairness in cost sharing? Is it possible
to guarantee the convergence of a decentralized algorithm while addressing the
fairness issue?
Since there may be multiple transmitting nodes in the network, a CN can exploit
maximal ratio combining (MRC). Using MRC, instead of choosing one PN, a CN can
combine the signals transmitted by multiple PNs to decode the intended message. This
can reduce the network power and the following questions arise.
Q8. How can one exploit MRC in multi-hop broadcast in a decentralized manner?
Q9. Is it possible to address the fairness and the convergence of a decentralized
algorithm for the MPBT problem while exploiting MRC?
Obviously, the aforementioned questions are related to the BT construction for the
MPBT problem and are independent of the application. Now, there is a need for
further optimization regarding video streaming over a BT. There exist several open
questions as follows.
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Q10. How can such a decentralized algorithm be customized for an application
like video streaming? How can one design an incentive mechanism for user
collaboration for video streaming?
Q11. How should the video layers, that result in different video qualities, be distributed
in order to maximize the QoE of the users?
Q12. How to incorporate the individual user preferences in decentralized video
streaming?
Q13. Since the contribution of the users closer to the source is vital for the network,
how to reward the contributing users according to the impact of their contribution
on the network and not merely based on the energy they consume for others?
1.4 Contributions and dissertation overview
In this section, an overview of the dissertation is provided. The section summarizes
the main contributions of the dissertation given the questions raised in the previous
section.
In Chapter 2, an overview of game theory as the main mathematical tool for designing
and analyzing our decentralized algorithm is presented. The categories of games and
the mathematical techniques used for their analysis are introduced. We further focus
on CSG as the main class of game considered through this dissertation. Different cost
sharing schemes and the relevant theorems are discussed.
Chapter 3 describes the system model that we consider in this dissertation. The
parameters and terminologies used in this dissertation are defined. In addition to
the system model, a medium access control (MAC) scheme using which the nodes can
access the channel and construct the BT in a decentralized ways is described.
In Chapter 4, our decentralized game theoretic approach for BT construction is
presented. Questions Q1. to Q7. are addressed in this chapter. Given the system model
described in Chapter 3, in this chapter, a game-theoretic algorithm is proposed for the
MPBT problem. The designed game is a potential game for which the convergence of
the state of the BT is always guaranteed (Q1.). The proposed model takes the circuitry
power of the transmitting nodes into account in addition to the power required for the
signal amplification (Q6.). The results are shown to be significantly better than the
existing approaches in term of the network power (Q2.). In order to benefit from
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multicast transmission, the proposed game is designed based on the CSG by which the
CNs share the cost if they choose a common PN (Q3.). The marginal contribution
(MC), the equal-share (ES) and the Shapley value (SV) are studied as the main cost
sharing schemes in this chapter and the MC is shown to have the best performance
for the MPBT problem. Further, it is shown that in UCNs where the fairness in cost
sharing is critical, SV is the best to be employed. The SV not only guarantees the
convergence of the BT, but also is the fairest cost sharing scheme (Q7.). We analyze
the performance of the game via measures called the price of stability (PoS) and the
price of anarchy (PoA), respectively (Q4.). In addition, a mixed integer linear program
(MILP) is provided for finding the optimum BT, which serves as a benchmark for our
decentralized algorithm (Q5.). Finally, in this chapter, a MAC scheme for decentralized
construction of the BT is studied.
In Chapter 5, the model proposed in Chapter 4 is further extended and the MRC
technique is employed at the receiving nodes. This chapter answers questions Q8. and
Q9. of the previous section. The CNs in this chapter are allowed to choose multiple
PNs. Instead of relying on one PN, a CN combines the signals transmitted by multiple
PNs. In addition, the CNs determine the transmit power by which their chosen PNs
have to transmit the message (Q8.). The proposed approach addresses network energy
efficiency and social cost minimization via the MC and the SV cost sharing schemes,
respectively. It is shown that the MRC-based game via both the MC and the SV
cost sharing schemes converges to an NE (Q9.). The results in this section show that,
exploiting MRC can significantly improve the network energy efficiency and the social
cost. Further in this section, an MILP is provided for finding the optimum network
configuration.
In Chapter 6, we specifically optimize our decentralized framework for video streaming
in UCNs. To address Q10. raised in the previous section, we propose a framework
for joint video quality adaptation and overlay network creation in a multi-hop wireless
network based on the CSG presented in Chapter 4. The order of distributing the layers
is according to the impact of the video layer on the QoE of the users as well as the
data rate that a video layer requires for transmission (Q11.). In our model, a utility
function is designed for each user that captures the preferences of the user concerning
the video quality she wishes to obtain and her preferred level of contribution to the
network (Q12.). The decision of the user, concerning the video quality she receives as
well as her transmit power for forwarding the video, is determined via utility function
maximization. An incentive mechanism is proposed by which the contributing users are
paid based on the energy they consume for forwarding the video. Further, a taxation
mechanism is proposed that captures the impact of the contribution of a user for the
network and pays the user accordingly (Q13.). The optimum tax rate is discussed and
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it is shown that the proposed incentive and taxation mechanisms improve the video
quality perceived by the users while preserving the network energy efficiency.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and discusses the open problems.
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Chapter 2
Overview of game theory
2.1 Introduction
Game theory models and studies the interactions among self-interested entities with a
set of mathematical tools. The entities are independent and each aims to maximize
its own benefit in a competitive environment. Competition among selfish agents has
been discussed in the field of economics long before the modern game theory, for
instance, Cournot [Cou38] and Bertrand [Ber83] introduced models for finding the
strategy of firms in duopoly markets. Game theory, as a mathematical discipline,
was formally introduced by John von Neumann in his paper titled ”Zur Theorie der
Gesellschaftsspiele” in 1928 [vN28] and later in the book with Morgenstern titled
”Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” published in 1944 [vNM44].
During the past decade, there has been significant growth in employing game theory
for tackling the problems related to communication networks. This is mainly due to
the importance of multi-user networks and distributed control for future generations
of communication networks. In this chapter, we review game theory and present the
relevant definitions an the results that we use throughout this dissertation. Classically,
game theory is divided into two categories of non-cooperative and cooperative games.
In Section 2.2, we formally introduce the categories of games, their components and the
mathematical techniques used for their analysis. We first start with non-cooperative
games in Section 2.2.1. Then, we present the cooperative game in Section 2.2.2. We
summarize the important aspects of cooperative game theory which will be used later
in this dissertation. Then, in Section 2.3.2, we specifically focus on non-cooperative
cost sharing games, as the main class of games which will be used in our work, and
discuss their properties in more details.
2.2 Categories of games
2.2.1 Non-cooperative games
Non-cooperative games, also known as a strategic games, are characterized by:
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 A finite set P = {1, . . . , N} of players.
 An action set Ai for each player i ∈ P .
Let ai ∈ Ai be the action, or strategy, of player i. Then, the action profile of the
game is shown by a = (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A in which A = A1 × · · · ×AN is the joint
action set of the game. The action profile of the game can also be denoted by
a = (ai,a−i) in which a−i represents the actions of all the players except player
i.
 A utility function ui that assigns a real value to player i ∈ P depending on the
action profile of the game as ui(ai,a−i) : A → R.
The non-cooperative game is then formally shown by the tuple G :=
(P , (Ai)i∈P , (ui)i∈P). The game is called finite if Ai is finite for all i ∈ P .
Definition 2.1. (Best response function): The set valued function Bi(a−i) is
called the best response function of player i and defined as [OR94]
Bi(a−i) :=
{
ai ∈ Ai
∣∣∣ui(ai,a−i) ≥ ui(a′i,a−i),∀a′i ∈ Ai} . (2.1)
As the name suggests, the best response function finds the best action that player i
can take given the actions of the other players, i.e., a−i. Based on the definition of
the best response function in (2.1), a player of the game deterministically chooses an
action among its action set. This also called a pure strategy game. In contrast, in a
mixed strategy game, the players randomly choose their action.
Definition 2.2. (Mixed strategies): Given a (pure strategy) non-cooperative
game G := (P , (Ai)i∈P , (ui)i∈P), a mixed strategy game is defined by the tuple
G := (P , (Σi(Ai))i∈P , (u˜i)i∈P) in which Σi(Ai) := {σi(ai)|ai ∈ Ai} is a probability
distribution of player i over its action set Ai with
∑
ai∈Ai σi(ai) = 1. The joint
mixed strategy set of the game that indicates the space of the game is defined as
Σ = Σ1×· · ·×ΣN . The mixed strategy profile of the game is shown by σ = (σ1, . . . , σN).
Further, the expected utility u˜i of player i defined as [OR94]
u˜i(σ) =
∑
a∈A
ui(a)
(∏
j∈P
σj(aj)
)
. (2.2)
Clearly, a pure strategy game is a special case of a mixed-strategy game in which the
probability of choosing one of the actions in ai ∈ Ai is equal to 1. Throughout this
dissertation, we merely focus on pure strategies.
One of the most widely-used solution concepts in game theory, used for analysis of the
game and prediction of player’s behavior is the Nash equilibrium (NE).
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Definition 2.3. (Nash equilibrium (NE)): An action profile a∗ ∈ A is an (a
pure) NE of the game G if
ui(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai,a∗−i), ∀i ∈ P , ai ∈ Ai. (2.3)
Given the definition of the best response function in (2.1), an NE, defined in Definition
2.3, can also be seen as a fixed-point of the best-response function. More precisely, an
action profile a∗ ∈ A is an NE for which a∗i = Bi(a∗−i),∀i ∈ P [OR94].
Roughly speaking, an NE is an action profile a∗ for which none of the players has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from the action profile a∗, given the actions of other
players. Note that there may exist another action profile, say a′, resulting in a higher
utility for player i, that is, ui(a
′) > ui(a∗), but moving from the action profile a∗ to
a′ needs more than one player to change their actions. This is in contradiction to the
definition of non-cooperative games in which the players take their action independently
and selfishly. Hence, given a∗−i, player i must stick to action a
∗
i in order to prevent
her loss. Since, based on Definition 2.3, this situation holds for all the players, nobody
can unilaterally deviate from a∗ to improve her utility. John Nash1 was the first who
introduced such a notion as an equilibrium point in a non-cooperative game, and stated
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. (Existence of NE): Every finite non-cooperative game has at least
one (mixed-strategy) NE [Nas50].
Remark 2.1. Although according to Theorem 2.1, the existence of a mixed-strategy NE
is guaranteed in any finite game, the existence of a pure NE depends on the properties
of the game and needs to be investigated as a crucial question.
A non-cooperative game can either be played as a one-shot game, also known as a
stage game, or a repeated game. In a one-shot game, the players can take actions
either simultaneously or iteratively, depending on the design of the game. As the
names suggest, in simultaneous games, the players know the action set of other players
along with the utilities corresponding to each action profile in advance. In fact, the
full information of the game is available for the players and the players have to take
one action (in a pure strategy game), out of their action set, simultaneously. The
prisoners dilemma is a well-known example of a one-shot simultaneous game [OR94].
In contrast, in an iterative games, also known as a dynamic games, the players take
1He won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1994 for his contributions to the
analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games.
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actions one after another by observing the previous actions taken by the other players.
In such games, a common approach for the players is to employ the best-response
dynamics that we will discuss in Section 2.2.1.2. Unlike for the one-shot games, in a
repeated game, the game will be played among the players for more than one round.
The game in a single stage of a repeated game could be either one-shot or iterative.
The analysis of repeated games is different from one-shot games. When the game is
repeated multiple times, the best action in a one-shot game may not be the best move
in the long run.
2.2.1.1 Potential games
The concept of potential games was first introduced by Monderer and Shapley in
their seminal paper [MS96]. In potential games, the strategy of the players and the
outcome of the game can be analyzed and predicted using a global function, called the
potential function. Such property makes potential games a strong tool for distributed
optimization [MW13a], resource allocation [ME12] and mechanism design [MASW+15].
Definition 2.4. (Potential game): A game G is an exact (finite) potential game
[MS96] if there exists a (finite) real-valued function Φ : A → R, called the potential
function, such that for every i ∈ P, ai, a′i ∈ Ai,
ui(a
′
i,a−i)− ui(ai,a−i) = Φ(a′i,a−i)− Φ(ai,a−i). (2.4)
Φ(a′i,a−i) can also be denoted by Φ(a).
Theorem 2.2. Every potential game has at least one pure NE.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify this theorem. As shown in in Fig. 2.1, let A be the
(continuous) action space and Φ(a) be the potential function value of a ∈ A. Further,
let a∗ = argmaxa∈AΦ(a) be the point that maximizes the potential function. Suppose
that a∗ is not an NE. Then, there exists at least one player who can deviate from
a∗ to increase its utility. Based on the definition of potential games, such a deviation
increases the potential function as well. This is in contradiction to our first assumption
that a∗ maximizes the potential function. Note that the point that maximizes the
potential function could also be a local optimum.
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Figure 2.1. The value of a potential function for two different action profiles. The
action space in this figure is assumed to be continuous.
2.2.1.2 Best-response dynamics
Although potential games answer to a key question in game theory, that is, the existence
of a pure NE for the game, another important question that needs to be answered here
is how one can find an NE.
Definition 2.5. (Best-response dynamics): The best-response dynamics, also
known as finite improvement path, is a strategy of playing a game in which every player
iteratively best-responds to the action taken by other players as [Rou16]
a∗i = argmax
ai∈Ai
ui(a,a−i). (2.5)
Proposition 2.1. In every potential game, the best-response dynamics converges to
the NE [Rou16].
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof given for Theorem 2.2. The players iteratively
update their action, and each action increases the potential function. Since the
potential function is finite, this process stops at an action profile which is an NE.
2.2.1.3 Performance measures
In a game with multiple NEs, the quality of each NE may differ in terms of the value
they provide for the players. One of the common measures for quantifying the quality
of an NE is the so-called social welfare.
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Definition 2.6. (Social welfare): The social-welfare of a non-cooperative game G
is defined as
SW(G) =
1
N
∑
i∈P
ui(ai,a−i). (2.6)
The social welfare, in general, is a function of the utilities of the players in the game.
It can also be defined without normalization in (2.6) as SW(G) =
∑
i∈P ui(ai,a−i) or
even SW(G) = mini∈P ui(ai,a−i) [SLB08]. In the latter case, the performance of the
game is measured via the minimum utility experienced by the players of the game at
an NE.
When the objective in the game is cost minimization, rather than utility maximization,
the social cost is used as the measure, defined similarly to the social welfare.
Definition 2.7. (Social cost): Denoting by ci(ai,a−i) the cost of player i in the
game, the social cost is defined as
SC(G) =
1
N
∑
i∈P
ci(ai,a−i). (2.7)
As stated earlier, the NEs may have different qualities concerning the value they bring
for the players. This is also the case in potential games. Although in such games the
best-response dynamics is guaranteed to reach an NE, the quality of the NE reached by
the best-response dynamics may heavily depend on the starting point (starting action
profile) of the game. More precisely, as shown in Fig. 2.1, depending on the initial
a ∈ A and its corresponding Φ(a), improvement of Φ(a) may lead to a different (local)
maximum and consequently, result in a different a∗. To evaluate the efficiency of an
NE, the price of anarchy (POA) and the price of stability (PoS) are used as measures.
Definition 2.8. (POA and PoS): Let E(G) be the set of NEs of the game G and G
denote the set of all possible games G. Let f(a) be the objective function of the game
and OPTmax represents its maximum value. The PoA and the PoS of the game G are
defined, respectively, as [SLB08]
PoA(G) := inf
G∈G
OPTmaxa∈A f(a)
mina∈E(G) f(a)
. (2.8)
and
PoS(G) := inf
G∈G
OPTmaxa∈A f(a)
maxa∈E(G) f(a)
, (2.9)
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A common choice for f(a) is the social welfare or the social cost function defined in
Definition 2.6. When the objective in the game is to minimize the cost function f , the
PoA, and the PoS are defined as
PoA(G) := sup
G∈G
maxa∈E(G) f(a)
OPTmina∈A f(a)
, (2.10)
and
PoS(G) := sup
G∈G
mina∈E(G) f(a)
OPTmina∈A f(a)
, (2.11)
respectively.
2.2.2 Cooperative games
2.2.2.1 Definition
In cooperative games, also known as coalitional games, the players of the game can
join together in order to form a coalition. Unlike for the non-cooperative game that
focuses on the actions that result in an equilibrium, in cooperative games, the goal
is to find the combinations of the users who benefit by forming a coalition, given the
payoff (or utility) assigned to them in the coalition they form. The payoff of a player
in a coalition is determined by a payoff allocation scheme which is a share of the value
generated by the coalition. An important point here is that in both cooperative and
non-cooperative games, the players are independent and self-interested, and decide
rationally to maximizes their own utility.
In a cooperative game, the coalition formed by all the players of the game is called
the grand coalition of the game [SLB08]. Clearly, a grand coalition is formed if all
the players of the game are better-off by joining together. If one of the players of the
game refuses to join the grand coalition, then it is called that the grand coalition of the
game is not stable. Classically, in cooperative games, the central question is how to
share the generated value in order to have a stable grand coalition, rather than what
coalitions S ⊆ P will be stable [SLB08]. The cooperative games that focus on the
former problem are also known as canonical cooperative games [SHD+09].
A cooperative game is characterized by
 A finite set P = {1, . . . , N} of players.
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 A value function that shows the value generated by the coalition S ⊆ P , denoted
by v(S).
A cooperative game is formally shown by the tuple (P , v) and the payoff of player i in
coalition P is denoted by ψi(P , v).
2.2.2.2 The core
A critical problem in cooperative games is how the value generated by a coalition has
to be shared among the members. In fact, one has to find the properties that a payoff
allocation scheme needs to satisfy in order to guarantee a stable grand coalition. The
answer is that the grand coalition is stable if the payoff allocation is in the core of the
cooperative game. The core is defined as follows:
Definition 2.9. (Core): Let xi be the payoff allocated to player i in the grand
coalition and v({i}) denote the value generated by a single player i if it does not join
any coalition. The payoff allocation x ∈ RN lies in the core of a cooperative game
(P , v) if and only if it satisfies the following conditions [SLB08]
• Efficiency: ∑i∈P xi = v(P) (2.12)
• Group rationality: ∀S ⊆ P ,∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S). (2.13)
Roughly speaking, a payoff allocation results in a stable grand coalition if (i) it shares
the whole generated value among its members, and (ii) given a sub-coalition S ⊆ P ,
the aggregated payoff allocated to the members of S in the grand coalition must not
be less than the value generated by the sub-coalition out of the grand coalition.
Note that the group rationality condition in (2.13) also includes the individual
rationality, meaning that the allocated payoff to a single player must not be less that
the value that the player can generate alone, i.e., ∀i ∈ P , xi ≥ v({i}).
Remark 2.2. The notion of core is analogues to the notion of NE from non-cooperative
games.
Both NE and core concepts describe the situations in which none of the players is
better off by deviating from the equilibrium or leaving the coalition, respectively. One
can even conclude that the notion of the core is stronger than the notion of NE. An
NE guarantees the stability of a game with respect to a single player. This means that
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there is no single player who can unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium and benefit
from such an action. Instead, the core states that there is no incentive for leaving the
grand coalition not only for a single player, but also for any arbitrary coalition of the
players S ⊆ P [SLB08].
The core of the game is actually obtained by solving the linear feasibility problem
using the constraints in (2.12) and (2.13). A linear feasibility problem is a linear
optimization problem in which the objective is not important. It focuses merely on
finding the feasible region of the problem given the constraints. Note that, depending
on the constraints, the feasible region of a cooperative game may be empty.
Remark 2.3. A cooperative game may have an empty core.
Similar to a non-cooperative game that may not possess a pure NE, a cooperative
game may also have an empty core. The non-emptyness of a cooperative game has
to be verified. Further, not every payoff allocation scheme falls inside the core of a
cooperative game. There are various ways for payoff allocation in cooperative games, for
instance equal-share [SLB08], the Shapley value [Sha53], Nucleolus allocation [Sch69],
Egalitarian allocation [PS78], etc. In the next section we will take a closer look at the
Shapley value as we will use it in the rest of this dissertation for our game-theoretic
algorithm design.
2.2.2.3 Shapley value
The Shapley value (SV) was first introduced by Loyd Shapley2 in 1953 [Sha53]. It is
one of the most prominent approaches for payoff allocation in cooperative games.
Definition 2.10. According to the SV, the payoff allocation to player i in coalition P
is calculated by
xi := ψi(P , v) =
∑
S⊆P\{i}
|S|! (|P| − |S| − 1)!
|P|! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)). (2.14)
Roughly speaking, the SV of a player is the average of her marginal contribution to all
sub-coalitions S ⊆ P when player i is not a member of S. The SV in (2.14) is equivalent
to the following: Let o := (i1, . . . , ik−1, ik, . . . iN) be an ordering (permutation) based
2He won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2012 for his contributions to the theory
of stable allocations and the practice of market design.
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Table 2.1. Calculating the SV of the players in the grand coalition of the Example 2.1.
o v˜o({1}) v˜o({2}) v˜o({3})
1,2,3 2 5 3
1,3,2 2 4 4
2,1,3 4 3 3
2,3,1 1 3 6
3,1,2 3 4 3
3,2,1 1 6 3
xi : 2.17 4.17 3.66
on which the players in P join the coalition. We define the contribution of player i
who has the k-th position in the ordering o as
v˜o(ik) = v({i1, . . . , ik−1, ik})− v({i1, . . . , ik−1}). (2.15)
In other words, v˜o(ik) finds the marginal contribution of player ik to the coalition
formed by the players who join the coalition prior to player ik given the ordering o.
Let O be the set of all orderings with |O| = N !. Then the SV of player i in (2.14) is
equivalent to [Mad08]
xi =
1
N !
∑
O
v˜o(i), o ∈ O. (2.16)
Illustrative Example 2.1. Suppose that a coalition is formed by P = {1, 2, 3}. The
value generated by each of the individual players and different sub-coalitions are given
by: v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 3, v({3}) = 3, v({1, 2}) = 7, v({1, 3}) = 6, v({2, 3}) = 9,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 10. We find the SV of each of the players using (2.16). All the possible
orders by which the players can join together and form the grand coalition are gathered
in Table 2.1. In this table, the first column represents the order of joining the coalition
by the players 1, 2 and 3. The columns on the right side show the contribution of each
player to the coalition according to the ordering o. The last row takes an average over
the contributions of each player based on (2.16).
2.2.2.4 Fairness
The main question that the concept of the core answers is the characterization of payoff
vectors that lead to a stable grand coalition. Such a payoff allocation is not unique.
The question that arises here is how fair is the allocated payoff. A payoff allocation
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vector is fair if it satisfies the axioms of fairness. Before introducing the axioms of
fairness, we present the following definitions [SLB08].
Definition 2.11. (Interchangeable Players): Players i and j are interchangeable if
they contribute the same amount to every coalition S ⊆ P\{i, j}. That is, v(S∪{i}) =
v(S ∪ {j}).
Definition 2.12. (Dummy player): A player i is dummy if it does not contribute to
any coalition. In other words, the value generated by a dummy player alone is equal to
the value generated by every coalition S that the player joins, i.e., v(S ∪{i}) = v({i}).
We now define the axioms of fairness in payoff allocation.
Definition 2.13. (Axioms of fairness): In a cooperative game (P , v), the payoff
allocation x ∈ RN is fair if it satisfies the following axioms [SLB08]:
 Symmetry: If players i and j are interchangeable, then xi = xj for any v.
 Dummy player: If player i is a dummy player, then xi = v({i}).
 Additivity: Let v1 and v2 be two value functions and v1(S) and v2(S) be the value
of coalition S ⊆ P. The payoff allocation scheme is additive if ψi(P , (v1 + v2)) =
ψi(P , v1)+ψi(P , v2) in which the characteristic function v1 +v2 on the set S ⊆ P
is defined by (v1 + v2)(S) = v1(S) + v2(S).
Theorem 2.3. The SV is the only payoff allocation scheme that satisfies the axioms
of fairness, defined in Definition 2.13 [OR94].
Finally, note that, even if the SV provides a fair approach in allocating the value of
a coalition, it does not address the stability of the coalition. To have a stable grand
coalition, the payoff allocation must be in the core which, in general, is not the case
with the SV.
2.3 Non-cooperative cost sharing games
2.3.1 Introduction
A new class of games within the category of non-cooperative games, called
non-cooperative cost sharing games or simply cost sharing games, has attracted
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significant attentions during the past decade due to its applications in distributed
control [KM06], distributed optimization [LM13], mechanism design [Rou16] and
network formation [vTW07]. The term cost sharing here comes from the specific
setup of the game. In cost sharing games, the players are to choose a resource from
the set of resources available to them. A resource could be a road, a public good,
an internet service provider, etc. Since the players who share a common resource
will impose a cost on resource providers, the cost of using the resource is shared
among the players who choose the same resource. Cost sharing games have elements
from both non-cooperative and cooperative games. Similar to the definition of a
non-cooperative game, a (non-cooperative) cost sharing game is defined by a tuple
G := (P , (Ai)i∈P , (ci)i∈P) in which ci is the cost of player i. While the game is
non-cooperative, the cost sharing scheme c is defined similarly to the payoff allocation
from the cooperative games. In fact, based on the decision of the players, a cost is
shared among the players who take the same action depending on the value that those
players generate. Here, the goal of the players is to minimize their own cost by joining
the best coalition given the cost sharing scheme. The solution concept from cooperative
games, like the core, is not applicable here, and instead, the concept of NE is commonly
used in this context.
The difference between the cooperative games and the cost sharing games is interpreted
as follows. As shown in Fig. 2.2.(a), in a cooperative game, each player is assumed
to generate a value even if she does not join any coalition. In such games, we study
the conditions (payoff allocation schemes) that provide incentives for all the players
to join together and form the grand coalition. In contrast, a cost sharing game is a
non-cooperative game. In cost sharing games, the players who take the same action
are treated as a grand coalition although they may be a subset of the set of players.
For instance, players 2 and 3 in in Fig. 2.2.(b). A cost sharing scheme shares the
cost among the players according to the cost imposed on the resource provider by
the players who choose the same resource. In other words, in cooperative games, the
decision of a player i is either to choose the grand coalition or opt-out and generate its
fixed value alone, that is, Ai = {∅,P}. In a cost sharing game, in contrast, a player i
has to choose one of the resources out of the set of available resources D, i.e., Ai ⊆ 2D.
Note that, in both cooperative and cost sharing games, the actions of the players are
assumed to be discrete.
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1 v({1})
v({2}) v({3})
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(a) Cooperative game
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(b) Non-cooperateive cost sharing
game
Figure 2.2. Difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative cost sharing games.
2.3.2 Cost sharing for multicast transmission
2.3.2.1 Definition
Let p(P) be the price of using a resource by coalition P = {1, . . . , N}, defined as
p(P) = max
i∈P
p({i}), (2.17)
in which p({i}) is the price of using the resource when a single player i uses it, called
the singleton price of player i. Note that the price function here is equivalent to the
value function from cooperative games.
The multicast transmit power of a wireless transmitter satisfies the property of the
function in (2.17). In a unicast transmission, the transmit power of the transmitting
node is equal to power required for serving the single receiver, that is the singleton price
p({i}). In a multicast transmission, the transmit power of a transmitter is equivalent
to the maximum of the powers required for serving every individual receiver. In order
words, as shown in Fig. 2.2.(a), the unicast and the multicast transmit powers are,
respectively, equivalent to the singleton and the grand coalition values of a cooperative
game with one resource in which the value function is determined by (2.17).
2.3.2.2 Cost sharing schemes
In this section, we present a few cost sharing schemes that can be used for finding
the cost share of each user i ∈ P in using a resource under the assumption in (2.17)
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[SA11,GMW14]. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the singleton prices for
using the resource can be sorted as
p({1}) ≤ p({2}) ≤ · · · ≤ p({N}). (2.18)
 Equal-share (ES): The ES simply splits the price among the players, that is,
cESi = p({N})/N ∀i ∈ P . (2.19)
 Highest cost allocation (HC): With the HC, the player with the highest
singleton price pays the whole price of using the resource while the others pay
nothing, i.e.,
cHCi =
{
p({N}) i = N
0 otherwise.
(2.20)
 Incremental cost allocation (IC): With the IC, every player is assigned the
marginal contribution she has over the player who appears before her in the list
given in (2.18). That is,
cICi = p({i})− p({i− 1}), ∀i ∈ P , p({0}) = 0. (2.21)
 Marginal contribution (MC) Using the MC, the cost of all the players is zero
expect the one who has the highest singleton price as
cMCi =
{
p({N})− p({N − 1}) i = N
0 otherwise.
(2.22)
 Shapley value (SV): With the assumption of (2.17), the SV of a player is given
by [LO73]
cSVi =
i∑
n=1
p({n})− p({n− 1})
N + 1− n . (2.23)
Remark 2.4. The MC scheme in (2.22) is equivalent to
cMCi = p(P)− p(P\{i}) ∀i ∈ P (2.24)
meaning that the cost share of player i is the difference in the generated price with and
without player i in P.
2.3 Non-cooperative cost sharing games 31
2.3.2.3 Relevant definitions and results
In this section, we presents the important definitions and results that we use later in
this dissertation.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that singleton price of all the players in P is equal to p. Then,
the SV acts similar to the ES and assigns an equal cost to every player i ∈ P.
Proof. We use (2.16) to prove. When p({i}) = p, ∀i ∈ P , a player i has a positive
contribution if it joins the coalition as the first member. In such a case, the total
number of permutations by which the other players can join the grand coalition is
(N − 1)!. This means that a player i ∈ P has a positive contribution equal to p for
(N − 1)! times and zero contribution for the rest of the cases. Then, according to
(2.16), her cost is given by
cSVi =
1
N !
((N − 1)!p) = p/N = cESi ∀i ∈ P . (2.25)
Definition 2.14. (Budget-balanced cost sharing scheme): A cost sharing
scheme is budget-balanced if the summation of the costs allocated to the players is
equal to the price of using the resource, i.e., if∑
i∈P
cBBi = p(P). (2.26)
Remark 2.5. The notion of budget-balancedness of a cost sharing scheme is equivalent
to the notion of efficiency of a payoff allocation scheme from cooperative games defined
in (2.12).
Remark 2.6. The cost sharing schemes introduced in this section are all
budget-balanced except for the MC. Although the MC is not budget-balanced, we will
show the benefits of using it in Chapter 4. It should also be noted that the HC and the
MC may not be a true cost sharing scheme as they do not share the cost among the
players. This case is even worse with the MC as it may allocate zero cost to all the
players. The term cost allocation scheme may describe them better, however, for the
sake of consistency we refer to all of them as cost sharing schemes. ES and SV are
two of the widely-adopted budget-balanced schemes in the field of CSGs and are known
to be fair depending on the application [ADK+04, MMAS+16].
Definition 2.15. (Cross-monotonicity): A cost sharing scheme c is
cross-monotone if
ci(S ∪ {k}) ≤ ci(S) ∀k ∈ P\S. (2.27)
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In other words, a cost sharing scheme is cross-monotone if the costs of the players who
are in a coalition do not increase if the size of the coalition expands.
Observation 2.1. All the cost sharing schemes discussed in Section 2.3.2.2 are
cross-monotone.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the MC, the HC, and the IC are cross-monotone.
The SV is also cross-monotone. Let i ∈ S. If a node k joins S, then, the denominator
of (2.23) reduces as the number of players increases from |S| to |S| + 1. Further, the
nominator of (2.23) in this case either decreases or remains unchanged. It decreases
if pi−1,r < pk,r ≤ pi,r and remains unchanged otherwise. In both cases, the cost of the
players in S decreases when the number of players using the resource expands. This
means that the SV is a cross-monotone function.
The ES is not cross monotone. Suppose P = {1} and p1,r = 1. Then, cES1 (P) = 1.
Now assume that player 2 joins the coalition with p2,r = 3. The cost of player 1 in the
new coalition, according to the price function in (2.17) and the ES cost sharing scheme
in (2.19), increases as
cES1 (P ∪ {2}) = max{3, 1}/2 = 1.5 > cES1 (P) = 1. (2.28)
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System and network models
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the system and the network models that we consider in this dissertation
will be introduced. We start by introducing the multicast transmission in wireless
networks in Section 3.2. Then, we express the conditions required to construct a BT
and finally, formulate the MPBT problem. In Section 3.3 we propose a MAC scheme to
be used by the nodes for decentralized construction of the BT. Parts of this model have
been published by the author of this dissertation in [MASW+15,MASL+15,MAHK16].
Here in this section we describe the basic system model. In the next chapters, we will
extend the system model where needed.
3.2 Transmission model and network power
In this section, we introduce the main properties of the system model that we use
during the rest of this dissertation. We first start by modeling the transmit power
of the nodes. We present a model that captures both powers required for radio link
and circuitry power at a transmitting node for a successful transmission. The MPBT
problem will also be formally defined.
In this dissertation, we consider a network composed of N + 1 wireless nodes with
random locations in a two-dimensional plane; a source S and a set P of N receiving
nodes. The nodes in P are interested in receiving the source’s message. We denote the
set of all the nodes of the network by Q = P ∪ {S}. Every node is equipped with an
omnidirectional antenna and has a transmit power constraint pmaxj , j ∈ Q, and hence,
its coverage area is limited. In a transmission from a transmitting node j ∈ Q to a
receiving node i ∈ P , nodes j and i are called the PN and the CN, respectively. The
transmitting nodes transmit either by multicast or unicast. It should be remarked
that, although the antenna broadcasts the message omnidirectionally, we refer to the
transmission as unicast or multicast, when a PN has one or more than one intended
receivers as its CNs, respectively. As stated in Chapter 1, the transmission flow from a
source to the receiving nodes of the network forms a tree-graph called the BT. In this
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Figure 3.1. A sample network and BT. The solid arrows show the transmission from
PNs to CNs and the dashed arrow represents a possible link that can be established
for CN i if it chooses PN k.
DSP, DAC, ... 
modules Amplifier
Figure 3.2. Structure of transmission modules in a transmitter.
chapter, we assume that in a BT, every node has one PN, but a PN may have one or
more than one CN in case of unicast or multicast transmission, respectively. The set
of CNs of PN j is denoted by Mj and the number of CNs of a PN is denoted by Mj.
Fig. 3.1 shows an instance of a BT. In this network, some of the nodes of the network
act as PN. Note that every node, except the source, is a CN in this network as it will
be assigned to a PN. For instance, in Fig. 3.1 node j is a PN of node i while it is a
CN of node S too. If a node j ∈ P does not forward the message of the source to any
other node, then, Mj = ∅.
A general structure of the transmission modules in a wireless transmitter is shown in
Fig. 3.2. The total power required at a transmitting node consists of two main parts.
The first part is the power required for the modules that mainly prepare the signal
for transmission, such as, base-band signal processing (DSP) unit, DAC and power
amplifier [CGB05]. We refer to the power required for these modules as the circuitry
power of the node required for transmission and denote it by pctj ,∀j ∈ Q. The second
part is the power that has to be spent by a transmitter to amplify the signal, referred to
as the transmit power of a node. As mentioned before, the circuitry power of a wireless
device is not negligible compared to the transmit power and may even dominate it if
the distance between the transmitter and the receiver is short [CGB05]. Hence, we
assume that every node j ∈ Q has a total power budget of pctj + pmaxj . While the
circuitry power of a transmitter can be assumed as a fixed value, the transmit power
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needed at a transmitting node j for amplifying the signal depends on the channel
quality between the transmitter and its receivers in Mj and thus, it is denoted by
pTxj (Mj) with pTxj (Mj) ≤ pmaxj . The total power required at node j for transmission
to its CNs in Mj is
PTxj (Mj) = pctj + pTxj (Mj). (3.1)
We refer to the PN of CN i as ai such that ai = j, j ∈ Q\{i} and a = (a1, . . . , aN)
represents a vector whose elements are the PNs of each of the nodes in P . For the sake
of notational convenience, we use PTxj (a) instead of P
Tx
j (Mj), when required. Note
that in our model, where every CN has one PN, we omit the circuitry power required
for message reception as it does not affect the energy-efficiency of the network. In other
words, circuitry power required for receiving data, usually a fixed value, is needed at
every node that aims to receive the message from its single PN and this energy does not
depend on the network topology. It should be remarked that the reception circuitry
power will be considered in our model studied in Chapter 5 where a node may have
more than one PN. In fact, as we will show, in such a case the reception circuitry power
of a CN varies depending on the number of PNs that serve it.
The power poutj of the signal emitted from the antenna of a transmitter j depends on the
efficiency of its power amplifier, denoted by ηj with 0 < ηj < 1, as is given by [WHY06]
poutj = ηjp
Tx
j . (3.2)
For the message reception, a threshold model is considered which means, a minimum
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), denoted by γth, is required at a CN for successful reception
of the message transmitted from its PN. In other words, the bit-error rate is assumed
to be negligible considering γth. Hence, we assume that the statistical properties of the
channel remain invariant during the data transmission. Let gi,j be the average channel
gain between the PN j and the CN i. By treating interference as noise and denoting
their joint power at the receiver i as σ2, the SNR of the signal received by CN i is given
by
γi,j(p
out
j ) =
poutj gi,j
σ2
. (3.3)
Based on the minimum required SNR γth at CN i, and using (3.2) and (3.3), the
transmit power needed at a transmitting node j for transmission to a receiving node i
is given by
pneedi,j =
γthσ2
ηjgi,j
. (3.4)
Notice that pneedi,j takes the efficiency of the power amplifier of the transmitting node
into account.
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Due to the transmit power constraint, a node j ∈ Q can be a PN of node i if the power
required for the link between the nodes j and i is less than pmaxj . The set of neighboring
nodes of node i is denoted by Ni and defined as
Ni =
{
j
j ∈ Q, pneedi,j ≤ pmaxj } . (3.5)
It is assumed that every node knows the channel gains of the links to its neighboring
nodes. We specifically denote the unicast transmit power required for the link between
node j and its neighboring node i by punii,j . In other words, p
uni
i,j = p
need
i,j , if j ∈ Ni, see
Fig. 3.1. The transmit power of a PN j is calcualted by
pTxj (Mj) = max
i∈Mj
{
punii,j
}
. (3.6)
Considering the circuitry power of PN j, the total power required for a unicast
transmission at PN j is
P unii,j = p
ct
j + p
uni
i,j . (3.7)
In case of multicast transmission, where a parent node j has multiple CNs, the total
required power at a PN j in (3.1) is given by
PTxj (a) = P
Tx
j (Mj) =
{
pctj + p
Tx
i,j (Mj) = max
i∈Mj
{
P unii,j
}
if Mj 6= ∅
0 if Mj = ∅
. (3.8)
Observation 3.1. Since the multicast transmit power in (3.8) is determined by the
highest required unicast power, it holds the property of the function p in (2.17) discussed
in Section 2.3.2.
Finally, the total required transmit power in the network for message dissemination
among all the nodes, simply termed the network transmit power, is calculated by
PTxnet(a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a). (3.9)
It should be remarked that the message flow from the source to the nodes must result
in a tree-graph, rooted at the source without any cycle. When a cycle occurs in a
graph, a part of the network loses its connections to S. We define the route of a node
as the set of the nodes which are on the route from S to node i, including node i, and
denote it by Ri. For instance, Rw = {S, k, u, w} for the BT given in Fig. 3.1. The
route of S is set to RS = {S}. If node i chooses PN j, Ri can be simply found as
Ri = Rj ∪ {i}. (3.10)
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... ...
Scheduled access
CN
PN CN
...
Random access
Time-slots
1 2 3 4 5
Guard/Proccessing interval
Channel access interval
Figure 3.3. Channel access scheme.
The network-wide objective, which is also referred to as the global objective, is to
minimize the network power defined in (3.9) such that every receiving node in W
receives the source’s message from a node j ∈ Q\{i} and has the source in its route as
minimize
{Mj}∀j∈Q
∑
j∈Q P
Tx
j (Mj) (3.11)
subject to: ∀i ∈ P ∃!j ∈ Q\{i} : i ∈Mj, S ∈ Rj .
Since every node i ∈ W is allowed to choose one PN and the source must be in the
route of the PN, i.e., S ∈ Rj, the constraints above results in a tree-graph.
3.3 Medium access control
Since the channel in this network is shared among the users, a proper MAC protocol
needs to be run in the network to provide access for every node. In our work, any
decentralized channel access scheme suitable for multi-hop communications can be
employed. For instance, a single, time-slotted channel can be used that consists of two
sections, the first section as random access and the second section as scheduled access.
The first section is contention-based and used for signaling message exchanges while
the transmissions by the PNs are carried out during the scheduled access section. Such
a model has been studied and adopted by standards during the past years [ROGLA06,
TSMW15,3GP10].
Fig. 3.3 shows a model for channel access. In this model, the random access channel
(RACH) phase, i.e., the first phase, is divided into several time-slots, each divided into
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five main intervals. Let us assume that a node i decides to access the channel in the
random access phase in time-slot s. Node i sends its request to node j in the first
interval of time-slot s, shown by 1 . In 2 , node j, as a PN, reserves a time-slot
for its transmission in the scheduled section. Then, in 3 it broadcasts a message to
inform its neighboring nodes about the reserved time-slot in the scheduled section as
well as other information which is required for the algorithm to run. The required
information depends on the cost sharing scheme used in the network which we discuss
in the next section. In the interval 4 , the CN i informs its neighboring nodes about
its new PN. Finally, 5 is a guard interval which can also be used for other nodes to
process the information they receive in 3 and 4 from the nodes i and j. Clearly, if
node j had already been chosen as a PN by other nodes, it does not require to reserve
a new time-slot.
In our model, a node accesses the channel at most once in a RACH phase. The random
access section is prone to collision, and a collision occurs if two or more nodes use the
same time-slot in the RACH phase for sending their requests. In this case, the nodes
have to retry accessing the channel in the next round of the RACH phase. The collision
probability depends on the number of nodes, the number of slots in a RACH phase and
the frequency of access. It will be shown in the next chapter that, by a proper design of
the MAC mechanism, one can keep the average number of nodes which face a collision
significantly low. It is important to remark that in this dissertation, we do not focus
on random channel access optimization. Moreover, to have a fair comparison with
the existing works, through the rest of this dissertation we abstract from the collision
probability and measure the performance of our new scheme separately. We assume
that the possible collisions impact the performance of our work and the existing works
in a comparable way. Indeed, in this work, given a random channel access method for
multi-hop networks, we propose a decentralized algorithm that finds an energy-efficient
BT for data dissemination during the scheduled access section.
Since such a channel access scheme requires time synchronization at the nodes, it is
common to use the clock of the source as a reference clock. The synchronization can
be done via a dedicated time-slot in a hop by hop manner from the source toward the
leaves of the BT [WCS11]. We assume that synchronization in the network is attained.
It should also be noted that, although the signaling messages impose additional energy
consumption on the network, we assume that the imposed energy is negligible compared
to that required for the actual data dissemination.
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Energy-efficient multi-hop broadcast:
Single transmitter per user
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a novel decentralized approach for BT construction in
wireless networks. Given the system model that we discussed in the previous chapter,
in this chapter, we propose an algorithm based on a cost sharing game for the MPBT
problem. Parts of this chapter have been originally published by the author in
[MASW+15,KLM+15,MASK19]. In Section 4.2, we first introduce our game-theoretic
model for the problem and the components of the game. We propose using MC for
the MPBT problem and will show that it performs the best in comparison to the SV
and the ES. For UCNs where the fairness is important, we employ SV and ES as
budget-balanced cost sharing schemes. A budget-balanced cost sharing scheme is fair
from a transmitter point of view, however, the way the cost of transmission is shared
among the receivers is also critical. We will show that not only the SV is fair, both from
the transmitter and the receivers’ perspectives, but also unlike ES it always results in
convergence to NE.
The model that we propose takes the circuitry power of the transmitting nodes into
account in addition to the power required for the signal amplification. As we will
show, such a model results in a significant improvement over the existing approaches.
In Section 4.2.2, we discuss the properties of our proposed cost sharing scheme in
comparison to the ES and the SV schemes, discussed in Section 2.3.2.2, in terms
of the convergence of the game to an NE, the overhead information required for
implementation, etc.
The performance bounds of the game will be discussed in Section 4.2.3 concerning the
PoS and the PoA, which were introduced in Section 2.2.1.3. Implementation notes and
how the algorithm has to be run in practice will be addressed in Section 4.2.5. Section
4.2.4 evaluates the performance the proposed RACH scheme discussed in Section 3.3.
We show that by a proper design, the probability of collision in the network can be
kept very low. Section 4.3 provides a centralized model for finding the MPBT based
on a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). The centralized solution with the MILP
serves as a benchmark for our algorithm. In Section 4.4, we provide the simulation
results of our algorithm and finally, Section 4.5 provide a summary of this chapter.
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4.2 Decentralized approach with cost sharing
games
4.2.1 Definition
In this section, we propose a non-cooperative cost sharing game for the MPBT problem.
As stated before, in a decentralized approach for the MPBT problem, every individual
node has to play its own role in forming the BT by establishing a communication link
to another node. Game theory is a suitable mathematical tool to design a framework
within which the nodes can act independently and form the BT. The proposed game
is an iterative (dynamic) game such that at every iteration t, one of the nodes of the
network takes one of its possible actions from its action set. The elements of the game
are as follows:
 Players: A set P = {1, . . . , N} of non-cooperative and rational nodes, that is,
all the nodes in the network except the source.
 Action: Choosing another node j ∈ Q\{i} as a PN. The action of a node i
is denoted by ai ∈ A(t)i in which A(t)i is the action set of player i at iteration
t. The action profile of the game is shown by a = (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A(t) in which
A(t) = A(t)1 × · · · × A(t)N is the joint action set of the game at iteration t.
 Cost function: The cost of a node is obtained based on a cost sharing scheme
defined as ci(ai,a−i) : A(t) → R+ ∪ {0},∀i ∈ P in which R+ represents the
positive real numbers.
The non-cooperative dynamic game GOPN in which the every node chooses one PN for
itself is defined formally by the tuple GOPN := (P , {Ai}i∈P , {ci}i∈P). The total power
required in the network depends on the action profile of the game, i.e., which nodes are
chosen as the PNs. We denote the action profile corresponding to the optimum BT by
aopt. We further show the cost of node i in case of choosing PN j as ci(j,Mj) since the
cost just depends on the set of the nodes who choose the same PN. Moreover, a
i→ a′
denotes an update in the action profile of the game from a to a′ = (a′i,a−i) when node
i updates its action from ai to a
′
i. The game G
OPN is a child-driven game, that is, a
node as a child selects another node in its neighboring area as its PN. The action set of
a node has to be defined in a way to ensure that no cycle occurs in different iterations
of the game. Based on the definition, a cycle occurs in a rooted tree when a node i ∈ P
connects to one of its descendants [Die06]; The descendants of a node j ∈ Q are all the
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nodes who have the node j on their route to S. A cycle occurs if node j chooses one of
its descendants as its PN, for instance in Fig. 3.1, if node k chooses node w as its PN.
Denoting the route of a node j at iteration t by R(t)j , we define the action set of a node
i ∈ P at iteration t as all the neighboring nodes of node i except its descendants as
A(t)i =
{
j
j ∈ Ni, S ∈ R(t−1)j , i /∈ R(t−1)j } (4.1)
in which S ∈ R(t−1)j indicates that node j, in order to be a PN of node i, must be
connected to the BT. For the sake of simplicity, in the rest we omit the time indicator
t in A(t).
In order to benefit from the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, the cost of the
nodes should be defined in a way to motivate the CNs to form a multicast group and
choose a common PN. Moreover, the circuitry power of a transmitting node must also
be considered in the cost model. The cost function in this game is defined based on
the MC principle (cf. Section 2.3.2.2 ) as
cMCi (j,Mj) = Pj(Mj)− Pj(Mj\{i}), i ∈Mj (4.2)
in whichMj\{i} represents the set of CNs of PN j except the CN i. Roughly speaking,
the cost of node i is the difference in the total power required at node j with and without
node i. Based on (4.2), a positive cost is assigned to the CN that requires the highest
unicast transmit power from PN j while the cost assigned to the other CNs in Mj is
zero. The game GOPN with the MC, defined in (4.2), as its cost function is called the
CSG-MC.
To illustrate the cost model in (4.2), let us assume that node i and node l require the
highest and the second highest unicast powers from PN j, respectively, see Fig. 3.1.
In this case, the cost assigned to the CN i using (4.2) is given by
cMCi (j,Mj)= pctj + punii,j −
(
pctj + max
h∈Mj\{i}
{punih,j}
)
= punii,j − punil,j . (4.3)
In this case, either i ∈ Mj or i /∈ Mj, the circuitry power is consumed at PN j as
it must serve the CN l. Therefore, no additional power, here the circuitry power, is
imposed on PN j by CN i and hence, the circuitry power of PN j does not appear in
the cost assigned to the CN i. Moreover, if we assume that the CN i is the only CN
of the PN j, then based on (4.2), the cost of CN i contains the circuitry power of PN
j, i.e., cMCi (j,Mj) = pctj + punii,j , as maxh∈Mj\{i}{punih,j} = 0. In other words, since in a
unicast both transmit and circuitry powers are imposed on the PN j by the CN i, the
circuitry power appears in the cost assigned to the CN i as well as the transmit power.
Therefore, depending on the structure of the BT and the transmission scheme (unicast
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or multicast), the cost model in (4.2) treats the circuitry power intelligently. It keeps
or removes the circuitry power from the cost of receiving nodes to prevent establishing
a new unicast transmission or motivate the nodes to form a multicast receiving group
and reduce the number of transmissions, respectively. Whether joining a multicast
group is better than establishing a unicast connection is decided by the node based on
its cost function.
We employ the best response dynamics (BRD) for game GOPN, cf. Section 2.2.1.2).
The best response of player i, which is also here referred to as the local objective, is
defined as
ai = argmin
j∈Ai
ci(j,Mj), ∀i ∈ P . (4.4)
Finally, we consider the NE as the solution concept of our game, defined in (2.3). When
cost minimization is the objective of the nodes, the NE is defined as
ci(a
∗
i ,a
∗
−i) ≤ ci(ai,a∗−i), ∀i ∈ P , ai ∈ Ai. (4.5)
While with the BRD, only one node is allowed to update its action in a time-slot,
it is possible to enable multiple simultaneous actions per time-slot. In [ZVP+11], a
randomized distributed algorithm is introduced by which the game can be viewed as
a time homogeneous Markov Chain with finite number of states in which each NE
represents an absorbing state. This will ensure convergence to an absorbing state with
probability 1, even with simultaneous updates. Although by such a design the game
converges to an NE, the complexity of the game increases, especially for designing rules
for preventing the occurrence of loop in the BT.
4.2.2 Convergence of the game and discussion
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the game described in the previous
subsection. We first show that the game converges to an NE. Then we discuss the
properties of the game.
Definition 4.1. Let ∆i
a→a′
f := f(a′) − f(a) be the change in the function f when
a
i→ a′. The local objective in (4.4) is said to be aligned with the global objective in
(3.11) if for every i ∈ P , ∆i
a→a′
ci < 0, then, ∆
i
a→a′
PTxnet < 0. They are also said to be
exactly aligned if ∆i
a→a′
ci = ∆
i
a→a′
PTxnet.
4.2 Decentralized approach with cost sharing games 43
Theorem 4.1. The game GOPN with the proposed MC cost sharing scheme is an exact
potential game with the potential function
Φ(a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a). (4.6)
Proof. According to the definition of a potential game in (2.4) and using (4.2) and
(4.6), we have to show that
∆i
a→a′
cMCi (a) = ∆
i
a→a′
Φ(a) (4.7)
in which cMCi (a) and Φ(a) are defined in (4.2) and (4.6), respectively. Let us assume
that ai = j and a
′
i = k and a
i→ a′, see Fig. 3.1. With such a transition, just PN j
and PN k will be affected among the PNs in the network. Thus, the network transmit
power, here the potential function of the game, can be written as
Φ(a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a) = P
Tx
j (Mj) + PTxk (Mk) +
∑
m∈Q\{j,k}
PTxm (Mm). (4.8)
The cost of node i when i ∈Mj is given by
cMCi (j,Mj) = PTxj (Mj)− PTxj (Mj\{i}), (4.9)
and the cost assigned to node i when it joins PN k is
cMCi (k,Mk ∪ {i}) = PTxk (Mk ∪ {i})− PTxk (Mk). (4.10)
The potential function in (4.8) when a′i = k is given by
Φ(a′) = PTxj (Mj\{i}) + PTxk (Mk ∪ {i}) +
∑
m∈Q\{j,k}
PTxm (Mm). (4.11)
Then, using (4.8), (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) we have
∆i
a→a′
Φ(a)= PTxk (Mk ∪ {i})− PTxk (Mk)− PTxj (Mj) + PTxj (Mj\{i})
= ∆i
a→a′
cMCi (a) (4.12)
Hence, given the potential function in (4.6) we always have = ∆i
a→a′
cMCi (a) = ∆
i
a→a′
Φ(a).
Corollary 4.1. If the cost of the nodes is defined based on the MC, the local objective
in the game GOPN is exactly aligned with the global objective defined in (3.11).
Corollary 4.2. The BRD converges to a pure NE for the game GOPN.
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Proof. Since the game GOPN is an exact potential game, it possesses a pure NE [MS96].
When a node updates its action in order to reduce its cost, based on Theorem 4.1 the
same reduction occurs in Φ. As Φ, i.e., the network transmit power, is bounded from
below, after some iterations the game GOPN reaches a state at which none of the nodes
can further reduce its own cost given the action of other nodes.
Remark 4.1. Although reaching an NE in a finite number of iterations is guaranteed
by using BRD, its convergence rate is exponential in the worst case. Nevertheless, the
average convergence rate of the BRD is O(N) [DG16] which is acceptable for practical
scenarios.
Theorem 4.2. Using MC, aopt is always an NE of the game GOPN.
Proof. Recall that aopt is the action profile of the game associated with the optimum
BT. Let us assume that aopt is not an NE. Therefore, based on the definition of NE, at
least one of the nodes of the network can update its action to reach a lower cost. As
shown in Theorem 4.1, reduction in the cost of a node results in the same reduction
of Φ, that is, the network transmit power. This is a contradiction as the BT of aopt is
optimum.
Remark 4.2. Let puni0,j = 0 ≤ puni1,j ≤ · · · ≤ punii,j ≤ · · · ≤ puniMj ,j, be the sorted individual
unicast powers imposed on PN j by its CNs. The cost of the i-th CN based on the SV
(cf. (2.23)) is given by
cSVi (j,Mj) =
i∑
n=1
P unin,j − P unin−1,j
Mj + 1− n . (4.13)
in which P unin,j is defined in (3.7).
Remark 4.3. Given the definition of the ES cost sharing scheme in (2.19), the cost
of a node i in this game is obtained by
cESi (j,Mj) = PTxj (Mj)/Mj, ∀i ∈Mj. (4.14)
Note that cESi (j,Mj) does not necessarily depend on the individual unicast power of
the link from the CN i to its PN j.
Remark 4.4. According to Definition 2.14, a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme in
this game satisfies ∑
i∈Mj
cBBi (j,Mj) = PTxj (Mj) (4.15)
in which cBB(.) denotes a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme like the SV or the ES.
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Figure 4.1. With ES and SV the optimum BT may not be an NE of the game
(Transition a
i→ a′).
Theorem 4.3. For both ES and SV, there exists at least one instance in which aopt is
not an NE.
Proof: We provide an instance in Fig. 4.1 for which the optimum action profile is
not an NE for the ES and the SV. In this instance, using the ES, node i updates
its action from ai = j to a
′
i = k to reduce its cost from (p
c
j + 6)/2 to (p
c
k + 3)/2.
Assuming pcj = p
c
k, this action reduces the cost of node i by 1.5 units while at the
same time, it deviates from the optimum action profile (a) and increases the network
transmit power by 1 unit, that is, from PTxnet(a) = P
Tx
S ({j, k}) + pcj + 6 + pck + 1 to
PTxnet(a
′) = PTxS ({j, k}) + pcj + 5 + pck + 3. Using the SV defined in (4.13) also leads to
the same conclusion as node i reduces its cost from 3.5 to 2.5 by the same action.
Remark 4.5. Although for the instance provided in Fig. 4.1 both the ES and the SV
are not able to reach the optimum configuration, the instances for which aopt is not an
NE may be different ones for the ES and the SV.
We now discuss how can one verify if a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme is not
able to reach the global optimum in general.
Remark 4.6. Let node i change its action from ai = j, ai ∈ a to a′i = k, a′i ∈ a′ under
a given budget-balanced cost sharing scheme cBB. Then, aopt ∈ A cannot be guaranteed
to be an NE for the CBB if one can find a and a′ for which the following holds:
∆i
a→a′
∑
m∈Mk∪Mj\{i}
cBBm > − ∆i
a→a′
cBBi . (4.16)
This can be shown as follows. Using Remark 4.4 and by a summation over all the nodes
j ∈ Q, for a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme one can write∑
j∈Q
∑
i∈Mj
cBBi (j,Mj) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (Mj). (4.17)
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The left side of (4.17) represents the total payment received by the PNs j ∈ Q which is
equal to the cost paid by the CNs i ∈ W, i.e., ∑i∈W cBBi (a). Thus, (4.17) is equivalent
to ∑
i∈W
cBBi (a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a). (4.18)
By expanding the left side of (4.18) and re-arranging it, the cost of node i is given by
cBBi (a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a)−
∑
m∈W\{i}
cBBm (a)
= PTxnet(a)−
∑
m∈W\{i}
cBBm (a) (4.19)
in which PTxnet(a) is defined in (3.9). Since in transition from ai = j to a
′
i = k, only the
PNs j and k and their CNs are affected, then using (4.19) we get
∆i
a→a′
cBBi = ∆
i
a→a′
PTxnet − ∆i
a→a′
∑
m∈W\{i}
cBBm
= ∆i
a→a′
PTxnet − ∆i
a→a′
∑
m∈Mk∪Mj\{i}
cBBm . (4.20)
Since a
i→ a′ implies that ∆i
a→a′
cBBi < 0, based on (4.20), ∆
i
a→a′
PTxnet < ∆
i
a→a′
∑
m∈Mk∪Mj\{i}
cBBm which
does not necessarily indicate ∆i
a→a′
PTxnet < 0. More precisely, based on (4.20), if the
condition in (4.16) is met, then, ∆i
a→a′
PTxnet > 0. Roughly speaking, according to (4.16),
if the increase in the sum of the costs of the CNs in m ∈ Mk ∪ Mj\{i} is higher
than the reduction that CN i experiences in its cost, then the network transmit power
increases by a
i→ a′.
Hence, if one finds an instance of the network for which (4.16) holds, then, the cost of
a CN and the network transmit power are not aligned under cBB and deviating from an
action profile a ∈ A does not, in general, result in network transmit power reduction.
Since aopt ∈ A, the global optimum cannot be guaranteed to be an NE for cBB.
If our proposed game, that employs the MC cost sharing scheme, reaches to the global
optimum at some iteration, the network never leaves the optimum point which is
a result of Theorem 4.2. Based on Theorem 4.3, this is not necessarily true if a
budget-balanced cost sharing scheme is used.
We further discuss the instances of networks provided in Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 where
node i updates its action to reduce its cost according to a budget-balanced cost sharing
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Figure 4.2. With IC the optimum BT may not be an NE of the game (Transition
a
i→ a′).
Table 4.1. Changes in the network transmit power and the cost of node i in Fig. 4.1
and Fig. 4.2 due to a
i→ a′ with pctj = pctk and P˜ := PTxS ({j, k}) + pctj + pctk .
Scheme Fig. ci(a) ci(a
′) PTxnet(a) PTxnet(a′) ∆i
a→a′
cBBi ∆
i
a→a′
PTxnet
ES 4.1 3 1.5 P˜ + 7 P˜ +8 -1.5 +1
SV 4.1 3.5 2.5 P˜ +7 P˜ +8 -1 +1
HC 4.1 6 3 P˜ +7 P˜ +8 -3 +1
IC 4.2 5 2 P˜ +7 P˜ +9 -3 +2
MC 4.1 1 2 P˜ +7 P˜ +8 +1 +1
scheme while its action increases the network transmit power. The cost sharing schemes
and the corresponding values, that is, the cost of node i before and after the transition
as well as the network transmit power, are gathered in Table 4.1. All the cost sharing
schemes used in this table have been introduced in Section 2.3.2.2. For instance,
using the HC scheme in Fig. 4.1, node i updates its action from ai = j to a
′
i = k
to reduce its cost from pctj + 6 to p
ct
k + 3. Assuming p
ct
j = p
ct
k , this action reduces
the cost of node i by 3 units while at the same time, it deviates from the optimum
action profile a and increases the network transmit power by 1 unit, that is, from
PTxnet(a) = P
Tx
S ({j, k}) + pctj + 6 + pctk + 1 to PTxnet(a′) = PTxS ({j, k}) + pctj + 5 + pctk + 3.
Note that the condition in (4.16) holds in this case. It should also be remarked that by
employing the MC in the example given in Fig. 4.1, node i does not change its action
since such an action increases its cost from 1 to 2.
In the rest of this chapter, we further investigate the properties of ES and SV in
comparison to MC.
Lemma 4.1. A necessary condition of a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme to
guarantee the existence of an NE is cross-monotonicity [MW13b].
Recall that, according to Definition 2.15, a cost function is cross-monotone if the cost
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Figure 4.3. The ES scheme for the MPBT problem does not guarantee the convergence.
of the CNs of a PN does not increase when a new node joins the PN. This property
for the convergence of the game is intuitive. When the cost is not cross-monotone,
when a new node joins a multicast group, the other nodes leave the group if their cost
increases and this may result in instability.
Theorem 4.4. The ES does not guarantee the existence of an NE for the MPBT
problem.
Proof. It is easy to see that based on Definition 2.15, the ES is not cross-monotone and
hence, based on Lemma 4.1 the convergence to an NE is not guaranteed. Moreover,
we provide an instance of the network in Fig. 4.3 for which the ES scheme does not
lead to an NE. In this figure, updating the action at node i increases the cost of node
v and vice versa. Hence, the nodes i and v iteratively update their actions and the
game GOPN does not converge. The costs of node i and v are provided in the figure for
different states of the BT.
Lemma 4.2. When the power of a PN j is fixed and independent of Mj, the cost
assigned to a CN by the SV is equal to the one assigned by the ES, i.e., cESi (j,Mj) =
cSVi (j,Mj), ∀i ∈Mj.
Proof. With fixed Pj(Mj), the contribution of every CN inMj on the transmit power
of PN j is equal and can be assumed as P unii,j = Pj(Mj),∀i ∈ Mj. Using (4.13) for
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i = 1 we have cSV1 (j,Mj) = Pj(Mj)/Mj. Since the other nodes do not change the
total transmit power of PN j, then, P unii,j = P
uni
i−1,j, ∀i > 1. Therefore, cSVi (j,Mj) =
cSV1 (j,Mj), ∀i ∈Mj.
Remark 4.7. Note that for the MTBT problem where the transmit powers are all equal
and fixed (and their values do not matter), the ES shares the cost as cESi (j,Mj) = 1/Mj.
Lemma 4.3. A non-cooperative CSG with SV scheme is a potential game for which
an NE always exists [MS96, GMW14].
Theorem 4.5. The ES guarantees the existence of an NE for the MFPBT (and MTBT)
problem.
Proof. As stated in Lemma 4.2, the ES scheme is a special case of the SV when the
contributions of the CNs are assumed to be equal. This is the case for the MFPBT
problem where the transmit power of a PN, regardless of the individual unicast powers
required for the links to its CNs, is fixed. Hence, using the ES for the MFPBT problem
can be seen as a special case of the MPBT problem with the SV scheme. Since based
on Lemma 4.3, the SV guarantees the existence of an NE for the MPBT (and MFPBT)
problem, the ES does so for the MFPBT problem.
Note that, based on Definition 2.15, the ES is cross-monotone for the MFPBT problem
and fulfills the necessary condition in Lemma 4.1.
Remark 4.8. The implantation of different cost sharing schemes differs in terms of
the information overhead they require. The ES is the simplest one since a node, to
calculate its cost, just requires knowing the number of CNs in a multicast receiving
group. With MC, every node needs to know the highest and the second highest unicast
powers required by the CNs of a PN. Finally, the SV imposes the highest overhead on
the network. To calculate the cost using the SV, a node must know the unicast power
required of every individual CN in a multicast group.
The information required for decision making has to be transmitted in a neighboring
area by every node as overhead information via a broadcast channel. Table 4.2
summarizes the properties of the different cost sharing schemes. The comparison in
terms of overhead is relative.
In conclusion, based on what has been discussed and using Table 4.2, we can find that
the MC has two main advantages over the SV for the MPBT problem. Firstly, with
MC, unlike SV or any other budget-balanced cost sharing scheme, aopt is always an
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Table 4.2. Properties of different cost sharing schemes.
MC SV ES HC IC
Convergence for MPBT yes yes no yes yes
Convergence for MTBT/MFPBT yes yes yes yes yes
Is aopt always an NE? yes no no no no
Overhead medium high low low high
NE. Secondly, the required overhead information for MC is lower than that of the SV.
This becomes more important when the size of the multicast receiving group increases.
Note that here we do not consider the ES for the MPBT problem due to the lack of
convergence guarantee.
4.2.3 Performance bound
In this section, we study the performance of our algorithm using the PoA and the
PoS measures defined in (2.10) and (2.11), respectively. We provide an instance of a
network for which the proposed game theoretic algorithm may converge to a bad NE.
This will be a lower bound for the worst case performance of our algorithm.
Theorem 4.6. The PoS of the proposed game with MC is lower bounded by Ω(N (α−1)).
Proof. Based on Theorem 4.2, aopt is always an NE of the game GOPN, thus,
PoS(GOPN) = 1.
Remark 4.9. With a budget-balanced scheme for the MPBT problem, based on
Theorem 4.3, PoS(GOPN) > 1.
Theorem 4.7. The POA of the game GOPN with MC is lower bounded by Ω(N (α−1)).
Proof. In this section, we provide a lower bound for the PoA of our game, mentioned
in Theorem 4.7. We find an instance of an NE for which the network transmit power
compared to the global optimum is bad. We assume a path-loss model for the channel
with the path-loss exponent α, 2 < α < 6. Thus, the channel gain between the nodes i
and j can be represented as gi,j ∝ 1/(l˜i,j)α in which l˜i,j is the distance between them.
Using Eq. (3.4), the maximum transmit power is given by
pmaxj =
γthσ2 (lmax)α
ηj
(4.21)
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Figure 4.4. Different schemes for transmission.
in which lmax is the largest possible distance between the PN j and its CN. For the
sake of convenience, in this section, we normalize the unicast power of the links to
pmaxj in (4.21) so that the transmit power between nodes i and j can be represented as
punii,j = (li,j)
α with li,j = l˜i,j/l
max and 0 ≤ li,j ≤ 1. Moreover, the maximum transmit
power is given by pmax = 1. Further, we assume that pctj = p
c,∀j ∈ Q. We now find a
topology for which the game-theoretic algorithm may converge to a bad NE. Let the
nodes of the network be evenly distributed on a line as shown in Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5
and l = 1/N . We first express the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. In Fig. 4.4, PTxnet(a1) ≤ PTxnet(a2) if pc ≤ 1− 1/2(α−1).
Proof. With N = 2 we have l = 1/2. Hence, PTxnet(a1) ≤ PTxnet(a2) implies 2(pc + lα) ≤
pc + (2l)α. This is valid if pc ≤ 1− 1/2(α−1).
Lemma 4.5. Let a1 be the action profile corresponding to a BT formed merely by
unicast transmissions and let a2 ∈ A\{a1} be the action profile corresponding to the
BT with a single-hop broadcast. Similar to Lemma 4.4, one can show that for every
N ≥ 2 ∈ N, we have P net(a1) ≤ P net(a2) if pc ≤ (1− 1/Nα−1) /(N − 1).
Let us assume that the condition in Lemma 4.5 holds. Then, given  → 0, the BT in
Fig. 4.5.(a) is the optimum configuration while the BT in Fig. 4.5.(b) is an NE. The
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Figure 4.5. The Optimum BT and a bad instance of NE.
PoA given the action profiles a1 and a2 is obtained by
PoA(GOPN) =
P net(a2)
P net(a1)
=
1 + pc
N (1/Nα + pc)
. (4.22)
The PoA in (4.22) is maximized when when pc → 0. Thus, a lower bound of the PoA
is Ω(N (α−1)).
Remark 4.10. The PoA of the game GOPN with ES scheme for the MPBT problem
is bounded by O(
√
N log2N) [CCLE+07].
The PoA of the game GOPN with SV scheme remains open.
4.2.4 Analysis of RACH for MAC
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed RACH scheme suggested
in Section 3.3. We find the probability of collision in this network and discuss the
number of slots required so that the nodes can access the channel at least once and
choose their PNs.
We consider a RACH consisting of s time-slots. Every node i ∈ P randomly and
uniformly chooses one of the slots in order to access the channel and send its request.
Theorem 4.8. The probability of collision in the RACH phase with s slots and N
nodes is equal to 1− sPN
sN
in which sPN is the number of s-permutations of N.
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Proof. We first find the probability of a collision-free access. Clearly, there will be
no collision with one node. The probability of a collision-free access with two nodes
accessing the channel, as the second node has s − 1 choices out of s, is given by
(s − 1)/s = 1 − 1/s. Similarly, a collision-free access with three nodes is obtained
by (1− 1/s) (1− 2/s). By induction, the probability of a collision-free access with N
nodes is calculated by
ρ¯col =
(
s− 1
s
)(
s− 2
s
)
. . .
(
s−N + 1
s
)
=
(s− 1)(s− 2) . . . (s−N + 1)
s(N−1)
=
s
s
(s− 1)(s− 2) . . . (s−N + 1)
s(N−1)
(s−N)!
(s−N)!
=
s!
sN(s−N)! =
NPs
sN
. (4.23)
The probability of collision is then given by ρcol = 1− ρ¯col.
Theorem 4.9. Let N be the number of nodes that randomly and uniformly access a
RACH consisting of s slots. Then, the average number ncol of the nodes that experience
a collision is given by ncol = N(1− (1− 1s)(N−1)).
Proof. We start by finding the probability of collision for a given node. As mentioned
before, the probability of a collision-free access for two nodes is equal to 1 − 1/s. A
given node does not have a collision with any other nodes in P\{i} with probability
(1− 1/s)(N−1). Since there are N nodes in the network, the expected number of
nodes that successfully choose a time-slot (experience no collision) is obtained by
N (1− 1/s)(N−1). Finally, the average number of nodes that experience a collision
is equal to
ncol = N −N (1− 1/s)(N−1) = N(1− (1− 1
s
)(N−1)). (4.24)
Fig. 4.6 and 4.7 show the probability of collision in the network and the average number
of nodes that experience a collision in a RACH consisting of s time-slots, respectively.
As can be seen, the probability of collision, even if N << s is high, however, as shown
in Fig. 4.7 the number of nodes that face a collision is expected to be relatively low.
This means that the number of nodes that needs to retry accessing the RACH will
significantly reduce over consecutive RACH phases.
Lemma 4.6. (Binomial approximation): (1 + x)k ≈ 1 + kx if |x| < 1 and |kx| << 1.
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Figure 4.6. Probability of collision in a RACH for different number s of slots and for
different number N of nodes.
Figure 4.7. Number of colliding nodes in a RACH for different number s of slots and
for different number N of nodes.
Corollary 4.3. Using Lemma 4.6 in Theorem 4.9 and assuming N >> 1 and N/s <<
1, we can approximate (1− 1/s)(N−1) by 1−N/s. Therefore, (4.24) can approximated
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by
n˜col ≈ N(1− (1− N
s
)) = N2/s. (4.25)
Note that, the number of collisions merely depends on the number of nodes and the
number of available time-slots.
Observation 4.1. Given (4.24) and (4.25), we always have n˜col ≥ ncol.
Proof. If n˜col ≥ ncol, then,
N(1− (1− N
s
))−N(1− (1− 1
s
)(N−1)) ≥ 0
(1− 1
s
)(N−1) ≥ 1− N
s
. (4.26)
According to the Bernoulli’s inequality, we always have
(1− 1
s
)(N−1) ≥ 1− N − 1
s
, (4.27)
and, since 1− N−1
s
> 1− N
s
, the statement in (4.26) is always true.
One can conclude from Observation 4.3 that n˜col in (4.24) is an upper bound for the
actual value of ncol in (4.25).
Assumption 4.1. We assume that the nodes in the network randomly and uniformly
access a RACH consisting of s time-slots. Further, if a collision occurs, that is, if more
than one node chooses the same time-slot for accessing the channel, the colliding nodes
back-off and access the channel in the next round of RACH phase. More precisely, if
a collision occurs in the r-th round of RACH phase, r ≥ 1, the colliding nodes back
off, and, retry accessing the channel during the next round of RACH phase within the
time-slots [rs+ 1, (r + 1)s], see Fig. 3.3.
Theorem 4.10. Let us assume that the nodes aim at accessing the RACH successfully
only for once. This means that, the nodes, after a successful access, do not access the
channel anymore. Considering N << s and according to Assumption 4.1, the average
number r¯ of the rounds required so that all the nodes access the RACH successfully is
upper-bounded by
r¯ ≤ 1 + log
(
log(s)
log(s/N)
)
. (4.28)
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Proof. Let n˜
(r)
acc and n˜
(r)
col be the approximated number of nodes that aim at accessing
the channel at round r of RACH phase and the approximated number of colliding nodes
in the r-th round of the RACH phase, respectively. Clearly, the number of nodes that
try to access the channel at the beginning of the r-th round of RACH, for r ≥ 2, is
equal to the number of colliding nodes at the end of the previous round, i.e.,
n˜(r)acc = n˜
(r−1)
col . (4.29)
In the first round of RACH we start by n˜
(1)
acc = N and, based on Corollary 4.3, the
number of colliding nodes is given by n˜
(1)
col ≈ N2/s. A number n˜(2)acc ≈ N2/s of the nods
access the channel in the second round of RACH again which results in n˜
(2)
col ≈ N4/s3.
Using induction, the number of colliding nodes at the r-th round of RACH phase is
obtained by
n˜
(r)
col ≈
N2
r
s(2r−1)
. (4.30)
The average number r¯ of rounds required so that all the nodes access the channel once
is upper-bounded by the round for which we have n˜
(r¯)
acc ≤ 1. By setting n˜(r¯)acc ≤ 1 we get
N2
(r¯−1) ≤ s2(r¯−1)−1
2(r¯−1) logN ≤ (2(r¯−1) − 1) log s
2(r¯−1) (logN − log s) ≤ − log s
2(r¯−1) ≤ − log s
logN − log s
r¯ − 1 ≤ log
( − log s
logN − log s
)
r¯ ≤ 1 + log
(
log(s)
log(s/N)
)
. (4.31)
Fig. 4.8 shows the average number of colliding nodes over different rounds of RACH.
In this figure, we set s = 10N and N ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70, 90}. This figure shows both
the simulation results and the approximation given in (4.30) which are fairly close. As
expected, although collisions occur in the first round of RACH, the number of collisions
in the second round would be very close to zero. Further, we observe that in Fig. 4.8,
the gap between the approximation and the simulation in the first round of RACH
increases when N becomes larger. The reason is the error of the approximation given
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Figure 4.8. Average number of nodes that experience a collision in different rounds of
RACH phases.
in (4.25). Let k = N/s, then, δ as the approximation error is calculated as
δ =
∣∣N(1− (1− 1
s
)(N−1))−N(1− (1− N
s
))
∣∣
= N
∣∣1− N
s
− (1− 1
s
)(N−1)
∣∣
= N
∣∣∣∣1− k − (1− 1s)(N−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈1−
∣∣∣∣, (4.32)
that shows the error scales with N .
Fig. 4.9 shows the average number of rounds required for successful channel access by
all the nodes, assuming s = 10N . We depict the result obtained by simulation, as well
as the approximation provided in (4.31). We observer that, when the number of nodes
is less than 60, less than two rounds of RACH are required, on average, so that all the
nodes access the channel once.
Remark 4.11. In practice, in designing a MAC scheme for the proposed
data-dissemination algorithm, one can assume that during the first r¯ rounds of RACH,
the nodes are allowed to have just one successful channel access. This way, and based on
Fig. 4.9, the initial BT can be formed with a few iterations. The nodes are allowed to
update their action in any of the next RACH phases without any limitations, however,
one attempt per RACH phase is allowed. Since the number of nodes that need to update
their action is a fraction of the total number of nodes, based on Fig. 4.8, the number
of nodes that may face a collision is expected to be significantly low.
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Figure 4.9. Average number of rounds required until all the nodes access the channel
once.
4.2.5 Implementation notes
In this section, we explain how the proposed algorithm can be implemented in a
decentralized way. Using a so-called HELLO message is necessary to implement the
proposed algorithm. When a node, as a source, has a message to disseminate in the
network, it broadcasts HELLO messages to inform its neighboring nodes. In fact,
every node after joining the broadcast-tree transmits the HELLO message to inform
its neighboring nodes. A HELLO message contains the node’s ID along with other
necessary information required for constructing the network. A node can obtain the
required unicast power of the link to its neighboring nodes by measuring the strength
of the received HELLO message [SL06].
After receiving the HELLO messages, a node finds its initial PN by solving (4.4) and
sends a JOIN message to its chosen PN. As stated in (3.10), the route of a node i to
S, i.e., Ri, if node i chooses PN j can be simply found as
Ri = Rj ∪ {i}.
This means that, when a CN i chooses PN j, it can simply add its ID to Rj to find its
own route to the S. When the node i joins the PN j and later on, receives a HELLO
message from a node k resulting in a lower cost than that of the PN j, it sends a
LEAVE message to the PN j and sends a JOIN message to the new PN k.
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In order to solve (4.4) and consequently find its PN, every node needs to know the
highest and the second highest unicast powers required by its CNs. Therefore, a PN
has to also add this information into its HELLO message. The action set of a node
in the game can also be found by using (3.10) in (4.1). To summarize, the HELLO
message of a node j ∈ Q contains:
 Node’s ID: j
 Circuitry power: pctj
 The route to the source: Rj
 Cost sharing scheme-specified information:
– MC: The highest and the second highest unicsat powers of the links to its
CNs in Mj, j ∈ Q
– SV: The unicsat power of all the links to its CNs in Mj, j ∈ Q
– ES: The highest unicast power of the links to its CNs in Mj, j ∈ Q along
with the number of CNs, i.e., Mj.
4.3 Centralized approach with mixed integer linear
program (MILP)
In this section, we model the MPBT problem of (3.11) as an MILP. This approach
is employed in the paper published by the author in [MASK19]. The provided MILP
mainly finds the optimum value of the network transmit power by finding the nodes
that should act as transmitting nodes as well as their transmit power. It does not
determine the structure of the optimum BT. We first provide the MILP for the MPBT
problem and then propose an algorithm by which the structure of the optimum BT can
be found based on the solution of the MILP. Before providing the MILP formulation,
we define the following vectors and variables and, later in this section, explain them
by a toy example:
 Transmission vector: the transmission vector is used to determine whether a
node j ∈ Q acts as a transmitting node or not. Moreover, in case that node j
is a transmitting node, it determines the CN of PN j that requires the highest
unicast power. The transmission vector is defined as tj = [t1,j, . . . , tN,j]
T, j ∈ Q
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Figure 4.10. A sample BT from S to four other nodes. The numbers on the links show
the required unicast powers, punii,j , and the downstream values, di,j.
as an N × 1 vector such that ti,j ∈ {0, 1} and ti,j = 1 if and only if node i
is the CN of PN j that requires the highest unicast power among all nodes in
Mj. Moreover,
∑
i∈Nj ti,j ≤ 1. If node j is a transmitter, then
∑
i∈Nj ti,j = 1,
otherwise
∑
i∈Nj ti,j = 0.
 Reachability vector: it determines that if a node i ∈ P is a CN of PN j with
highest required unicast power, given PTxj = p
uni
i,j , which of the other nodes in
P fall inside the coverage area of PN j (without imposing additional transmit
power on PN j). It is defined as ri,j = [r
(1)
i,j , . . . , r
(l)
i,j , . . . , r
(N)
i,j ] as a 1×N binary
vector for all j ∈ Q and i, l ∈ P . The l-th entry of ri,j is equal to 1 if punil,j ≤
punii,j = p
Tx
j ,∀i ∈ P . Since a node does not transmit to itself, then, r(l)i,i = 0,∀i, l ∈
P , r(j)i,j = 0,∀i, j ∈ P . Reachability matrix Rj = [rT1,j, . . . , rTN,j]T, j ∈ Q is an
N ×N binary matrix with ri,j the reachability vector.
 Downstream value: the downstream value di,j is defined for the link between any
two nodes j and i in Q and shows the total number of nodes in the network that
rely on the transmission from PN j to CN i for receiving the source’s message.
Since the outcome of the MILP must be a tree graph rooted at the source, i.e., S ∈
Ri.∀i ∈ P , as also exploited in [CK13], three conditions for the downstream have to be
met. Firstly, the source node cannot be in the downstream of any other node as it is
not a CN for other PNs. Secondly, the number of downstream nodes of the source node
must be equal to N , as the whole network is connected to the source, either directly
or indirectly. Finally, the difference between the sum of the downstream values of the
links coming in and going out of a node in P must be equal to 1.
We explain the defined vectors and matrices in detail using the illustration shown in
Fig. 4.10. In the BT of Fig. 4.10, the source node multicasts the message to node
1 and node 2. Then, node 2 forwards the message to nodes 3 and 4. punii,j required
between any two nodes i and j and di,j of the link are also shown in Fig. 4.10. As
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can be seen, the downstream values of the links between the source and nodes 1 and 2
are equal to d1,S = 1 and d2,S = 3, respectively. Therefore, d1,S + d2,S = 4, that is, the
total number of downstream nodes of S is equal to the total number of receiving nodes
in P . The difference between the downstream values coming to and going out of node
2, as an intermediate node, is 1, i.e., d2,S − (d3,2 + d4,2) = 1. This is also true for the
nodes which do not forward the message. Variables ti,j and di,j are to be found by the
MILP for all i, j ∈ Q, while Rj can be obtained based on the unicast power required
between the nodes. Based on the unicast power for each link shown in Fig. 4.10, the
reachability matrix for S is given by
RS =

1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
 . (4.33)
The entries of the last row in (4.33), i.e., r4,S, are all zero as node 4 and S are no
neighbors, that is, node 4 cannot be reached by S due to the power constraint at S. It
can be seen in (4.33) that r1,S = [1, 1, 0, 0], that is, r
(1)
1,S and r
(2)
1,S are equal to 1. Recall
the entries of ri,j show the nodes that can receive the message from PN j without
additional transmit power at node j if the transmit power of node j is equal to punii,j .
This shows that if the source node transmits to node 1, then, node 2 can also receive
the source’s message by a multicast transmission without additional transmit power.
In order to find which of the nodes of the network are covered by PN j based on its
transmission, we define yj = [y1,j, . . . , yN,j]
T as
yj = R
T
j tj. (4.34)
More precisely, yj is equal to one of the reachability vectors of node j depending on its
transmission matrix tj. In the BT shown in Fig. 4.10, tS = [1, 0, 0, 0]
T. Using (4.33)
and (4.34), we have yS = r
T
1,S = [1, 1, 0, 0]
T.
The MILP for the MPBT problem is provided in (4.35).
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min
ti,j
∑
j∈Q,i∈Nj
ti,jP
uni
i,j (4.35a)
s.t. ∑
i∈Nj
ti,j =
{
1
≤ 1
j= S
j ∈ P (4.35b)
∑
i∈Nj
(di,j − dj,i) =
{
N
−1
j= S
j ∈ P (4.35c)
di,j ≤ Nyi,j ∀j ∈ Q,∀i ∈ Nj (4.35d)
tj,j = 0 ∀j ∈ P (4.35e)
ti,j ∈ {0, 1}, di,j ≥ 0, di,j ∈ R ∀i ∈ P , j ∈ Q. (4.35f)
P unii,j in (4.35a) is defined in (3.7). Eq. (4.35b) expresses that the source node must
be a transmitter while the other nodes j ∈ P are not necessarily a transmitter. The
constraints in (4.35c) and (4.35d), as stated before, guarantee that the resulting tree
is a BT rooted at the source. The values of yi,j, found by (4.34), are used in (4.35d)
to find the downstream values of the links between the nodes. Eq. (4.35d) represents
the constraint on the downstream values. More precisely, yi,j = 0 in (4.35d) indicates
that, for a given tj, node i cannot be covered by node j and the downstream value of
the link between the nodes j and i must be zero, that is, di,j = 0.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the proposed MILP can also be used for the
MFPBT and the MTBT problems [CCLE+07, CK13], however, due to the fixed
transmit power, the number of constraints for the MFPBT problem will be much
lower than that of the MPBT problem. In fact, since every node has only two choices,
that is, whether to transmit or not, there will be only a reachability vector for the
nodes and no reachability matrix.
By the solution of the MILP, a node j ∈ Q is a transmitting node if ∑i∈Nj ti,j = 1
and its transmit power is equal to pTxj = p
uni
i,j if ti,j = 1. As a node can be covered by
multiple transmitting nodes in the network, an algorithm is required to find the set
Mj of each PN j ∈ Q in the optimum BT as well as the route Ri of every receiving
node in P . To this end, we suggest Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, using the solution
of the MILP and starting from the source, node i ∈ P is a CN of node j if yi,j 6= 0 and
node i has not been already connected to the BT. The set C in this algorithm refers
to the set of nodes which are connected to the BT. This set at first contains S and the
algorithm is run until all the nodes of the network are added to this set. The algorithm
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Algorithm 1 Constructing the optimum BT
1: C = {S}, V = ∅
2: while Q \ C 6= ∅ do
3: for each node j ∈ C \ V do
4: V = V ∪ j
5: if yi,j 6= 0, i ∈ Nj, i /∈ C then
6: Mj =Mj ∪ {i}
7: Ri = Rj ∪ {i}
8: C = C ∪ {i}
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
visits the nodes one by one to see if based on the solution of the MILP, a given node
must be a PN of other nodes or not. In this algorithm, the set of visited nodes by the
algorithm is given by V . The number of binary variables that have to be determined
with the proposed MILP are N binary variables for the source and, as tj,j = 0 and
tS,j = 0, a number N − 1 of binary variables for each of the N nodes in P . Thus, the
total number of binary variables for the proposed MILP is N +N(N − 1) = N2.
4.4 Performance analysis
4.4.1 Simulation Setup
For simulation, a 250m×250m area is considered in which the coordinate of a node is
determined by (x, y) with x and y as independently and uniformly distributed random
variables in the interval [0, 250]. The total number of nodes varies between 10 and 50.
The simulation results are based on the Monte-Carlo method and in each simulation
run, one of the nodes in the network is randomly chosen as the source. The channel is
based on the path-loss model. Let li,j and l0 be the distance between nodes i and j and
a reference distance, respectively. Then, by considering η as the path loss exponent
and λ as the signal wavelength, the power gain of the channel between nodes i and j
is defined as
gi,j =
(
λ
4pil0
)2(
l0
li,j
)η
(4.36)
During the simulation, we set λ = 0.125m, l0 = 1m and η = 3. Moreover, using
[CGB05], we assume uniformly distributed random values for pmaxj ∈ [150, 250] mW
and pctj ∈ [50, 100] mW and ηj = 0.3 for all j ∈ Q. The minimum SNR for successful
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Table 4.3. Parameters used through the simulation.
Parameter Value
pmaxj ∈ [150, 250] mW
pctj ∈ [50, 100] mW
σ2 -90 dBm
γth 10 dBm
λ 0.125m
l0 1
α 3
decoding is set to γth = 10 dB and the noise power is assumed to be σ2 = −90 dBm. We
compare our algorithm with the conventional centralized and decentralized algorithms.
The benchmarks of our algorithm are the optimum solution of the MILP, explained
in Section 4.3, and the BIPSW [WNE02], the BDP [RVF08] and the GBBTC [CK13]
algorithms which are discussed in Section 1.2 and Section 4.2.2. It should be noted
that the result obtained for the MFPBT problem using the ES scheme will be similar
to that of GBBTC for the MTBT problem, on average. Hence, we just use the GBBTC
algorithm representing both. The results for the network transmit power for all the
algorithms are normalized to the average of the maximum power budget of the nodes
denoted by P¯max, i.e., P¯max = Ej∈Q[pctj + pmaxj ]. The normalized network transmit
power is then denoted by PTxnet(a) = P
Tx
net(a)/P¯
max in which PˆTxnet(a) is defined in (3.9).
The simulations are carried out in MATLAB1 and the optimization problems of (6.34)
and (6.35) are solved using CVX2 [GB14, GB08] along with Gurobi.3.The simulation
parameters are collected in Table 4.3
It should be noted that we apply no changes to the benchmark algorithms. For instance,
in terms of the circuitry power, the benchmarks ignore it and we also implement
them in this way. After constructing the BT by those algorithms, we consider the
circuitry powers in calculating the actual network transmit power. Modifying those
algorithms in a proper way to consider the circuitry power is out of the scope of our
work. Furthermore, we aim to emphasize on the impact of the circuitry power which
has been largely ignored by the existing algorithms and to show that the BT resulting
from those algorithms are not efficient.
1http://mathworks.com/
2http://cvxr.com/cvx/
3http://www.gurobi.com/
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Figure 4.11. Normalized network transmit power versus the number of nodes for
different algorithms.
4.4.2 Results
Fig. 4.11 compares the normalized network transmit power PˆTxnet(a) versus the number
of nodes for different algorithms for the MPBT problem. The benchmark algorithms,
except the MILP, do not consider the circuitry power during the BT construction. As
can be observed, our proposed algorithm outperforms other benchmark algorithms.
The main reason is that our algorithm, besides the transmit power, considers the
amount of circuitry power of the nodes and adapts the BT based on that. In a dense
network, the effect of the circuitry power on the network transmit power is significant.
In our algorithm, by increasing the number of nodes, the network transmit power
first starts increasing and then tends to saturate. When the number of nodes in the
network increases, the distances between the nodes and consequently the transmit
powers required between the nodes reduce. Despite the fact that the required transmit
powers reduce, the number of transmitting nodes in the network increases and since
each transmitting node imposes a fixed power on the network, which is not negligible,
the network transmit power increases. When the network becomes dense, the number
of transmitting nodes required to cover the whole network, as well as the network
transmit power, remains roughly the same.
Fig. 4.12 compares the three main cost sharing schemes discussed in this chapter, that
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Figure 4.12. Comparison between different cost sharing schemes for multi-hop
broadcast.
is, the MC, the SV, and the ES in terms of the total normalized network transmit
power versus the number of nodes in the network. We replace the MC cost sharing
scheme in CSG-MC with SV and ES and refer to them as the CSG-SV and the CSG-ES,
respectively. Due to the lack of convergence guarantee with the ES scheme, the transmit
power of the nodes for the CSG-ES, as well as for the GBBTC, are assumed to be fixed
and equal to 200 mW. In this experiment, all the algorithm, except the GBBTC,
consider the circuitry power in BT construction. In fact, the only difference between
GBBTC and CSG-ES is that GBBTC relies merely on the transmit power. There
are two main observations in Fig. 4.12. First, performing power control at the nodes
and taking the circuitry power into account, which is the case for the CSG-MC and
CSG-SV, significantly improves the energy-efficiency of the network. For instance, in a
network with |Q| = 40, the normalized network transmit power obtained by CSG-MC
is Pˆ net(a) ' 5. This number for the GBBTC (and also for BIPSW in Fig. 4.11) is
more than 8 which means that the BT obtained by our algorithm requires around 40%
less energy. The second observation is that the MC performs slightly better than the
SV. This observation is in accordance with Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. Aside from the
performance, the information overhead required for the MC is much lower than that
of the SV and this makes the MC the best choice for such a network. Although the
transmit power of the nodes is fixed for both the GBBTC and the CSG-ES, the network
transmit power with CSG-ES is less than that of the GBBTC. This is because, unlike
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Figure 4.13. Number of iterations required for algorithms to converge.
the GBBTC, the CSG-ES considers the circuitry power in the BT formation and thus,
a smaller number of nodes act as PN.
In Fig. 4.13, we depict the number of iterations required for each of these algorithms
to converge. The number of iterations of an algorithm can also represent its time
complexity. As can be observed, the CSG-MC algorithm requires the lowest number
of iterations among all. Moreover, the SV-based CSG requires a higher number of
iterations than the MC-based CSG. This difference stems from the way these algorithms
share a cost among the receiving nodes of a multicast group. With MC, the cost of
all CNs except one of them is zero, and hence, the CNs have no incentive to change
their PN. In contrast, the cost of the CNs with SV is always a positive value and the
CNs may have an incentive for updating their action and finding a PN with lower
cost. Moreover, the number of iterations required for all algorithms, except for the
BDP, increases almost linearly. The non-linear time complexity of BDP stems from
the Bellman-Ford algorithm with which the BDP needs to be initialized.
To show how the circuitry power affects the structure of the BT, Fig. 4.14 shows the
average number of PNs in the network versus the total number (|Q|) of nodes and
for different values of the circuitry power. It actually shows the average number of
transmissions that will be carried out in the network. The set T of the PNs in the
network is defined as T = {j|pTxj > 0, j ∈ Q} where |T | represents the number of
PNs. As can be seen, when the circuitry power increases, the number of PNs in the
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Figure 4.14. Average number of PNs (transmitting nodes) in the network for different
total number of nodes.
network decreases. In this case, our proposed algorithm, as well as the MILP, exploit
multicast transmission to reduce the network transmit power by reducing the number
of transmissions. For instance, when |Q| = 30 and the average value of the circuitry
power is Ej∈Q[pctj ] = 25 mW, the BT, constructed by our algorithm, consists of roughly
|T | = 11 PNs, which means, every PN has 2.75 CNs on average. When the average
circuitry power is Ej∈Q[pctj ] = 150 mW, the number of PNs becomes |T | = 8, that is,
3.75 CNs on average for every PN.
Finally, to have a better insight about how the algorithms construct the BT, a
realization of the network with |Q| = 20 nodes is presented in Fig. 4.15. In this figure,
the BT is constructed with four algorithms; the optimum BT in Fig. 4.15 (a) and
4.15 (c) based on the centralized MILP approach along with the Algorithm 1 explained
in Section 4.3, the proposed decentralized game theoretic algorithm in Fig. 4.15 (b)
and 4.15 (d), the GBBTC [CK13] in Fig. 4.15 (e) and the centralized BIPSW [WNE02]
in Fig. 4.15 (f). In this experiment, to show the impact of the circuitry power on the
BT construction, the MILP and CSG-MC algorithms are run for two different values
of the average circuitry power, that is, pctj = 25 mW in Fig. 4.15 (a) and Fig. 4.15 (b),
and pctj = 150 mW in 4.15 (c) and 4.15 (d) which is assumed to be the same for all
the nodes j ∈ Q. Recall that the GBBTC and BIPSW ignore the circuitry power. In
Fig. 4.15 the nodes with just one outgoing link represent the PNs that transmit via
unicast while multiple outgoing links show a multicast transmission. For instance, in
the obtained BT in Fig. 4.15 (f), node 2 receives the message from the source by a
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(a) Optimum - pctj = 25 mW
(b) Proposed (CSG-MC) - pctj = 25 mW
(c) Optimum - pctj = 150 mW (d) Proposed (CSG-MC) - p
ct
j = 150 mW
(e) GBBTC [CK13] (f) BIPSW [WNE02]
Figure 4.15. BT resulting from different algorithms in a 250m×250m area with |Q| =
20.
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unicast transmission and sends it to its CN, i.e., node 3, again by a unicast. Node 3
then forwards the message to its CNs, node 1 and 5, via multicast. In Fig. 4.15 (f), we
first find that the BIPSW constructs the BT mostly with short hops including many
unicasts. This is because the BIPSW relies merely on minimizing the transmit powers.
For the given instance, BIPSW requires 14 transmissions in total where 11 of these
transmissions are via unicast. In contrast to BIPSW, the GBBTC in Fig. 4.15 (e),
due to the fixed transmit power of the nodes, tends to form large multicast groups to
reduce the number of transmissions.
Our proposed algorithm, as well as the optimum MILP-based BT, are flexible. When
the circuitry power is very low, the obtained BTs, similar to that obtained by the
BIPSW, will be constructed by short hops and the unicast transmission is used
relatively more often. For instance, with pcj = 25 mW, the BT constructed by our
algorithm in Fig. 4.15 (b) contains 10 transmissions including 6 unicasts. With the
optimum MILP algorithm in Fig. 4.15 (a), 11 transmissions are needed with also 6
unicasts. When the circuitry power increases to pcj = 150 mW, in the same network,
the number of transmissions with our algorithm becomes 6 including 1 unicast (Fig.
4.15 (d)), while, the optimum BT (Fig. 4.15 (c)) consists of 5 transmissions, all via
multicast. In fact, when the circuitry power, as a fixed term that affects the total
transmit power of a node, dominates the transmit power, our proposed algorithm as
well as the MILP, tend to exploit the multicast transmission. In other words, it adapts
itself depending on the value of the circuitry power.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a non-cooperative cost sharing game with MC cost sharing scheme has
been proposed for the MPBT problem in multi-hop wireless networks. MC, SV and
ES cost sharing schemes are studies and we showed that MC is the best cost sharing
scheme for MPBT problem. The proposed game has been shown to be a potential
game with guaranteed convergence. The game is designed in a way that the potential
function of the game is equal to the total power required in the whole network. We
have shown that, the MC cost sharing scheme is the scheme for which the optimum
BT is always an NE of the game. Besides, the information overhead required for it is
relatively low. These two properties make it the best choice among the cost sharing
schemes for the MPBT problem in terms of both performance and required information
overhead.
We have shown that in designing games for decentralized optimization, the elements of
the game such as the cost function, and the action sets have to be designed in a way to
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guarantee that the individual local behavior of the players is desirable from the global
system point of view. In the MPBT problem, the MC cost sharing scheme satisfies
such a critical condition, that is, the MC-based cost function of the nodes and the
network transmit power are exactly aligned, while the budget-balanced cost sharing
schemes, including the ES and the SV, do not. We further showed that the ES does
not guarantee the convergence of the algorithm to an NE for the MPBT problem. To
overcome this problem of the ES, the PNs in the network have to transmit with a fixed
transmit power, regardless of the unicast power of the links to their corresponding
CNs. Although by doing so, the algorithm will be guaranteed to converge, it is in
contrast to the the network-wide goal, that is, the energy efficiency. Unlike many of
the existing algorithms, our proposed model not only captures the circuitry power of a
device together with its transmit power, but also the nodes in our algorithm are able
to perform transmit power control. We also discussed a MAC scheme for decentralized
broadcast-tree construction and studied the probability of collision and the number of
time-slots required for the nodes for accessing the shared channel. We demonstrated
that the proposed algorithm and the considered power model significantly improve the
network energy-efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Energy-efficient multi-hop broadcast:
Multiple transmitters per user
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend the model we studied in the previous chapter and exploit
the MRC combining diversity. Using MRC, a CN is able to combine the signals
transmitted by multiple PNs in order to achieve the minimum SNR required for
decoding the message. This can help in reducing the transmit power required at
a given PN for serving a CN, and consequently, can help in reducing the power
required for data dissemination. We showed in Section 4.2.2 that the MC cost sharing
performs better than the other cost sharing schemes for the MPBT problem. Besides,
among the budget-balanced cost sharing schemes, the SV is fair and also guarantees
the convergence of the game for the MPBT problem. Hence, here we extend our
model of the previous chapter for the MC-based and the SV-based cost sharing games
to exploit MRC. Parts of this chapter have been originally published by the author
in [MASL+15,MMAS+16].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Since a CN is now able to have
multiple PNs, in Section 5.2 we extend the system model, discuss the MAC scheme,
and formulate the problem. The MRC-based decentralized game-theoretic approaches
with the MC and the SV cost sharing schemes are provided in Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3,
respectively. In Section 5.4, we present an MILP formulation for finding the global
optimum of our problem. Simulation results are provided in Section 5.5 and finally,
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 System model extension and problem
formulation
5.2.1 Power model and MAC scheme
The system model in this chapter is based on the one presented in Chapter 3 . Since
in this chapter, we assume that the CNs can choose multiple PNs, the system model
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needs to be extended. In this network, every node i ∈ P chooses its PNs as well as
the transmit power with which they should transmit the message for node i. By
accumulating the SNRs of the signals received from the chosen PNs, the CN can
successfully decode the message if the accumulated SNR is at least γth. The requested
power of CN i from its PN j is denoted by preqi,j . We define the action of a node i in this
network as the set of tuples composed of the PNs that the node chooses along with the
corresponding requested powers
ai =
{
(j, preqi,j )|j ∈ Ai, preqi,j ∈ [0, pmaxj ]
}
, (5.1)
in which Ai is the action set of the CN i. We further define the set of actions of all the
nodes as
a := {ai|i ∈ P}. (5.2)
Even thought with MRC a CN is able to accumulate the signals transmitted from
the PNs which are not in its neighboring area, we restrict the action set of the CN
to the nodes in its neighboring area. This is because overhead information needs to
be transmitted in practice between a PN and a CN in order to find the multicast
receiving group, the cost of the CNs, etc., and this implies that the PN must be in
the neighboring area of the CN. The action set of node i in this section is defined as
the set of neighboring nodes of node i whose distance from the source, in terms of the
number of hops, is not larger than that for node i. More precisely, it is defined as
Ai = {j|j ∈ Ni, hj ≤ hi, hj 6=∞} (5.3)
in which hj is called the hop-rank of node j ∈ Q, representing the number of hops
from the source to node j. Denoting by Wi ⊆ Ai,Wi 6= ∅ the set of PNs of CN i, the
hop-rank of CN i is obtained by
hi = max
j∈Wi
{hj}+ 1, ∀i ∈ P , (5.4)
which indicates that the hop-rank of a node depends on the maximum of the hop-ranks
of its PNs. Initially, we set hS = 0 and hi = ∞ for all i ∈ P . Based on the definition
of the action of a node in (5.1), we observe that each action contains two sub-actions.
We call them the PN set and the power request set of node i and define them as
Wi =
{
j|preqi,j > 0, j ∈ Ai
}
(5.5)
and
preqi =
{
preqi,j |preqi,j > 0, j ∈ Ai
}
, (5.6)
respectively. The number of PNs chosen by CN i is denoted by Wi = |Wi|. Fig. 5.1
shows a sample network in which Wi = {l, j}. From the perspective of a transmitting
node j ∈ Q, we define the set of its CNs as
Mj =
{
i
preqi,j > 0,∀i ∈ Nj} . (5.7)
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S
. . . . . .
. . .
Figure 5.1. A sample network. In this network, node i decides to be served by more
than one PN, that is, nodes l and j.
We further denote the set of power requests received by node j from its neighboring
nodes as prcvj =
{
preqi,j |i ∈Mj
}
and prcv−i,j := p
rcv
j \
{
preqi,j
}
represents the prcvj without
the power request of CN i. The total transmit power of a PN j in the network is then
given by
PTxj (a) := P
Tx
j (p
rcv
j ) =
p
ct
j + max
i∈Mj
{
preqi,j
}
, if Mj 6= ∅
0 otherwise
(5.8)
in which pctj is the circuitry power required for transmission.
We assume that the CNs exploit the MRC technique and constructively combine the
signals received from different PNs. Using MRC, the aggregated SNR experienced by
CN i is calculated by
γreqi|MRC(p
req
i ) := γ
req
i,1 (p
req
i,1 ) + γ
req
i,2 (p
req
i,2 ) + · · ·+ γreqi,Wi(preqi,Wi) =
∑
j∈Wi
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
, (5.9)
where γreqi,j (p
req
i,j ) is defined in (3.3). Note that gi,j in (5.9) represents the average value
of the channel gain assuming that the statistical properties of the channel does not
change. We further assume that a node knows the average channel gains between itself
and the other nodes in its proximity.
The channel access scheme adopted for our MRC-based multi-hop broadcast approach
is similar to the one suggested for the single-PN case in Fig. 3.3. In MRC-based
multi-hop broadcast, as shown in Fig. 5.2, when a CN chooses multiple PNs, each of
the selected PNs need to reserve a time-slot for their transmission in the scheduled
section. Moreover, each PN needs to inform its neighboring nodes about the new CN
that joined it. In the example shown in Fig. 5.2, the CNs can choose up to three PNs
and the corresponding time-slots of the PNs for updating their neighboring nodes are
represented by 3 , 4 and 5 .
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Random access Scheduled access
CN
PN 1 CNPN 2 PN 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Time-slots
Guard/Proccessing interval
Channel access interval
Figure 5.2. Channel access for multi-hop broadcast with MRC and three PNs.
In order to maximize the SNR received at a CN, the received signal from each of its
PNs must be ideally combined.
Remark 5.1. Let yi = [yi,1, yi,2, . . . , yi,Wi ]
ᵀ denote the received signal vector at CN i
transmitted by its chosen PNs. From the physical layer perspective, yi is modeled as
yi = hix+ ni, (5.10)
in which
 x is the transmitted symbol by the PNs of CN i,
 hi = [hi,1, hi,2, . . . , hi,Wi ]
ᵀ is the vector of channel coefficients of the links between
CN i and its PNs,
 ni = [ni,1, ni,2, . . . , ni,Wi ]
ᵀ is the noise vector considered as AWGN.
The reconstructed signal at CN i is then obtained by yˆ = wiyi in which wi =
[wi,1, wi,2, . . . , wi,Wi ] is the combining vector that combines the signals received from
the PNs. The MRC provides the highest SNR for the received signal yˆ, given in (5.9),
if wi = kh
ᵀ
i in which k is a constant [PS08].
One of the main differences between the network power model in this section and that
proposed in Section 3.2 is the difference in the reception power of the nodes. In the
previous section, every CN was allowed to choose only one PN and consequently would
receive the signal transmitted by its PN in one time-slot of the the scheduled section.
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Figure 5.3. Transmission and reception in different time-slots in the scheduled section
of the channel access. A node can receive its message in multiple slots.
In fact, the circuitry power required for receiving the message is equal for every node
and therefore, could be omitted in network power optimization. In other words, in
the previous chapter, to optimize the network power, one could merely focus on the
transmit power of the nodes, composed of the power of the radio link and the circuitry
power required for transmission.
Unlike the previous section, here, a node may need to receive the messages from its PNs
in multiple time-slots. Hence, depending on the number of PNs that a CN chooses,
the reception power and consequently the energy it requires to consume over multiple
time-slots changes. This issue is further illustrated in Fig. 5.3. In this Figure, for
instance, node 1 receives its message from the source in time-slot 1 and acts as a
PN in the next time-slot. Node 3 receives the message from node 1 , transmitted
in time-slot 2 and acts as a transmitter in time-slot 3 . Node 2 , in order to receive
the message, accumulates the signals received from node 1 and node 3 in time-slots
1 and 3 , respectively. Node 4 , similar to node 2 receives its message in more
than one time-slot, from nodes S and 3 in time-slots 1 and 3 . In this example,
nodes 2 and 4 receive the message in two time-slots and the circuitry power they
require for message reception is more than the case of receiving it from one PN, like
nodes 1 and 3 . Since the circuitry power required for message reception at a node
may vary depending on the decision of the node, it must be considered in our problem.
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The reception power of a CN i is calculated by
PRxi (a) = Wip
cr
i , (5.11)
in which pcri is the circuitry power of node i for message reception. Using (5.8) and
(5.11), the total power required at a node in this network for both message transmission
and reception is then given by
P totj (a) = P
Rx
j (a) + P
Tx
j (a)
= Wjp
cr
j + 1j(Mj)
(
pctj + max
i∈Mj
{
preqi,j
})
(5.12)
in which 1j(Mj) is an indicator and equals 1 if node j acts as a transmitting node and
serve the CNs in Mj. It is formally defined as
1j(Mj) =
{
1 if Mj 6= ∅
0 otherwise.
(5.13)
5.2.2 Problem formulation
Before formulating the problem, we first present the following definitions:
Definition 5.1. (Network power): Let P totj (a) be the total power that node j ∈ Q
requires in this network. The total network power is defined by
P totnet (a) :=
∑
j∈Q
P totj (a). (5.14)
Definition 5.2. (Node’s Cost): We define by Cfi (a) the total cost that a node i
pays to its chosen PNs under the cost sharing scheme f as
Cfi (a) := C
f
i (p
req
i ) =
∑
j∈Wi
cfi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) (5.15)
in which cfi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) is the cost paid from node i to its PN j given the requested
powers preqi,j and p
rcv
−i,j.
Definition 5.3. (Social cost): Let Cfi (a) be the cost that a node i ∈ P pays for
receiving the message under the cost sharing f . The social cost of a network formed by
the nodes in P, denoted by SC(a), is defined as [SLB08]
SC (a) :=
∑
i∈P
Cfi (a). (5.16)
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As discussed earlier, we consider two different scenarios in this network. The objectives
in each of the scenarios are defined as follows.
Scenario 1 (Energy minimization): The objective in this scenario is formally
defined as
OBJ-1: minimize
{ai}i∈P
P totnet
({ai}i∈P) (5.17)
subject to: ∀i ∈ P ∃{j} ⊆ Q\{i} : i ∈Mj, hi ≤ hj (5.18)
γreqi|MRC(p
req
i ) ≥ γth. (5.19)
Note that OBJ1 is similar to the objective defined in (3.11). Unlike (3.11) where the
nodes are allowed to have just one PN (∃!j ∈ Q\{i}), here the nodes can have multiple
PNs (∃{j} ⊆ Q\{i}). The constraint in (5.19) guarantees that node i is able to decode
the message transmitted by its PNs.
Scenario 2 (Social cost minimization): In this scenario, we aim to find the
minimum cost required to be paid by the receiving nodes of the network for obtaining
the message. Since in this scenario we assume that the forwarding nodes of the network
are sensitive to incentives, we focus on the class of budget-balanced cost sharing
schemes, cf. Definition 2.14. We define the network wide objective for the second
scenario as:
OBJ-2: minimize
{ai}i∈P
SC
({ai}i∈P) (5.20)
subject to: ∀i ∈ P ∃{j} ⊆ Q\{i} : i ∈Mj, hi ≤ hj (5.21)∑
i∈Mj
cfi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) = P
Tx
j (a) (5.22)
γreqi|MRC(p
req
i ) ≥ γth (5.23)
The condition in (5.22) guarantees that the employed cost sharing scheme is
budget-balanced.
5.3 MRC-based decentralized approach with CSG
5.3.1 Game-theoretic model
In this section, we propose a decentralized approach for Scenarios 1 and 2 discussed in
the previous section and find the decision of the nodes in each scenario.
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We propose a decentralized approach via a cost sharing game. The MRC-game with
multiple PNs defined in this section is an extension of the case of a single-PN defined
in 4.2. The properties of the game with MRC, denoted by GMPN, is summarized as
follows:
 Players: The finite number of nodes in P .
 Action: The action of a node i ∈ P is defined in (5.1) as a set of tuples that
determines the PN set and power request set of the node, defied in (5.5) and
(5.6), respectively. The PN set of CN i is formally defined as Wi ∈ 2Ai\{∅}
and the joint PN set of the game is given by W =×i∈PWi, in which 2Ai and× represent the power set of Ai and the Cartesian product, respectively. We
further define the joint request set of the game as Preq =×i∈P preqi .
 Cost function: Assigns a real-valued cost to every node i ∈ P as Ci(a) :
(W ,Preq)→ R+. The cost function is defined in (5.15).
Remark 5.2. As a result of Theorem 4.1 and as we discussed in Section 4.2.2 we
employ the MC cost sharing scheme for the first scenario where we aim at network
energy minimization. For the second scenario, we adopt the SV due its fairness and
budget-balancedness. In the rest of this section, we denote the two cost sharing schemes
as cf (.) ∈ {cMC(.), cSV(.)}.
Theorem 5.1. The GMPN with cMC(.) and cSV(.) converges to an NE.
Proof. We have shown in Section 4.2.2 that the game GOPN in which the nodes can
choose one PN is a potential game for which the convergence of the game to an NE is
guaranteed. Let ∆i
(j)
cfi be the difference in the cost of node i with respect to PN j after
it changes its decision. Since GOPN is an exact potential game, then, ∆i
(j)
cfi = ∆
i
(j)
Φ in
which Φ is the potential function of the game when the nodes are allowed to choose
one PN. Let Wi and W ′i be the sets of old and new PNs of CN i and ∆iWi→W ′i
Cfi be the
change in the cost of node i when it changes its PNs from Wi to W ′i. Since the cost
function in GMPN, defined in (5.15), is linearly separable with respect to the cost paid
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by a CN to each of its chosen PNs, we can write
∆i
Wi→W ′i
Cfi = ∆
i
Wi→W ′i
∑
j∈Wi∪W ′i
cfi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j)
=
∑
j∈Wi∪W ′i
∆i
(j)
cfi
=
∑
j∈Wi∪W ′i
∆i
(j)
Φ
= ∆i
(j)
∑
j∈Wi∪W ′i
Φ
= ∆Φ′, (5.24)
which shows that the game is still an exact potential game with a new potential function
Φ′ =
∑
j∈Wi∪W ′i Φ.
5.3.2 Marginal contribution cost sharing scheme
In this section, we propose a decentralized approach for the problem in (5.17) using
the MC, aiming at network energy minimization. According to (4.2), the cost of node
i, based on the MC, is defined as the power imposed by CN i on the network, including
the power imposed on the chosen PNs and its own circuitry power, as
CMCi (a) = P
Rx
i (a) +
∑
j∈Wi
cMCi (a) (5.25)
= Wip
cr
i +
∑
j∈Wi
cMCi (Mj) + cMCi (preqi,j ,prcv−i,j) (5.26)
in which cMCi (Mj) and cMCi (preqi,j ,prcv−i,j) are the costs of node i due to imposing transmit
circuitry power and radio link power on PN j, respectively.
cMCi (Mj) in (5.26) depends merely on the existence of other CNs than node i in Mj
and is given by
cMCi (Mj) = pctj (1− 1j(Mj\{i})) (5.27)
which means that if PN j has another CN than node i, that is, if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1,
then, node i does not impose any additional circuitry power on node j and hence,
cMCi (Mj) = 0. Similar to (4.2), cMCi (preqi,j ,prcv−i,j) in (5.26) is calculated as
cMCi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) = p
Tx
j (p
rcv
j )− pTxj (prcv−i,j). (5.28)
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(a) The cost function of node i when 1j(Mj) = 0.
pTxj (p
rcv−i,j)
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req
i,j
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(b) The cost function of node i when 1j(Mj) = 1.
Figure 5.4. The cost function of player i in (5.30) based on the MC rule in case of
choosing PN j under two different cases.
Given (5.27) and (5.28), the cost of node i in (5.25) is given by
CMCi (a) = Wip
cr
i +
∑
j∈Wi
pctj (1− 1j(Mj\{i})) + pTxj (prcvj )− pTxj (prcv−i,j). (5.29)
Note that, Given (5.27) and (5.28), cMCi (a) in (5.25) can be broken down as follows:
cMCi (a) =

fMC1 = p
ct
j + p
req
i,j , if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 0
fMC2 = p
req
i,j − pTxj (prcv−i,j), if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1, preqi,j = max
h∈Mj
{preqh,j}
fMC3 = 0 if 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1, preqi,j 6= max
h∈Mj
{preqh,j}.
(5.30)
Figures 5.4a and 5.4b show the cost function of node i under two different cases of
1j(Mj\{i}) = 0 and 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1, presented in (5.30), respectively. As can be
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seen, when 1j(Mj\{i}) = 1, the cost function cMCi (preqi,j ,prcv−i,j) is a piece-wise linear
function. Given the piece-wise linearity of the cost function, we propose the MILP
problem shown in (5.31) for decision making at every node i ∈ P . In the MILP, given
in (5.31), wi is a binary vector of length |Ai| defined as wi = [wi,j|j ∈ Ai] where
wi(j) := wi,j = 1 if node i chooses node j ∈ Aj as its PN. We assume that the nodes
in Ai are sorted according to their index, starting from S.
argmin
preqi ,ti,wi
∑
j∈Ai
wi,jp
cr
i + ti,j, ∀i ∈ P (5.31a)
subject to
wi,jp
min
j ≤ preqi,j ≤ wi,jpmaxj , ∀j ∈ Ai (5.31b)∑
j∈Wi
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
= γmin ∀j ∈ Ai (5.31c)
preqi,j − pTxj (prcv−i,j) + (1− 1j(Mj\{i}))wi,jpctj ≤ ti,j ∀j ∈ Ai (5.31d)∑
j∈Ai
wi,j ≤ Wmax ∀j ∈ Ai (5.31e)
preqi,j , ti,j ∈ R, si,j, wi,j ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ Ai (5.31f)
Due to the piece-wise linearity of cMCi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) we define ti,j as an auxiliary variable
which is used in both (5.31a) and (5.31d). wi,jp
cr
i in (5.31a) represents the power
imposed on the network by node i due to its signal reception power. Moreover, ti,j
in (5.31a) and (5.31d) captures the cost of node i which is a function of the total
transmit power of its chosen PNs. In (5.31b), pminj is the minimum transmit power of a
transmitter in transmission mode. (5.31c) represents the minimum-SNR condition for
signal reception. Finally, (5.31e) can restrict the number of PNs that a CN can choose
if the system designer sets such a restriction.
5.3.3 Shapley value cost sharing scheme
Despite the complexity of the SV, we will show that it can be represented by a piece-wise
linear function, as well as the MC.
Lemma 5.1. Given the definition of PTxj (a) in (5.8), the SV in (4.13) can be written
as
cSVi (a) =
pctj
Mj
+
i∑
n=1
preqn,j − preqn−1,j
Mj + 1− n . (5.32)
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Proof. Using (5.8), the transmit power of a PN j is composed of two parts; pctj as the
fixed circuitry transmit power and the transmit power required for the radio link, i.e.,
pTxj . Since these two parts are independent and since the SV satisfies the additivity
axiom [SLB08, Ch. 12], the cost of a node i can be written as
cSVi (a) = c
SV
i (Mj) + cSVi (preqi,j ,prcv−i,j) (5.33)
in which cSVi (Mj) = pctj /Mj. Moreover, the cost share regarding the requests of the
CNs, by assuming that they can be sorted as
0 = preq0,j ≤ preq1,j ≤ · · · ≤ preqn,j ≤ preqi,j ≤ preqn+2,j ≤ · · · ≤ preqMj ,j, (5.34)
is given by [LO73] [SA11]
cSVi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
i∑
k=1
preqk,j − preqk−1,j
Mj + 1− k . (5.35)
Note that, using Lemma 2.1, the cost share of the nodes for the fixed circuitry power
is shared equally among the nodes and the cost that depends on the radio link power
is shared according to the SV rule defined in (2.23).
Note that, the cost of a node with the SV does not consist of its own reception power.
In fact, here a node aims at minimizing the cost it pays for message reception, which
could be for instance by a token. Hence, we assume that the node merely minimizes
of the power imposed on its chosen PNs.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that the requests received by PN j can be sorted as (5.34). The
SV cost function, resulted from the radio link power requests in (5.35), can be modeled
by a piecewise-linear, increasing function as
cSVi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j
Mj − n +
n≥1∑
k=1
( −preqk,j
(Mj − k)(Mj − k + 1)
)
. (5.36)
Proof. Assume that preqi,j is the (n + 1)th lowest request from PN j as shown in (5.34)
such that preqi,j = p
req
n+1,j. Based on (5.35) by considering i = n + 1, c
SV
j,i (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) can
be written as a function of n as
cSVi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j − preqn,j
Mj + 1− (n+ 1) +
n∑
k=1
preqk,j − preqk−1,j
Mj + 1− k . (5.37)
By expanding the right side of (5.37) and some transformations, (5.37) can be written
as
cSVi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j
Mj − n −
preqn,j
Mj − n +
preqn,j
Mj − n+ 1 + · · · −
preq1,j
Mj − 1 +
preq1,j
Mj
. (5.38)
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Eq. (5.38) is equivalent to
cSVi (p
req
i,j ,p
rcv
−i,j) =
preqi,j
Mj − n +
n≥1∑
k=1
( −preqk,j
(Mj − k)(Mj − k + 1)
)
. (5.39)
It can be derived from (5.39) that the cost of node i is obtained by a linear function
whose slope and y-intercept depend on the interval that preqi,j falls in. Eq. (5.39) shows
that if preqi,j increases and falls inside an interval with a higher n, the slope of the function
cj,i in (5.39) increases accordingly. Besides, the y-intercept of cj,i decreases. Therefore,
cj,i in (5.39) forms a piece-wise linearly increasing function in the interval [0, p
max
j ].
Theorem 5.2. LetMj\i :=Mj\{i} be the set of CNs of PN j without node i with the
number Mj\i of CNs. Let p
req
i,j be the (n+ 1)-th smallest request among the CNs of PN
j as (5.34). Then, the cost of a node i if it joins PN j according to the SV is obtained
by
cSVi (a) = mi(n)p
req
i,j + yi(n,p
rcv
−i,j) (5.40)
in which
mi(n) =
1
Mj\i + 1− n (5.41)
and
yi(n,p
rcv
−i,j) =
pctj
Mj\i + 1
+
n≥1∑
k=1
( −preqk,j
(Mj\i − k + 1)(Mj\i − k + 2)
)
. (5.42)
Proof. It follows from Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2.
Note that, unlike the MC where the cost function of node i changes if the PN has
already another CN (cf. (5.30)), here the cost of node i can always be obtained by a
single closed-form function.
Illustrative Example 5.1. Fig. 5.5 shows cSVi (a) when Mj = {a, b} and preqa,j ≤ preqb,j .
In this case, the cost of node i, using (5.40) can be obtained by
cSVi (a) =

fSV1 = p
req
i,j /3 + p
ct
j /3, if p
req
i,j ≤ preqa,j (n = 0)
fSV2 = p
req
i,j /2 + p
ct
j /3− preqa,j /6, if preqa,j ≤ preqi,j ≤ preqb,j (n = 1)
fSV3 = p
req
i,j + p
ct
j /3− preqa,j /6− preqb,j/2, if preqb,j ≤ preqi,j (n = 2)
Corollary 5.1. The optimal request vector of node i, i.e., preqi can be obtained by
solving an MILP.
The optimal decision of node i can be obtained by the MILP shown in (5.43). Notice
that the parameters used in the MILP of (5.43) are similar to the ones used for the
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Figure 5.5. The cost function of player i with SV. The cost, depending on the requests
of other nodes, can always be found via a linear function.
MC scheme in (5.31). The main difference is the SV-based cost function discussed in
Theorem 5.2.
argmin
preqi ,ti,si,wi
∑
j∈Ai
ti,j, ∀i ∈ P (5.43a)
subject to
wi,jp
min
j ≤ preqi,j ≤ wi,jpmaxj , ∀j ∈ Ai (5.43b)∑
j∈Wi
preqi,j gi,j
σ2
= γmin ∀j ∈ Ai (5.43c)
mi(n)p
req
i,j + yi(n,p
rcv
−i,j) ≤ ti,j ∀j ∈ Ai, for n = 0, . . . ,Mj (5.43d)∑
j∈Ai
wi,j ≤ Wmax ∀j ∈ Ai (5.43e)
preqi,j , ti,j ∈ R, si,j, wi,j ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ Ai (5.43f)
5.4 MRC-based centralized approach with MILP
In the previous section, we discussed the decision-making by the nodes with MC and
SV cost sharing schemes. In this section, we find the global optimum for both the
network energy efficiency and the social cost minimization problems.
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Theorem 5.3. Let { ∗ai}PTxi∈P and {
∗
ai}SCi∈P be the set of optimum action profiles
corresponding to the network’s minimum transmit power and the minimum social
cost (with a budget-balanced cost sharing scheme), respectively. We always have
{ ∗ai}PTxi∈P = {
∗
ai}SCi∈P .
Proof: Theorem 5.3 states that any action profile that minimizes the total transmit
power in the network minimizes the social cost as well. Using the definition of a
budget-balanced cost sharing scheme, for every PN j ∈ N we have∑
i∈Mj
cBBi (a) = P
Tx
j (a). (5.44)
By taking a summation over all the nodes of the network, which can act as PNs, we
get ∑
j∈Q
∑
i∈Mj
cBBi (a) =
∑
j∈Q
PTxj (a). (5.45)
Note that the cost received by PN is equal to the cost paid by its CNs. Therefore,
we can replace the left side of (5.45), which is the total price received by the PNs in
the network, with the total cost paid by the CNs. Hence, the left side of (5.45), using
(5.15), is equivalent to ∑
j∈Q
∑
i∈Mj
cBBi (a) =
∑
i∈P
∑
j∈Wi
cBBi (a)
=
∑
i∈P
Ci(a)
= SC(a) (5.46)
By comparing (5.45) and (5.46), we find that with a budget-balanced cost sharing
scheme, the minimum social cost of the network is equal to the minimum transmit
power of the network.
Before providing the MILP formulation, we define the following.
 S˜: The maximum number of time-slots used for message dissemination in the
network. To avoid notational confusion, between the source and the time-slot,
we show the source node in this formulation by S and (s) represents the time-slot
1 ≤ s ≤ S˜.
 P Tx (transmit power matrix): A (N + 1) × S˜ matrix with P = [pTx(1), . . . ,pTx(S˜)]
in which ps = [p
Tx
S,(s), p
Tx
1,(s), . . . , p
Tx
N,(s)]
ᵀ is a column vector and pTxj,(s) shows the
transmit power of node j in time-slot s.
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 T (transmission matrix): A (N + 1)× S˜ binary matrix with T = [tS, t1, . . . , tN ]ᵀ
in which tj = [tj,(1), tj,(2), . . . , tj,(S˜)] is a row vector of size 1 × S˜ and tj,(s) = 1 if
node j transmits in time-slot s.
 R (reception matrix): A N × S˜ binary matrix with R = [r1, . . . , rN ]ᵀ in which
rj = [ri,(1), ri,(2), . . . , ri,(S˜)] is a row vector of size 1 × S˜ and ri,s = 1 if node i
receives the message from a transmitting node that transmits in time-slot s.
 G (channel gain matrix): A N × (N + 1) matrix with G := [gᵀ1 , . . . , gᵀN ]ᵀ in
which gi = [gi,S, gi,1 . . . , gi,N ] is a 1×N +1 row vector and gi,j is the channel gain
between transmitter j and receiver i. We set gi,j = 0 if j /∈ Ai.
 Γ (SNR matrix): A N × S˜ matrix with Γ := [γ1, . . . ,γN ]ᵀ in which γi =
[γi,S, γi,1 . . . , γi,N ] is a 1 × S˜ row vector and γi,(s) is the SNR received by node i
in time-slot s.
 1N : A vector of size N × 1 with all its elements equal to 1.
 IN(i): A vector of size N × 1 with all elements equal to 1 except the i-th element
which is equal to 0.
Before presenting the optimization problem, we provide the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. (Big M method): Let v1, v2 ∈ R≥0 and b ∈ {0, 1} all be the variables
of an optimization problem. The following non-linear constraint
v1 = v2b (5.47)
can be linearized by the following set of constraints
v1 ≤ v2 (5.48)
v1 ≤Mb (5.49)
v1 ≥ v2 −M(1− b) (5.50)
v1 ≥ 0 (5.51)
in which M is a sufficiently large number so that v2 is upper bounded by M.
Remark 5.3. According to Lemma 5.3, when b = 1, based on the constraints (5.48)
and (5.50), v2 limits v1 from both upper and lower sides as v2 ≤ v1 ≤ v2. Hence,
v1 = v2 if b = 1. Likewise, one can observe that when b = 0, according to (5.49) and
(5.50) we have v2 −M ≤ v1 ≤ 0. Further, based on the constraint (5.51) together with
(5.49) and (5.50) we finally get 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 0 which results in v1 = 0.
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The MILP for the MRC-based multi-hop broadcast is presented in (5.52). Note that,
when the network objective is social cost minimization, we set pcrj = 0 in formulation
(5.52a).
min
P ,T ,R,Γ
S˜∑
s=1
(∑
j∈Q
pTxj,(s) + p
ct
j tj,(s) +
∑
i∈P
pcrj ri,(s)
)
, (5.52a)
s. t.:
tj,(s)p
min
j ≤ pTxj,(s) ≤ tj,(s)pmaxj , ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52b)
tj1S˜ ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Q (5.52c)
ri1S˜ ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ P (5.52d)∑
j∈Q
tj,(s) ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52e)
ri,(s) ≤
∑
j∈Q
tj,(s), ∀i ∈ P , j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52f)
ri,(s) ≤ 1−
s∑
s′=1
ti,(s′), ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52g)
γˆi,(s) = 1
ᵀ
N+1
[
p(s)  IN+1(i)  gᵀi
]
/γthσ2, ∀j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52h)
γi,(s) ≤ γˆi,(s), ∀i ∈ P , 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52i)
γi,(s) ≥ γˆi,(s) −M(1− ri,(s)), ∀i ∈ P , 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52j)
γi,(s) ≤Mri,(s), ∀i ∈ P , 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52k)
γi1S˜ ≥ 1, ∀j ∈ P (5.52l)
tj,(s) ≤
s−1∑
s′=1
γj,(s′), ∀j ∈ P , 2 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52m)
tS,1 = 1 (5.52n)
pTxj,(s), γi,(s) ∈ R≥0, tj,(s), ri,(s) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ P , j ∈ Q, 1 ≤ s ≤ S˜ (5.52o)
The constraint in (5.52b) indicates the transmit power constraint. Based on our
assumption, every node can transmit in one time-slot. This property has been captured
by (5.52c). The condition in (5.52e) indicates that there exists at most one transmission
per time-slot. Further, every node receives the message at least in one time slot as
shown in (5.52d). The constraint in (5.52f) is due to the fact that a reception occurs
in a time-slot if there is at least one transmission. The constraint (5.52g) indicates
that a node i ∈ P does not receive the message if it has already transmitted it. In
fact, ri,s = 0 if node i transmits the messages in one of the previous slots 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s.
The expression in (5.52h), in which  shows the element-wise product, calculates the
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normalized SNR of the signal received at user i in time-slot s. More precisely, given the
transmit powers of the users at time-slot s in ps, the expression ps IN+1(i) gᵀi gives
a vector whose elements are the SNR of the signal received by node i from each of the
transmitters j ∈ Q in time-slot s. We normalize the SNR to γthσ2, so that γˆi,(s) ≤ 1.
Recall that IN+1(i) is an all-one column vector of length N + 1 with the i-th element
equal to zero. This helps us to eliminate the SNR received by node i due to its own
transmission.
Although (5.52h) determines the SNR available at node i in time-slot s, the actual SNR
received by node i depends on whether node i receives the message in this time-slot.
Node i uses the signals transmitted in time-slot s if ri,(s) = 1. The constraints in
(5.52i), (5.52j) and (5.52k) are used based on the big M method, discussed in Lemma
5.3. They have been employed here to find out if node i should receive the message in
time-slot s. More precisely, they linearize the following non-linear constraint
γi,(s) = ri,(s)γˆi,(s) (5.53)
in which γˆi,(s) is a function of the continuous variable p
Tx
i,(s) that makes the right side of
(5.53) non-linear. We linearize (5.53) via (5.52i), (5.52j) and (5.52k). The constraint in
(5.52l) indicates that the aggregated SNR obtained by every node i ∈ P must be higher
than the minimum SNR. Every node i ∈ P can transmit the message in time-slot s if
and only if it receives the message with minimum SNR over the previous time-slots.
The only exception is the source for which we always have tS,1 = 1.
5.5 Performance analysis
5.5.1 Simulation setup
The channel model and its parameters are the same as in Section 4.4.1. The
changes with respect to parameters in Section 4.4.1 are as follows. The total
number of nodes varies between 10 and 25. We consider three circuitry powers,
pc ∈ {1 mW, 10 mW, 100 mW}. The low circuitry power case is suitable for low-power
IoT applications while the high circuitry power can model conventional wireless
transmitters [HCB00, WHY06]. We assume that the transmit and receive circuitry
powers of the nodes in the network are equal, i.e., pcrj = p
ct
j [CGB05]. The results for
the network power and the social cost are normalized to the value v = p˜Tx + p˜c in which
p˜Tx and p˜c represent normalization reference values for the radio link power and the
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circuitry power, respectively. More precisely, the normalized network power and the
normalized social cost are defined as
P totnet(a) =
∑
j∈Q P
tot
j (a)
v
(5.54)
and
SC(a) =
∑
i∈P Ci(a)
v
, (5.55)
respectively, where P¯ totnet(a) is defined in (5.12) and Ci(a) =
∑
j∈Wi c
SV
i (a) in which
cSVi (a) is defined in (5.32). We set p˜
Tx = 200 mW and p˜c = 10 mW. Moreover, we do
not set any limitation on the number of PNs that a CN is allowed to select.
In order to avoid confusion, we clarify the following terms.
 Total power: The summation of the transmission circuitry power, the reception
circuitry power and the power required for transmission over the radio link. The
total power of a node and the total power of the network are defined in (5.12)
and (5.14), respectively. The total power of the network is also referred to as the
network power.
 Total transmit power: The circuitry power required for transmission along with
the power required for transmission over the radio link. Total transmit power
of a node is defined in (5.8). The total transmit power of the network is the
summation of the total transmit power required at the PNs for distributing the
message to all the receiving nodes.
 Total radio link power of the network: The summation of the transmit power of
the PNs required merely for the radio links.
The algorithms that we consider in this section for evaluation are as follows.
 GreedyMRC: The centralized MRC-based greedy algorithm proposed in
[MY04]. This algorithm does not consider the circuitry power of the nodes in
calculating the network power.
 MC-MRC, SV-MRC: Our proposed MRC-based algorithm with MC and SV
cost sharing schemes, referred to as MC-MRC and SV-MRC, respectively.
 MC-OPN, SV-OPN: The algorithm proposed in the previous chapter in which
the nodes can only choose one PN. The MC-based and the SV-based algorithms
are in this case referred to as MC-OPN and SV-OPN, respectively.
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 MILP-MRC, MILP-OPN: the MILP that finds the optimum solution with
and without employing the MRC technique, referred to as MILP-MRC and
MILP-OPN, respectively. MILP-MRC and MILP-OPN are obtained by solving
(5.52) and (4.35), respectively.
5.5.2 Simulation results
We first show the importance of taking the circuitry power into account for message
dissemination. We compare our proposed algorithm with GreedyMRC proposed in
[MY04] which is centralized, ignores the circuitry power required at the nodes and
merely considers the power required for the radio link in network optimization. Figures
5.6a, 5.6b and 5.6c, correspond to low, medium and high circuitry powers, respectively.
First, we observe that by increasing the number of nodes, the network power increases.
This is because the circuitry power required at the nodes for message reception imposes
additional power on the network which is not negligible. Second, we observe in 5.6a
that by increasing the number of nodes, the powers required by both algorithms tend to
saturate. When the network becomes denser, the number of PNs required for covering
the network and serving all the receiving nodes does not necessarily increase. Hence, by
increasing the number of nodes, at some point, the total transmit power of the network
required for message dissemination remains unchanged. However, the circuitry power
required at the nodes makes the total network power continue to increase. The value of
the reception circuitry power in Fig. 5.6c is higher that the other two cases. Thus, in
Fig. 5.6c, even if the total transmit power of the network does not change significantly,
the high value of the circuitry power for message reception dominates the network’s
total transmit power. This results in constant increase of the total power of the network
in Fig. 5.6c.
In comparison to the benchmark, our propose algorithm outperforms it in all the three
cases shown in 5.6. When the circuitry power of the nodes is high, the performance
of our game-theoretic algorithm becomes significantly better than the benchmark
algorithm, see Fig. 5.6c. The main reason is that our proposed approach adapts
the message dissemination strategy according to the circuitry power of the nodes. In
contrast, the nodes in [MY04] transmit over large number of hops in order to minimize
the total radio link power of the network. Since each transmission imposes a circuitry
power on the total power of the network, the actual power required by [MY04] for
message dissemination, after adding the circuitry power of the nodes to the outcome
of the algorithm, becomes significantly high. This is more remarkable with high values
of the circuitry power.
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Figure 5.6. Network power for different numbers N of nodes in the network and
different values pc of circuitry power.
94 Chapter 5: Energy-efficient multi-hop broadcast: Multiple transmitters per user
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
No. N of Nodes
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
n
et
w
or
k
p
ow
er
P
to
t
n
et
(a
)
MILP-MRC - pc = 1 mW
MILP-OPN - pc = 1 mW
MC-MRC - pc = 1 mW
MC-OPN - pc = 1 mW
MILP-MRC - pc = 10 mW
MILP-OPN - pc = 10 mW
MC-MRC - pc = 10 mW
MC-OPN - pc = 10 mW
(a) The network power with pc ∈ {1 mW, 10 mW}.
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
4
6
8
10
12
No. N of Nodes
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
n
et
w
or
k
p
ow
er
P
to
t
n
et
(a
)
MILP-MRC - pc = 100 mW
MILP-OPN - pc = 100 mW
MC-MRC - pc = 100 mW
MC-OPN - pc = 100 mW
(b) The network power with pc = 100 mW.
Figure 5.7. The normalized network power for different numbers N of nodes in the
network and different values pc of circuitry power.
In Fig. 5.7 we evaluate the effect of employing the MRC in message dissemination. We
depict the total power of the network obtained via the MC and the MILP approaches
for different numbers of the nodes and different values of the circuitry power. First, we
observe that with MRC, the message can be disseminated with a lower power compared
to the case of one PN (OPN). Second, we find in Fig. 5.7a that, when the circuitry
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power is low, employing the MRC technique results in a higher gain compared to the
case in which the circuitry power is high. In fact, with low circuitry power (1 mW)
where the power required of the radio link dominates the circuitry power, it is beneficial
for the nodes to combine the signals from multiple PNs. Conversely in 5.7b, where the
circuitry power is high, i.e., 100 mW, the nodes do not exploit the MRC as it requires
reception circuitry power over multiple time-slots. In other words, as shown in Fig.
5.7b, even if the nodes are allowed to choose multiple PNs, they only select one PN
and hence, the performance of the MPN and OPN approaches are almost the same.
Figure 5.8, evaluates the effect of employing MRC on the social cost. As mentioned
earlier, when the objective of the nodes is social cost minimization, the nodes do not
consider their own reception circuitry power. In fact, the goal of the nodes in this case
is to minimize the power imposed on their chosen PNs and consequently to minimize
the cost they pay. Similar to the MC-based game in Fig. 5.7, here, SV-MRC performs
better that SV-OPN in terms of the social cost. In other words, the total cost paid
by the receiving nodes in order to receive the message reduces when they are allowed
to receive the message from more than one PN. By comparing 5.7a and 5.8a, we find
that employing the MRC has a slightly higher gain on the SV-based game than the
MC-based game. The reason is that in the SV-based game, the reception circuitry
power is not considered in the cost function of a CN. Hence, receiving via the MRC
over multiple time-slots imposes a lower cost on the receiving nodes compared to the
MC-based game in which the cost of reception is also included.
In order to find the effect of the MRC technique on nodes’ decision, in Fig. 5.9 we
show the average number of PNs per CNwith two values for the circuitry power, 1 mW
and 10 mW. Considering the MC-MRC and the SV-MRC for low circuitry power, i.e.,
pc = 1 mW, we observe that the average number of PNs per CN for the MC-based
game is higher than that for the SV-based game. The reason is that, since the objective
is network power minimization and since the circuitry power in this case is low, the
nodes exploit the MRC technique to a higher extent than the SV-based game in order
to reduce their costs as well as the network power.
In addition, we observe that, in general, when the circuitry power increases, the average
number of PNs per CN reduces for both the MC-based and the SV-based games. This
reduction is more significant for the MC-based game. Recall that, with the MC-based
game, the cost of a CN with respect to the transmit circuitry power of its PN is either
zero (in multicast) or pc (in unicast), see (5.30). Moreover, according to (5.32), with the
SV-based game, the circuitry power of transmission at the PN is equally shared among
the CNs. In short, the impact of the transmission circuitry power on the cost function
of a node is not as significant as the impact of the reception circuitry power which is
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Figure 5.8. The normalized social cost for different numbers N of nodes and different
values pc of circuitry power.
only captured in the MC-based game. Therefore, as the circuitry power increases from
pc = 1 mW to pc = 10 mW, the nodes in the MC-based game react by choosing a
lower number of PNs. While in contrast, such an increase of the circuitry power has a
lower impact on the decision of the nodes in the SV-based game. For instance, when
there are 20 nodes in the network, by increasing the circuitry power from pc = 1 mW
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Figure 5.10. Normalized network power P totnet(a) versus the number S˜ of time-slots used
for message dissemination.
to pc = 10 mW, the average number of PN per CN with the MC-based game reduces
from 1.26 to 1.11 PNs per CN. These numbers for the SV-based game are 1.18 and
1.16 PNs per CN, respectively.
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Finally, Fig. 5.10 shows how efficient the resources are used in this network for different
algorithms. We plot the network power versus the number of time-slots used in the
network for message dissemination. The optimum MILP-based approach and the
MC-based game are considered with two different values of circuitry power, that is,
pc = 10 mW and pc = 100 mW. Further, the performance of the GreedyMRC is
also shown for the case of pc = 10 mW. Since the network power obtained by the
GreedyMRC for pc = 100 mW is much higher than the other algorithms, we omit the
GreedyMRC for pc = 100 mW. In Fig. 5.10, the closer the points to the origin, the
better the resources are used. As can be seen, when the circuitry power increases, the
number of time-slots required for message dissemination in the network decreases. In
other words, transmissions over a large number of hops impose additional transmission
and reception circuitry powers on the nodes. Hence, cost minimization at the nodes
results in a message dissemination strategy that requires a lower number of time-slots.
Considering both Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.9, it can be inferred that by increasing the
circuitry power, the nodes tend to receive the message from one PN and the multicast
receiving groups are formed by a larger number of CNs so that both the average
number of PNs per CN as well as the average number of time-slots required for message
dissemination reduce.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we extended the game theoretic approach proposed in Chapter 4 in
order to exploit the MRC technique at the receiving nodes. By this technique, the nodes
are able to combine the signals received from multiple transmitting nodes in order to
reduce the network power required for message dissemination. Since the PNs that a
receiving node chooses transmit at different time-slots, the circuitry power for receiving
the message becomes important. We studied two problems in which the goals are
network power minimization, suitable for IoT scenarios, and social cost minimization,
suitable for UCNs. MC and SV cost sharing schemes are employed for decision making
at the nodes in the former and the latter cases, respectively. We proposed an MILP
formulation for decision making by which a node is able to choose its optimum set of
PNs along with the transmit power of each of the chosen PNs. We further proposed
an MILP to find the globally optimum solution. Simulation results showed that
our proposed algorithm outperforms the existing heuristic algorithm concerning the
required power for message dissemination. We further showed that since our proposed
algorithm captures the effect of circuitry power on the network power, the higher the
circuitry power of the nodes, the higher gain is obtained by our proposed algorithm
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in comparison to the centralized greedy approach. Moreover, we found that when the
circuitry power is high, the nodes tend to choose only one PN even though they are
allowed to choose multiple PNs. This is due to the fact that receiving the message
from multiple PNs, over multiple time-slots, imposes additional reception power on the
nodes.
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Chapter 6
User-centric application: Multi-hop video
streaming
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we optimize our game-theoretic network formation algorithm, proposed
in Chapter 4, for video streaming algorithm. We propose a decentralized game-theoretic
algorithm for joint video quality adaptation and overlay network creation in a multi-hop
wireless network. In our model, we capture the preferences of the users concerning the
video quality an individual user wishes to obtain and her preferred level of contribution
to the network. The algorithm provides higher video quality for the users with higher
willingness to contribute, regarding the energy they spend on delivering the video to
others. Our objective here is to improve the video quality perceived by the users while
preserving the network energy efficiency.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: We first overview the scalabe video
coding (SVC) and discuss the QoE measurement in Section 6.2. We extend the system
model, introduced in Chapter 3, in Section 6.3 for a video streaming scenario. Section
6.4 is the main part of this chapter where we completely discuss our proposed algorithm
for the preference-based video streaming. In this section, we first start by modeling the
interactions among the users in Section 6.4.1 including a taxation mechanism. These
interactions have to be taken into account for incentive mechanism and utility design.
In Section 6.4.2 we define the game and its elements. Sections 6.4.2.2 and 6.4.2.3,
respectively, discuss how the utility function and the cost function have to be designed
for individual users. The decision making of the users in terms of the video quality they
prefer to receive and their level of contribution to the network is provided in Section
6.4.2.4. In Section 6.4.2.5 we discuss how the taxation mechanism works and to find
its optimum parameter. Simulation results are provided in Section 6.5 and, finally,
Section 6.6 summarizes this chapter. Parts of this chapter have been published by the
author of this dissertation in [WMA+15,MAHK16,MAK+17,MK19]
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Figure 6.1. The structure of SVC coding [AZP+11]. The base layer is shown in gray.
6.2 Notes on video coding and quality of experience
6.2.1 Scalable Video Coding (SVC)
The SVC is an extension of the H.264 codec that can provide multiple video qualities
with the same content [SMW07]. Using the SVC technique, a video is scaled into several
layers containing a base layer and several enhancement layers. A video encoded by the
SVC, in short, SVC video, has three dimensions: spatial (frame resolution), temporal
(frame rate) and quantization (encoding precision). Fig. 6.1 represents the SVC with
three spatial, temporal and quantization dimensions where each dimension contains
two enhancement layers. The enhancement layers on top of the base layer increase
the video quality and decoding a certain enhancement layer in a dimension requires
receiving all the previous layers in the same scalability dimension. The base layer of
the SVC video, that provides a basic video quality, can be decoded independently.
The biggest advantages of SVC is its adaptability. In fact, the number of layers that
are going to be transmitted from a sender to a receiver can be adapted depending
on the channel quality. For example, when the channel quality between a transmitter
and receiver is very poor, low layers of SVC video that require low data rate can be
transmitted to the receiver. This adaption can reduce the stalling events in video
playbacks which have the highest impact on QoE of the users [AZP+11]. Notice that,
when the channel quality is poor, the packet loss is relatively high, and providing
high video quality at the receiver with smooth playback needs a significantly higher
energy-consumption at the transmitter.
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6.2.2 QoE vs. QoS
Typically for network optimization, a set of objective parameters, like throughput or
energy, are considered as the QoS constraints while the application layer requirements
are usually ignored. It is known that fulfilling merely QoS constraints in video
streaming scenarios may not necessarily result in user satisfaction. The overall user
satisfaction is defined subjectively and is referred to as the QoE. The QoE is measured
by the mean opinion score (MOS) [ITU96]. In MoS, the users score the quality of the
service they receive based on their level of satisfaction. The score is given by a number
between 1 to 5 where 5 and 1 represent the best and worst QoEs, respectively. As the
name suggests, the MOS is the mean of the user’s satisfaction score.
Assessing the QoE via MoS has to be done oﬄine via surveys and therefore, it is time
consuming and may not be applicable for every scenario. To address this problem,
several methods have been proposed to objectively measure the QoE, referred to as the
objective QoE (OQoE) [CWZ15]. Peak signal power to noise power ratio (PSNR) is one
of the most widely-used OQoE measures in the literature for assessing the video quality
perceived by the users [CSRK11]. Studies show that measures like the PSNR do not
really reflect the user satisfaction as they are content-agnostic [WB09]. In fact, they
rely mainly on bit-level accuracy of data transmission and do not consider the human
visual system (HVS). To take the properties of HVS into account other measures have
been proposed, e.g., structural similarity index metric (SSIM) [WBSS04], video quality
metric (VQM) [PW04], and psuedo-subjective quality assessment (PSQA) [MR02]. A
more comprehensive review can be found in [CSRK11] [SSBC10] [CWZ15].
In this dissertation, we use the VQM as the OQoE metric1. The VQM is a full-reference
and user validated metric. It assigns a value between 0 and 1 to the video quality
such that a VQM value closer to 1 shows a higher QoE. Measurements show that the
VQM values for the QoE are highly correlated with the ones obtained by subjective
evaluations [CSRK11].
6.3 System model extension
6.3.1 Video model
The considered video is layered and encoded by scalable video coding (SVC) [SMW07].
The dimensions of the SVC are shown by S for spatial dimension (frame resolution),
1In the rest, we merely use the term QoE.
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Figure 6.2. The proposed approach for the dissemination of a layered video. Receiving
more layers results in higher quality.
T for temporal dimension (frame rate) and Q for quantization dimension (encoding
precision). We refer to a video layer by a tuple (x, y, z) where 0 ≤ x ≤ |S|, 0 ≤ y ≤ |T|,
and 0 ≤ z ≤ |Q| in which |S|, |T| and |Q| are the maximum number of enhancement
layers in spatial, temporal and quantization dimensions, respectively. The base layer of
the SVC video, denoted by (0, 0, 0), provides a basic video quality and can be decoded
independently.
The streamed video in the network is encoded into L layers and the set L = {1, . . . , L}
shows the set of video layers where video layer l requires a transmission rate of d(l) bits
per second. l = 1 represents the base layer which always has to be transmitted first.
Since there are three dimensions in an SVC video, it is essential to determine which of
the scalability dimensions (spatial, temporal or quantization), the first enhancement
layer (l = 2) belongs to. More precisely, the first enhancement video layer can be
either (1, 0, 0) or (0, 1, 0) or (0, 0, 1). In Sec. 6.5, we explain how we put different video
layers into order. For now, we assume that the layers of the video in L are ordered and
decoding a layer l ∈ L implies receiving layer l− 1 as well. A layer l increases the QoE
of a user by q(l) and q = [q(1), . . . , q(l)]T is an L× 1 vector containing the VQM values
of all the layers such that q(l) > 0. We assume that the values of q(l) are available in
the metadata of the video.
A node in the network receives a video layer l ∈ L either directly from the source or via
another node in P . Since the video contains L layers, we propose forming L separate
broadcast trees such that each video layer is disseminated by a different broadcast tree,
see Fig 6.2. A user determines how many of these broadcast trees she prefers to join.
The PN of a CN for the l-th layer of the video is denoted by a
(l)
i . The set of CNs of PN
j for layer l that receive layer l via a multicast transmission from PN j is denoted here
by M(l)j with cardinality |M(l)j | = M lj. Note that a receiving node may have different
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PNs for different video layers. Throughout this chapter, the transmitting nodes on the
hops from the source to the PN of a node i are called the upstream nodes of node i.
Moreover, the nodes toward the edge of the network which rely on node i on receiving
the video are called the downstream nodes of node i.
We define the vector bi = [b
(1)
i , . . . , b
(L)
i ] of size 1 × L with b(l)i ∈ {0, 1} as a binary
indicator where b
(l)
i = 1 shows that layer l is received by node i. More precisely, we
have
b
(l)
i =
{
1, ∃j ∈ Ni, a(l)i = j, bl−1i ≥ b(l)i
0, otherwise
(6.1)
in which Ni represents the neighboring nodes of user i. Condition b(l−1)i ≥ b(l)i in (6.1)
indicates that the layers of the video must be received in consecutive order. We define
the QoE of a user i as the aggregated quality of each video layer, i.e.,
Qi = biq. (6.2)
6.3.2 System model
The total energy required at PN j for unicast transmission of layer l to CN i, denoted
by e
(l),uni
i,j , depends on the data rate d
(l) of the layer as
e
(l),uni
i,j =
d(l)
nb
(
punii,j + p
ct
j
)
Ts (6.3)
in which punii,j is the unicast power required for the link between PN j and CN i defined
in (3.4). nb in (6.3) is the number of bits per symbol transmitted from the PN j with
symbol duration Ts. We assume that nb and Ts are the same at all the nodes and all
the video layers. In general, the energy required for transmission of layer l is given by
e
(l)
j = max
i∈M(l)j
{
e
(l),uni
i,j
}
. (6.4)
The vector ej = [e
(1)
j , . . . , e
(L)
j ]
T is an L × 1 vector with elements representing the
consumed energy at node j for transmission of each of the video layers.
We define the vector of video layers transmitted by node j as a 1 × L binary vector
tj = [t
(1)
j , . . . , t
(L)
j ] in which
t
(l)
j =
{
1, M(l)j 6= ∅
0, otherwise,
(6.5)
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Figure 6.3. Proposed channel access scheme.
so that the total energy consumed at of PN j is given by Ej = tjej.
For the channel access scheme, we propose using both time and frequency where
each video layer is transmitted on a different orthogonal channel. For instance, in
an OFDM-based transmission, each video layer can be transmitted over one or a group
of dedicated subcarriers. Besides, we assume that each channel, which is dedicated to a
BT, is time-slotted and composed of two sections. The first section as a random-access
section used for overhead exchange and BT construction and the second section as
a scheduled section for video dissemination, see Fig. 6.3. Such an access for the
BT construction of a video layer has been discussed in Section 3.3. Note that our
calculations in this chapter, for instance, for energy consumption, cost, etc., are for
one second of video. Moreover, we focus on the initial overlay BT construction given
the preferences of the users, however, since the proposed algorithm is decentralized it
can be updated over the time if required.
6.4 Proposed video dissemination model
6.4.1 Interactions among the users
Before explaining our game-theoretic algorithm, we first introduce different interactions
among the users in this network and the parameters involved. In this network, as shown
in Fig. 6.4, for any one-hop transmission from a PN to a CN (or a group of CNs in
a multicast transmission), a cost is paid to the PN by the CN. The payment in this
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Figure 6.4. A CN receives video layers and pays tokens in exchange.
network is by tokens that the users already possess. From the PN’s point of view, the
cost paid by the CN is referred to as the direct reward.
Definition 6.1. (Cost) Let c
(l)
i be the cost that node i pays for layer l and ci =
[c
(1)
i , . . . , c
(L)
i ]
T represent a vector that contains the cost paid by node i to the PNs of
each layer, then, the total cost paid by node i to its PNs in order to receive the video
is given by
Ci = bici. (6.6)
In the next subsection, we explain how the exact value of the cost, assigned to a
receiving user, has to be calculated based on the energy spent by a forwarding user.
Definition 6.2. (Direct reward) Let βi > 0 be the reward demand coefficient (RDC)
of node i. The direct reward of user i for forwarding layer l to her CNs m ∈ M(l)i , is
defined as
r
(l)
i = βie
(l)
i . (6.7)
βi in (6.7), as the RDC of node i, shows the willingness of node i to contribute to the
network. Lower values of βi represent an altruistic user while higher values imply that
user i is reluctant for contributing to the network unless she receives a high reward.
The RDC for a user who does not want to forward the video to others will be set to
β =∞ so that it will not be chosen as a PN.
By defining an L× 1 vector ri = [r(1)i , . . . , r(L)i ]T containing the direct rewards received
by node i for each of its transmitted video layers, the total direct reward obtained by
node i is given by
Ri = tiri = tiβiei. (6.8)
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Figure 6.5. The interactions among the nodes for receiving the video and sending the
rewards (direct, indirect) back to their PNs.
To capture the impact of a node’s contribution to the network, we design a taxation
mechanism. The taxation mechanism provides a higher reward for the nodes whose
contribution plays a crucial role in the network. For instance, in Fig. 6.5, node i plays
a more important role in the network than node m. Using this mechanism, a tax is
paid from a CN to her corresponding PN in case that the received video layer by the
CN is further transmitted to other nodes. Unlike the direct reward that depends on
the energy that a PN spends, the taxation mechanism reflects the importance of the
role that a node plays in the network.
If node m in Fig. 6.5 forwards the video layer l to her CNs and receives a direct reward
from them, node i as the PN of node m receives an indirect reward from her. The
indirect reward received by PN i is called tax from node m’s point view, see Fig. 6.5.
We denote the tax paid by node m to node i for layer l by x
(l)
i,m. Using an L× 1 vector
xm = [x
(1)
m , . . . , x
(L)
m ]T containing the tax paid by node m for each of the video layers,
the total tax paid by node m is given by
Xm = tmxm. (6.9)
Definition 6.3. (Indirect reward) The indirect reward received by PN i for layer l
is denoted by
◦
r
(l)
i and given by
◦
r
(l)
i =
∑
m∈M(l)i
x(l)m . (6.10)
Note that in Fig. 6.5, node i has two CNs. While node i receives a direct reward from
both of its CNs, the indirect reward is just received from node m as the CN who further
forwards the video. By defining
◦
ri = [
◦
r
(1)
i , . . . ,
◦
r
(L)
i ]
T that contains the indirect rewards
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a node receives for forwarding each of the layers, the total indirect reward received by
node i is obtained by
◦
Ri = ti
◦
ri. (6.11)
Definition 6.4. (Virtual income): The virtual income of a node is defined as the
sum of its direct and indirect rewards as
Vi = Ri +
◦
Ri = ti (ri +
◦
ri) = ti (βiei +
◦
ri) (6.12)
where vi = ri +
◦
ri is a vector containing the virtual income of node i for the video
layers.
In this network, every user transfers a portion θ of her virtual income as the tax to her
PNs. The value of 0 ≤ θ < 1 as the tax rate is a design parameter and assumed to be
fixed for all the nodes in the network independent of the user preference.
Definition 6.5. (Tax) The tax paid by node i for layer l is equal to θ times of its
virtual income as x
(l)
i = θt
(l)
i v
(l)
i = θ
(
r
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
. The tax vector paid by node i for all
the layers is defined as
xi = θVi = θti(ri +
◦
ri). (6.13)
Note that a CN pays a tax just to the PNs of the layers which have been forwarded
to others by her. For the layers that she does not forward, she pays merely the cost of
the video layer.
6.4.2 Game-theoretic model
6.4.2.1 Definition
Here, we extend the game theoretic model we used for a single layer in Chapter 4.
Since we have a separate broadcast-tree for each of the layers, the players of the game
for each layer are denoted by P(l) such that P(l) ⊂ P . The action of player i for layer
l, denoted by a
(l)
i , is to choose a PN from whom it receives the video layer l. A(l)i is the
action set of player i for layer l, consisting of the candidate parents of CN i that can
transmit layer l to it. Further, A(l)i ∈ A(l) where A(l) :=×i∈P A(l)i is the joint action
set of the game for layer l in which×denotes the Cartesian product. The action set
of user i for all the layers is shown by ai = {a(l)i }l∈L and a−i represents the action sets
of all the players except player i. The action profile of the game over all the layers is
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denoted by a = (ai,a−i) ∈ A where A :=×l∈LA(l) is the joint action set of the whole
game over all the layers.
Similar to the definition in (3.10), we define R(l)i as a set that contains the nodes on
the path from the source to node i for video layer l. Thus, node j can be a candidate
parent for node i for layer l if node i is not on the path of node j to the source. We
set R(l)S = {S},∀l ∈ L and the route of CN i whose PN for layer l is node j is given by
R(l)i = R(l)j ∪ {i} and h(l)i = |R(l)i | − 1 = |R(l)j | shows the number of transmission hops
from the source to node i. Second, video transmission over a large number of hops
increases the delay for the nodes at the edge of the network. Hence, we assume that
the number of hops from the source to a user cannot exceed hmax. Considering these
two constraints, the action set of node i for layer l is defined as
A(l)i =
{
j
∣∣∣∣j ∈ N (l)i , i /∈ R(l)j , |R(l)j | ≤ hmax} . (6.14)
The set of actions of node i is the joint actions of node i for all the layers as
ai =
{
a
(l)
i
∣∣∣∣a(l)i ∈ A(l)i , 1 ≤ l ≤ L} . (6.15)
The proposed game is iterative, and the nodes follow the best response dynamics
strategy defined in Section 2.2.1.2. A utility function assigns a value to every node
based on the action taken by the nodes such that ui(a
(l)
i ,a
(l)
−i) : A(l) → R,∀i ∈ P in
which ui(a
(l)
i ,a
(l)
−i) is the utility of node i for layer l and R represents the real numbers.
Ui(ai,a−i) =
∑
l∈L ui(a
(l)
i ,a
(l)
−i) is the overall utility of the node in the network. The
game G is formally defined by the tuple G =< {P(l)}l∈L, {A(l)i }i∈P,l∈L, {Ui}i∈P >. The
proposed game G is child-driven, that is, a node as a CN chooses her PNs for different
layers. In other words, for a certain layer l, a node either refuses to receive that layer,
i.e., b
(l)
i = 0, or if it decides to receive the video layer l, then, i.e., b
(l)
i = 1, and
a
(l)
i = j, j ∈ A(l)i .
6.4.2.2 Utility design based on user preferences
The utility function of a node must capture three main aspects: the user’s utility
must (i) increase by receiving higher video quality as it improves user satisfaction, (ii)
decrease by the cost the user pays for receiving video layers, (iii) increase when the
user receives a reward in exchange of forwarding the video. Thus, We define the utility
function of a user i ∈ Q as
Ui := Ui(ai,a−i) = Qi − ζ (αiCi +Xi) + ζ
(
Ri +
◦
Ri
)
(6.16)
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in which αi is a user-dependent coefficient that reflects the importance of the video
quality for user i. More precisely, a lower value for αi degrades the impact of the cost
paid by the user in the utility function versus the video quality she perceives. Thus, a
user who is interested in receiving a high video quality is represented by a low value
of αi. Moreover, in (6.16), ζ matches the physical dimensions of parameters and also
determines the value of contribution in the network. For example, in a token-based
reward, by choosing a proper ζ, the system designer determines how many tokens per
energy unit have to be transferred from a CN to her PN. For the sake of brevity in the
rest of this chapter, we assume ζ = 1.
It should also be remarked that a user can interactively and subjectively set her
preferences, regarding the video quality she prefers to receive and her level of
contribution. The user’s inputs then need to be turned to objective parameters, i.e.,
αi in (6.16) and βi (in Ri defined in (6.8)), to be used in the utility function. Such a
conversion is out of the focus of our work.
Observation 6.1. The utility function of node i ∈ P can be written as
Ui =
∑
l∈L
b
(l)
i Π
(l),rx
i + t
(l)
i Π
(l),tx
i (6.17)
in which
Π
(l),rx
i = q
(l) − αic(l)i , Π(l),txi = (1− θ)
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
. (6.18)
Proof. Using (6.2), (6.6), (6.9), (6.8), (6.11) in (6.16) gives
Ui= biq − αibici − tixi + tiri + ti ◦ri
= bi (q − αici) + ti (ri + ◦ri − θ(ri + ◦ri)) . (6.19)
Expanding (6.19) over the layers and inserting (6.7) in it, we get
Ui =
∑
l∈L
b
(l)
i
(
q(l) − α(l)i c(l)i
)
+ t
(l)
i (1− θ)
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
. (6.20)
If user i decides to receive layer l, then her action is given by
a
(l)
i = argmin
j∈A(l)i
c
(l)
j,i (b
(l)
i = 1). (6.21)
Recall that b
(l)
i is the decision variable of user i for layer l. The NE is then defined by
U(a∗i ,a
∗
−i) ≥ U(ai,a−i), ∀i ∈ P ,a∗,a ∈ A. (6.22)
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6.4.2.3 Choice of the cost function
The cost function plays a critical role in our proposed mechanism. Depending on her
cost, the decision of a user in the network, and consequently, her QoE may significantly
change. In this work, we restrict our attention to the class of budget-balanced
cost-sharing schemes which is defined in (4.15).
The cost-sharing scheme to be used in this network must have the following properties:
i) It has to be budget-balanced so that the reward obtained by a PN (with RDC βi = 1)
is equal to the value of energy she consumes. ii) It has to guarantee the convergence of
the game to an NE. iii) It must prevent free-riding so that c
(l)
i,m > 0,∀i ∈ M(l)i . iv) It
has to be scaled by the RDC of a transmitter, so that the higher the RDC, the higher
the cost allocated to its CNs. v) It must be fair in order to assign a cost to a CN in
proportion to the energy she imposes on her chosen PN.
We choose the Shapley value as the cost-sharing scheme that not only satisfies all
the conditions above [SLB08], but also it allows the nodes to perform transmit-power
control without compromising the convergence of the game [MASK19].
Definition 6.6. (Shapley value): Assume that the required direct rewards for
every unicast link from the PN j to the multicast receiving nodes in M(l)j are sorted as
0 ≤ βje(l),uni1,j ≤ · · · ≤ βje(l),uniM lj ,j such that e
(l)
j = e
(l),uni
M lj ,j
. Then, the cost that CN i pays to
PN j for layer l, based on the Shapley value, is obtained by [LO73]
c
(l)
j,i = βj
i∑
k=1
e
(l),uni
k,j − e(l),unik−1,j
M lj + 1− k
, a
(l)
i = j. (6.23)
Lemma 6.1. A non-cooperative cost-sharing game with the Shapley value as the
cost-sharing scheme is a potential game [MW13a].
Proposition 6.1. The game G converges to an NE.
Proof. The game G that we propose is played for each layer l ∈ L separately. Although
receiving the higher layers implies receiving the lower layers, the main difference in the
game of layer l compared to layers l′ > l is the difference between the number of players,
i.e., |P(l′)| ≤ |P(l)|. Hence, to evaluate the convergence of the game, we can focus on
one layer. The game G, for a given layer l, can be seen as a multicast cost-sharing
game in which the nodes choose a resource with minimum cost to maximize their utility
function. Based on lemma 6.1, the game G is a potential game that possesses at least
one NE which can be reached by employing the best response dynamics [MS96].
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Remark 6.1. As stated in Section 2.2.1.3, the performance of a game theoretic
algorithm can be measured by analyzing its worst-case performance, called the price
of anarchy (PoA). Due to the dependency of the video layers to each other and the
complexity of the proposed framework that includes a joint incentive and taxation
mechanism, it is not straightforward to find the PoA of the game G. Nevertheless,
under a special case where the nodes do not perform power control and use a fixed
transmit power instead, the PoA can be obtained. In such a case, according to Lemma
2.1, the SV equally shares the cost of transmission among the CNs of a PN as 1/Mj.
Considering a fixed and equal transmit power for the nodes of the network and by
setting θ = 0, L = 1 and pctj = 0, the PoA of the game with SV rule is bounded by
O(
√
N log2N) [CCLE+07].
Theorem 6.1. The social welfare of the game G is given by
SW =
1
|Q|
(∑
i∈P
bi(q − αici) +
∑
i∈Q
tiβiei
)
. (6.24)
Proof. According to (2.6) the SW is defined as
SW =
1
|Q|
∑
i∈Q
Ui(ai,a−i). (6.25)
To find the social welfare of (6.24), without loss of generality, we first focus on one
layer l ∈ L. Further, we omit b(l)i and t(l)i for the nodes which receive or transmit the
video layer l, respectively, as they are equal to 1, cf. (6.5) and (6.1). Since the source
is the owner of the video and does not pay for the video, Π
(l),rx
S in (6.18) for the source
is equal to zero. Hence, the utility of the source node for layer l is equal to her virtual
income, and according to (6.16), is given by
u
(l)
S = βSe
(l)
S +
◦
r
(l)
S . (6.26)
Using (6.11), we can extend
◦
r
(l)
S in (6.26) as
◦
r
(l)
S =
∑
i∈M(l)S
θv(l)m =
∑
i∈M(l)S
θ
(
r
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
= θ
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
. (6.27)
Then, the utility of the source in (6.26) is written as
u
(l)
S = βSe
(l)
S + θ
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
. (6.28)
Using (6.20), the sum of utilities of the CNs of the source in M(l)S is given by∑
i∈M(l)S
u
(l)
i =
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
q
(l)
i − αic(l)S,i + (1− θ)
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
))
=
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
q
(l)
i − αic(l)S,i + βie(l)i + ◦r(l)i
)
− θ
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
. (6.29)
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Using (6.28) and (6.29), the sum of the utilities of the source node and its CNs is equal
to ∑
i∈{S}∪M(l)S
u
(l)
i =
∑
i∈M(l)S
(
q
(l)
i − αic(l)S,i
)
+
∑
i∈{S}∪M(l)S
βie
(l)
i +
∑
i∈M(l)S
◦
r
(l)
i . (6.30)
The very right term in (6.30) is the indirect reward of the CNs of the source in M(l)S .
Similar to (6.27), one can extend (6.30) toward the edge of the network where the
nodes do no forward the video and the very right term becomes equal to zero. Hence,
by a summation over all the layers, it is straightforward to find the social welfare given
in (6.24).
As it can be observed, the social welfare trades the average QoE of the users and the
reward they receive off against the cost they pay.
Definition 6.7. (Social Cost) The social cost of the game G is defined as the total
payment of the users for receiving the service as
SC =
∑
i∈Q
Ci +Xi. (6.31)
Theorem 6.2. The social cost of the game G with a budget-balanced cost-sharing
scheme is equal to the total reward received by the contributing users of the network,
i.e.,
SC =
∑
i∈Q
Ri =
∑
i∈Q
tiβiei. (6.32)
Proof. The proof outline is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.1. By summing up the
costs paid by CNs, and since with a budget-balanced cost-sharing scheme, the tax
paid by CNs is equal to the indirect reward received by their respective PNs, (6.32) is
obtained.
Observation 6.2. If αi = 1,∀i ∈ P, then the SW in (6.24) is given by
SW =
1
|Q|
∑
i∈P
biq. (6.33)
Proof. The proof is straightforward using Theorem 6.2 and the proof given for Theorem
6.1.
Observation 6.3. No new token is generated and the total number of tokens in the
network remains unchanged.
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Based on Theorem 6.2, the total cost paid by the receiving users in the network is equal
to the reward obtained by the contributing users as the social cost. In other words,
the taxation mechanism that we propose is a way to transfer the tokens from receiving
nodes to the to contributing users. Note that we assume the nodes possesses enough
tokens for payment.
6.4.2.4 Decision making in two stages
Every node that receives the video, including the source as the first node, distributes a
so-called HELLO message in the network. This message contains the number of video
layers and the corresponding VQM value of each layer. In addition, it contains the
list of CNs of a PN for each layer and the corresponding unicast power required for
the link to each of the CNs. The game is child-driven, and after receiving the HELLO
message, a node decides about the number of video layers she wants to receive and the
corresponding PN for each layer. Before discussing how a node solves its problem, we
present the following corollary.
Observation 6.4. In (6.18), we always have Π
(l),tx
i ≥ 0. Then, if a node which
possesses a given layer, receives a request from another node to serve it as a PN,
accepting the request is a dominant strategy.
Corollary 6.1. The decision of node i is just determined by b
(l)
i ,∀l ∈ L.
More precisely, if a node i already possesses a layer, it forwards if it receives a request.
If it does not possess the layer while receiving a request, then, b
(l)
i determines whether
node i receives this layer (and consequently forwards). We define W(l)i as the set of
nodes which request video layer l from node i and replace t
(l)
i by 1
(l)
i ∈ {0, 1} as a
binary indicator such that 1
(l)
i = 1, if {M(l)i ∪W(l)i } 6= ∅.
To make a decision, a node solves its utility maximization problem in two stages with
different constraints that we explain using Fig. 6.5 in the following.
Stage 1: Receive a number of available video layers
At the first stage, every node i ∈ P maximizes her utility function by finding the best
PNs j ∈ A(l)i , ∀l ∈ L based on the layers that are currently available at her neighboring
nodes. Then, node i joins the chosen PNs by sending a JOIN message to them. The
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optimization problem at a node can be formulated as an integer programming problem
as:
OPT 1: max
bi
∑
l∈L
b
(l)
i
(
Π
(l),rx
i + 1
(l)
i Π
(l),tx
i
)
(6.34a)
s.t.:
b
(l)
i ≤ b(l−1)i , 2 ≤ l ≤ L, (6.34b)
b
(l)
i ∈ {0, 1}. (6.34c)
(6.34b) indicates that to get a specific video layer, receiving the previous layers is
necessary. Recall that the binary indicator 1
(l)
i = 1 if node i has a CN or a request for
video layer l.
Stage 2: Request the preferred video layers
Let us assume that node i decides to receive L
(r)
i layers as a result of solving OPT 1.
At the second stage, node i assumes that all the layers of the video are available at
all of its neighboring nodes, i.e, b
(l)
j = 1, ∀j ∈ Ni and solves the utility maximization
problem for L
(r)
i +1 ≤ l ≤ L under the new assumption. If receiving higher video layers
improves the utility of node i, then, node i is able to increase its utility by receiving
additional layers that are currently not available at its neighboring nodes2. In this case,
node i incentivizes another user, say node j, to get additional video layers that node i
wishes to receive. More precisely, node i proposes to pay a tax equal to x
(l)
i = θv
(l)
i to
node j indicating its interest in receiving video layer l, see Fig. 6.5. Then, node j, by
having such a proposed indirect reward from user i (equal to
◦
r
(l)
i = x
(l)
i ), can get the
video layer l from another user and serve node i (if doing so improves its utility). To
ask a node j ∈ Ni for additional layers, node i sends a request message (REQ) to node
j so that we have i ∈ W(l)j . The optimization problem at the second stage is written
as:
OPT 2: max
bi
∑
l∈L
b
(l)
i
(
Π
(l),rx
i + 1
(l)
i Π
(l),tx
i
)
(6.35a)
s.t.:
b
(l)
i ≤ b(l−1)i , L(r)i + 2 ≤ l ≤ L, (6.35b)
b
(l)
i = 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ L(r)i , (6.35c)
b
(l)
j = 1, ∀j ∈ A(l)i , l ∈ L, (6.35d)
b
(l)
i ∈ {0, 1}, L(r)i + 1 ≤ l ≤ L, (6.35e)
2Note that, if a preferred video layer was available in the neighboring area, the node would receive
it as a result of solving OPT 1.
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Algorithm 2 Decision making by node i
1: HELLO message is received at node i
2: for for all l ∈ L do
3: Find A(l)i
4: for for all j ∈ A(l)j do
5: Calculate the unicast energy using (6.3)
6: Calculate c
(l)
j,i using (6.23)
7: Find a
(l)
i using (6.21) and corresponding c
(l)
i
8: end for
9: Find
◦
r
(l)
i using (6.10)
10: Calculate Π
(l),rx
i and Π
(l),tx
i using (6.18)
11: end for
12: Solve (6.34)
13: for for all l ∈ L do
14: if b
(l)
i = 1 and node i has no PN for layer l then
15: JOIN : i
l−→ j, a(l)i = j
16: R(l)i = R(l)j ∪ {i}
17: else if b
(l)
i = 1 and node i receives layer l then
18: LEAVE : i
l−→ current parent
19: JOIN : i
l−→ j, a(l)i = j
20: R(l)i = R(l)j ∪ {i}
21: end if
22: end for
23: Solve (6.35)
24: for for all l ≥ L(r)i do
25: if b
(l)
i = 1 then
26: REQ : i
l−→ j, a(l)i = j
27: Propose x
(l)
j,i = θ
(
βie
(l)
i +
◦
r
(l)
i
)
28: end if
29: end for
30: Broadcast the HELLO message
When it comes to node j to decide, it first finds r
(l)
j and
◦
r
(l)
j based on (6.7) and (6.10)
over the setW lj (instead ofMlj) for all the layers l ∈ L. Then, it solves the optimization
problems OPT1 and OPT2 as explained above. The same procedure is performed
at every node. Through iterations, when a node that currently receives layer l finds
another PN that improves her utility, the node sends LEAVE and JOIN messages to her
current PN and new PN, respectively. Table 2 provides a Pseudo-code that describes
the whole algorithm. In this table, sending a message from CN i to PN j for layer l of
the video, say a JOIN message, is denoted by JOIN : i
l−→ j.
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Figure 6.6. A structure in which node i’s contribution is vital for the network.
6.4.2.5 Notes on the tax rate
The tax paid by the users influences the decision of the nodes and their collaboration.
From a designer’s perspective, the optimum value of the tax rate, denoted by θ∗, is
defined as the value that maximizes the utility of a user and consequently maximizes
the chance for her contribution. For instance, a proper value of θ can incentivize node
i in Fig. 6.6 which is located at a critical point of the network so that it provides
further video layers to the nodes located at its downstream. The optimum value of θ,
i.e., θ∗, depends on the structure of the broadcast-tree and the position of the node in
it. Since the nodes in the network are randomly distributed, and the broadcast-tree
does not have a fixed structure, there does not exist a unique θ∗ for every node and
every structure.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider the structure shown in Fig. 6.6 as an
instance, and find θ∗ for the node i which is located at a critical point. This will give
us a sense of how the tax rate has to be set. Let us assume that the nodes are evenly
distribute over the network, so that the energy consumption of the PNs for a given
video layer is equal. We denote the average reward that a node receives from its CNs
by r¯ = E[βme(l)m ],∀m ∈ Q.
In this structure, the broadcast-tree consists of H hops in total, node i has M CNs
and the other nodes have one CN. Note that M = 1 in Fig. 6.6 corresponds to a line
structure.
Lemma 6.2. In a line structure for a broadcast-tree, the average utility function
corresponding to video layer l for a node i ∈ P who is (H−1) hops away from the edge
of the network, is
u¯i
(l) = q(l) +
(
1− αi − θ(H−1)
)
r¯. (6.36)
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Proof. By expanding (6.20), the average value of the utility function of node i is given
by
u¯i
(l) = q(l) − αir¯ + (1− θ)
(
r¯ + θ
(
r¯ + θr¯ + · · ·+ θ(H−3)r¯))
= q(l) − αir¯ + (1− θ)
(
1 + θ(1 + θ + · · ·+ θ(H−3))) r¯. (6.37)
The right side of (6.37) contains a geometric sum. Hence,
u¯i
(l)= q(l) − αir¯ + (1− θ)
(
1 + θ
(
1− θ(H−2)
1− θ
))
r¯
= q(l) − αir¯ +
(
1− θ + θ (1− θ(H−2))) r¯ (6.38)
= q(l) +
(
1− αi − θ(H−1)
)
r¯. (6.39)
Now, the we have the following theorem for θ∗.
Theorem 6.3. The optimum value of the tax rate, θ∗, that maximizes the utility of
node i in Fig. 6.6 is given by
θ∗ = (H−2)
√
M − 1
M(H − 1) , M ≥ 1, H ≥ 2. (6.40)
Proof. We assume that node i does not possess video layer l ∈ L while the other nodes
request this layer from their respective upstream nodes. The optimum value of θ for
motivating node i for contributing to the network is the value that maximizes its utility
function. Similar to (6.38) in Lemma 6.2, the average utility of node i with M CNs
can be written it as
u¯i
(l) = q(l) − αir¯ +
(
1− θ +Mθ (1− θ(H−2))) r¯
= q(l) − αir¯ +
(
1 + (M − 1)θ +−Mθ(H−1)) r¯. (6.41)
Taking the derivative of (6.37) with respect to θ leads to
du¯i
dθ
=
(
M − 1−M(H − 1)θ(H−2)) r¯. (6.42)
Setting (6.42) to zero results in (6.40).
Note that the optimum value of θ is independent of the average reward required for the
links and the video layer, that is, rˆ and l, respectively. We show θ∗ in Fig. 6.7 and Fig.
6.8 for different values of M and H, respectively. Interestingly, for a line structure,
the optimum value of the tax rate is θ = 0. In fact, the selfish behavior of the node
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Figure 6.7. The optimum tax rate for node i in the structure given in Fig. 6.6 versus
different values of M .
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Figure 6.8. The optimum tax rate for node i in the structure given in Fig. 6.6 versus
different values of H.
i results in receiving the total reward of its contribution for itself as it plays a critical
role for others. When M increases, θ∗ increases as well and the best strategy for node
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i is to provide the layers for the nodes and benefit from the tax that the downstream
nodes pay.
Corollary 6.2. High values of tax rate θ degrade the network performance.
Proof. Eq. (6.40) shows that θ∗ for a node like i increases by the number M of CNs
it serves, see Fig. 6.7 and Fig. 6.8. Such a result is obtained by assuming that all
the other downstream nodes of node i have already received a request from its CN
and sent it to their upstream nodes until the final requests reach node i. Since node
i’s downstream nodes have just one CN each, θ∗ for them, according to (6.40) and by
considering M = 1 is equal to 0. Therefore, even if one has to increase θ for a node like
i to increase the chance of its contribution, nodes i’s contribution depends on receiving
a request from its downstream nodes which will be incentivized with lower values of θ.
Therefore, with an equal tax rate for the whole network, when θ increases, the overall
chance for nodes’ contribution is expected to decrease.
6.5 Performance analysis
6.5.1 Simulation setup
We consider a 1000m × 1000m network in which the nodes are randomly and uniformly
distributed. The number of nodes varies between 20 and 50, and in each realization of
the network, one of the nodes is randomly chosen as the source. The channel model and
its parameters are the same as in Section 4.4.1. Here, as the video quality is sensitive
to packet-loss, we set the minimum required SNR at the receiving nodes is set to
γth = 15 dB. Further, we assume that pmaxj ∈ [250, 350] mW and pctj ∈ [150, 250]
mW, respectively. The number of bits per symbol is set to nb = 2 with symbol
duration Ts = 10
−6s. Similar to the previous chapters, the simulations are carried
out in MATLAB and the optimization problems of are solved using CVX along with
Gurobi.
6.5.2 Properties of the video layers and the order of the
enhancement layers
The videos used through the simulation are three videos encoded by scalable video
Coding H.264/SVC provided by xiph.org3 called CrowdRun, BlueSky and ParkJoy.
3https://media.xiph.org/video/derf/
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Table 6.1. Video properties used for the simulation [Abb12].
(x, y) layer Data rate: VQM: agg. Data rate agg. VQM:
(∈ S,∈ T) l d(l) (Mbps) q(l) (Mbps) Q
(0,0) 1 0.6980 0.2585 0.6980 0.2585
(0,1) 2 0.3508 0.1616 1.0487 0.4200
(0,2) 3 0.3829 0.1513 1.4316 0.5713
(0,3) 4 0.1969 0.1556 1.6285 0.7269
(0,4) 5 0.0784 0.1632 1.7069 0.8901
(1,4) 6 2.4739 0.0789 4.1808 0.9690
(2,4) 7 3.8541 0.0185 8.0349 0.9875
(3,4) 8 5.9385 0.0125 13.9733 1.0000
The videos contain three spatial and four temporal layers as enhancement layers
on top of the base layer. The average VQM values of different video layers of the
mentioned videos, as well as their corresponding data rate required for transmission,
are provided in Fig. 6.9 [Abb12]. A complete mapping between the video layers and
their corresponding VQM values and data rates are provided in [Abb12].
The sequence of the transmission of the enhancement layers plays a crucial role in
the receiving node’s utility. By considering Fig 6.9, we can see that receiving one
enhancement layer in the temporal dimension improves the perceived quality much
more than receiving one enhancement layer in the spatial dimension. Besides, the
enhancement layers of the temporal dimension require a lower data rate than that
of the spatial dimension. Low data rate transmission not only reduces the energy
consumption at a PN, but also reduces the cost assigned to the CNs, cf. (6.23).
Hence, the best order for transmission of the enhancement layers is to transmit all the
temporal layers prior to the spatial layers. With such an order, the VQM values and
the corresponding required data rate of each layer used throughout the simulations are
shown in Table 6.1.
6.5.3 Utility function setup
The parameters captured by the utility function span from the physical layer (energy)
to the application layer (video quality) and user level (preferences). Therefore, they
need to be set up carefully in order to work together correctly. Since the VQM values
are already normalized between 0 and 1, we first normalize the energy values. The
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(a) Data rate
(b) VQM values.
Figure 6.9. Required data rates and corresponding VQM values for different layers of
H.264/SVC [Abb12].
energy values required for unicast communication (6.3) between any two nodes are
normalized to a reference energy value denoted by Eref . We define Eref as the energy
a node needs to spend to transmit all the video layers to a node located at a standard
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distance. Denoting by dstd and g(dstd) the standard distance and the corresponding
channel gain at such a distance, respectively, Eref is given by
Eref :=
L∑
l=1
d(l)
nb
(
γthσ2
g(dstd)
+ pct
)
Ts. (6.43)
In our simulation setup we set dstd = 10m.
To model the willingness of the users to contribute to the network, we consider the
RDC βi ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5,∞} which correspond to the most altruistic users (50% of the
users), the average users (25% of the users), the reluctant users (15% of the users)
and the users who do not want to contribute at all (10% of the users), respectively.
Likewise, to model the preferences of the users regarding the video quality they wish to
receive, we assume that there are three types of users whose preferences are captured
by αi ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1}. These parameters correspond to the most passionate users in
receiving highest video quality (50% of the users), the average users (30% of the users)
and the users who are not much interested in paying the price for having high video
quality (20% of the users), respectively. It should also be remarked that we define the
most passionate user as the user whose utility function is maximized by receiving all
the video layers from a transmitter with β = 1 and the standard distance dstd from it.
By such a definition we obtain αi = 0.1.
6.5.4 Benchmarks
To evaluate different aspects of our design, we compare our proposed algorithm in
terms of energy efficiency and QoE with the following benchmarks.
Without incentive: When the incentive is not enabled in the network, the nodes
do not request the video layers which are not available at their neighboring node. In
such a case, the nodes merely maximize their utility based on the available layers at
their neighboring nodes by solving OPT1 in (6.34). Note that, with our proposed
algorithm, the nodes further solve OPT2 in (6.35) as discussed in Section 6.4.2.4.
Equal-share (overlay): Equal-share is a well-studied cost-sharing scheme for network
creation in which the cost of multicast transmission is equally shared among the
receivers. Using the equal-share, the cost of node i in (6.23) is given by c
(l)
j,i =
e
(l),uni
M
(l)
j ,j
/M
(l)
j . Note that, in order to guarantee the convergence of an equal-share-based
cost-sharing game to an NE, the transmit power of the nodes must be fixed (cf.
Theorem 4.5) which we set to pj = 300mW in our simulation.
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Figure 6.10. The social welfare for different numbers of users.
Flooding (overlay): Flooding is one of the simplest schemes for data dissemination.
With flooding, every receiver re-transmits the packets it receives, regardless of whether
another node in its neighboring area needs it.
6.5.5 Results and Discussion
6.5.5.1 General performance
Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11 show the social welfare of the network and the average number
of received layers for different numbers of nodes. We evaluate our proposed algorithm
for two different values of tax rate, θ = 0.1 and θ = 0.5. We further compare
our proposed algorithm with the case in which there is no incentive and taxation
mechanism. We see in this figure that the social welfare increases when the network
becomes denser. Since in a denser network the distances between the nodes are shorter
on average, the energy required for transmission and, consequently, the cost that every
node has to pay for receiving the video decreases. Therefore, the service is cheaper and
the nodes request higher layers of video, as shown in Fig. 6.11. Furthermore, the social
welfare is higher when the tax rate is low. This is in accordance with Observation 6.2
where we expected to have a better performance with low tax rates.
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Figure 6.11. The average number of received layers by the users for different numbers
of users.
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Figure 6.12. The convergence of the game to an NE and the change in the number of
received layers.
In Fig. 6.12 and Fig. 6.13, the convergence of the algorithm to an NE is depicted when
there are 20 nodes in the network. In all three cases, the algorithm converges to an NE
where none of the nodes updates its decision. By enabling our proposed mechanism,
higher social welfare and a higher number of video layers can be obtained through more
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Figure 6.13. The convergence of the game to an NE and the change in the social
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Figure 6.14. The change in the number of tokens of the users. The nodes are indexed
based on their distance to the source.
iterations.
Fig. 6.14 shows the change in the number of tokens of each user after constructing
the network. The number of tokens is calculated based on the difference in the users’
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payment and income using (6.16), that is, ζ
(
R +
◦
R− C −X
)
assuming ζ = 1. It is
assumed that one token per unit of normalized energy is paid by a receiving user to her
transmitting user in a unicast transmission. Recall that, in a multicast transmission
the number of tokens that need to be paid are shared among the receivers. There are
20 nodes in the network and the abscissa shows the index of the nodes depending on
their proximity to the source. In other words, node 2 is the nearest user to the source
and node 20 has the largest distance.
As we can see, the number of tokens of the nodes which are located closer to the source,
and typically have a higher contribution, increases. In contrast, the nodes which are
located far from the source end up paying their tokens for receiving the video and
cannot receive tokens from others. With our proposed mechanism, the curves have a
higher slope, and the number of tokens received by the contributing nodes reaches a
higher value than for the case without incentive. One can conclude that by using the
proposed incentive/taxation mechanism in our algorithm, the available tokens in the
network are moved toward the nodes closer to the source whose contribution is vital.
This actually results in higher social welfare, already shown in Fig. 6.13. It should be
remarked that in all the cases shown in Fig. 6.14, the total number of tokens in the
network are equal, and no new token will be generated according to Observation 6.3.
The main benefit of our proposed algorithm compared to the case without incentive is
the transfer of the tokens from the ones who want to have a better quality to the ones
who can contribute.
6.5.5.2 Network creation algorithm
The impact of overlay BT construction algorithm is studied in Fig. 6.15 in which we
show the energy consumption in the network versus the QoE of the users. We compare
our proposed algorithm with the equal-share-based and flooding-based algorithms
explained in Sections 6.5.4. Our proposed algorithm that uses the Shapley value
performs better than the other two schemes for data dissemination. E.g., when there are
20 nodes in the network, our algorithm requires 68% and 288% less energy compared
to the equal-share and flooding for transmitting four layers of the video. The gain
achieved by our algorithm in comparison to the equal-share-based algorithm is a result
of transmit-power control at the PNs, cf. Section 6.5.4.
Further, when there are ten nodes in the network, the performance of the equal-share
algorithm is close to the performance of our proposed algorithm. The reason is that
when the network is sparse, the transmissions are mostly in unicast for which the
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Figure 6.15. The energy required for achieving different levels of QoE for different
network creation approaches.
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Figure 6.16. The energy efficiency of the network versus average QoE of the users for
different orders of video layers transmission.
Equal-share and the Shapley value schemes share the cost of a transmission similarly.
In such a case, the single CN pays the whole cost of transmission [MASK19].
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6.5.5.3 Impact of the order of layers
In Fig. 6.16, we compare our proposed order of the video layers, cf. Table 6.1, with
two other orders; random order and spatial-first order. As the name suggests, in
the latter case, we first disseminate the spatial layers after the base layer and then
the temporal layers. There are 20 nodes in the network and as Fig. 6.16 shows,
our proposed scheme for transmission of the layers has the best performance and
spatial-then-temporal performs the worst among the three orders. For instance, when
the normalized energy consumed in the network is 2, the average VQM value obtained
by our proposed algorithm is 0.65 while the random approach and spatial-first achieve
0.20 and 0.28, respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 6.9, the path taken by the
spatial-then-temporal scheme, is very expensive. It requires a high data rate while
it improves the QoE marginally. Therefore, the users do not join the broadcast-trees
for quality enhancement, and consequently, the average QoE is lower. Hence, the order
based on which the enhancement layers are transmitted can significantly impact the
QoE of the users.
6.5.5.4 Preference-awareness
Finally, to have a better insight into how our proposed game-theoretic algorithm works,
Fig. 6.17 and Fig. 6.18 show the stream of different video layers in the network from
PNs to their CNs with and without taking the individual user preferences into account.
Different colors in the heat maps shown in Fig. 6.17 and Fig. 6.18 represent different
video layers. There are eight layers in total available at the source and the color of a
user shows the number of video layers received by the user. In this network, there exist
six users including the source. We assume that users 3, 4, and 5 who are located far
from the source are interested in receiving a high video quality (αi = 0.1, i = 3, 4, 5)
while the source node is not accessible for them. Further, node 2 has low RDC (high
willingness for contribution) with β2 = 0.5 while for node 1 we have β1 = 1 that
represents an average user.
In Fig. 6.17, the individual user preferences are ignored and αi and βi are set to 1 for
all the users. Since nodes 1 and 2 are considered homogeneous concerning the reward
that they ask from their respective CNs, node 4 is indifferent in choosing its PN and
sends its requests randomly to one of the nodes 1 or 2 for each of the layers.
In Fig. 6.18, we take the individual user preferences into account. As Fig. 6.18 shows,
node 2, with low RDC (high willingness for contribution), is chosen by the nodes 3,
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Figure 6.17. The stream of the video and the number of video layers received by the
users: User preferences are ignored.
4, and, 5 for providing them the higher layers of the video. This figure clearly shows
the impact of taking the individual user preferences into account. Using our proposed
algorithm, in contrast to Fig. 6.17, the stream of the video is through the user with
high willingness to contribute, i.e., user 2. Further, the users who require a high-quality
video, that is, the users 3, 4, and 5, receive six video layers at the end. In fact, thanks
to the high willingness of user 2 for contribution, the perceived QoE of the users in
Fig. 6.18 is higher in comparison to Fig. 6.17.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel decentralized game-theoretic algorithm for video
streaming in wireless networks with one source and multiple receivers. We propose a
joint incentive and taxation mechanism by which the nodes are motivated to contribute
to the network and in return get paid by their respective receivers. Our design streams
the video into the network by taking the preferences of individual users into account
regarding their interest in high video quality and contribution to the network. Further,
with our algorithm, the contributing nodes are not only paid based on the energy they
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Figure 6.18. The stream of the video and the number of video layers received by the
users: User preferences are considered.
spend in the network for transmission of video layers to others, but also based on the
importance of their contribution for the rest of the network. Finally, we showed by
simulation that our proposed algorithm converges to an NE, the social welfare improves,
and the users perceive higher QoE on average.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and outlook
7.1 Conclusions
This chapter provides a summary of the dissertation and discusses the related problem
that can be further investigated. In this dissertation, multi-hop broadcast in wireless
networks is studied.
It is shown in Chapter 1 that with the current trend in users’ interests and the
communications industry, multi-hop broadcast is vital for data dissemination in the
future generations of communication networks. Since the energy-efficiency is a major
challenge in multi-hop networks and since the transmission flow in multi-hop broadcast
forms a tree-graph, the MPBT problem is introduced and the need for a decentralized
yet efficient algorithm for this problem is discussed. The existing open issues are
explained and finally, the main contributions of this dissertation are summarized.
Since game theory is a suitable mathematical tool for modeling the MPBT problem in a
decentralized way, in Chapter 2, an overview of game theory is provided. The categories
of the game, the solution concepts, and the relevant theorems are introduced. Further,
CSG as the main class of game used in this dissertation for the MPBT problem, is
discussed.
In Chapter 3, the considered system and network models are described and the MPBT
problem is formally defined. Moreover, a MAC scheme is proposed for the decentralized
construction of the MPBT problem.
Chapter 4 presents in detail the proposed decentralized approach for the MPBT
problem, which is designed based on a non-cooperative cost sharing game. The
proposed cost sharing game is shown to be a potential game. Several cost sharing
schemes for the MPBT problem are studied in this chapter including MC, SV and ES.
First, it is shown that the MC is the best scheme for the MPBT problem. With MC, the
potential function of the game is equal to the network power, meaning that, the local
objective of the nodes is exactly aligned with the global objective of the network and
hence, the optimum BT is always an NE of the game. It is proved that this property
does not necessarily hold for budget-balanced cost sharing schemes. Second, concerning
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the budget-balanced cost sharing schemes, it is shown that, despite its simplicity, the
ES does not guarantee the convergence of the game to an NE for the MPBT problem. It
is further shown that, to guarantee the convergence when the ES is employed, the PNs
in the network have to transmit with a fixed transmit power, regardless of the unicast
power needed for the links to their corresponding CNs. This results in a significant
increase in the network power. The budget-balanced cost sharing scheme which is fair
and also always leads to an NE for the MPBT problem is shown to be the SV. Third,
the necessity of having a model that jointly considers the radio link power and circuitry
power is emphasized in this chapter. Simulation results show that taking the circuitry
power into account jointly with the radio link power, impacts the structure of the BT
and remarkably reduces the power required for message dissemination.
In addition, Chapter 4 analyzes the MAC scheme proposed in Chapter 3 . The
probability of collision in accessing the shared channel is studied and the average
number of nodes which may experience a collision in accessing the channel is calculated.
It is shown that by a proper design, the nodes can access the channel and find their
initial PNs within a few time-slots with negligible number of collisions. In fact, this
can be achieved by allocating an enough number of time-slots for accessing the channel
during the first few rounds of the RACH phase.
In Chapter 5, the message dissemination approach introduced in the previous chapter
is further extended. More precisely, in this chapter, the receiving nodes employ
the MRC technique in order to further reduce the network power by combining the
signals transmitted by multiple transmitting nodes. MC and SV cost sharing schemes
are considered for decision making at the nodes for network power and social cost
minimization, respectively. It is shown that the MRC-based SV and MC cost functions
can be formulated as piece-wise linear functions. Hence, an MILP formulation for
decision making at the nodes is proposed by which each node chooses its optimum set
of PNs along with the transmit power of each of the chosen PNs. Further, an MILP
is also presented to find the globally optimum solution of the MRC-based message
dissemination. Since the proposed algorithm takes the circuitry power into account
and finds the re-transmitting nodes accordingly, it outperforms the existing heuristic
algorithm, especially when the the circuitry power or the number of nodes in the
network is high. Besides, it shown that exploiting MRC for the MPBT is beneficial,
compared to the simple non-MRC approach, when the circuity power of the nodes is
low. When the circuitry power is high, the nodes tend to choose only one PN even
though they are allowed to choose multiple PNs. This is due to the fact that reception
of the message from multiple PNs over multiple time-slots, imposes additional reception
power on the nodes. We have also demonstrated that exploiting MRC can reduce the
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social cost while preserving the fairness in cost allocation and providing incentives for
contributing nodes.
Our proposed decentralized data dissemination algorithm is further customized for an
SVC-based video streaming in Chapter 6. The focus of this chapter is on UCNs in which
having a proper incentive mechanism is critical. To answer the fairness issue, SV is
employed as the cost sharing scheme in this chapter. Via a utility function, the proposed
model in this chapter captures the interest of the individual users, in terms of the video
quality a user wishes to receive and her preferred level of contribution to the network,
and constructs the BT accordingly. It is shown that by such a model, the users with
a higher willingness for contribution obtain a higher reward and are able to receive a
higher video quality as well. Further, a taxation mechanism is proposed in this chapter
that rewards the contributing users according to the impact of their contribution.
Such a taxation mechanism is shown to be effective as it provides incentives for the
nodes closer to the source which results in their contribution to the network. This
improves the QoE of the users located far from the source. It is shown by simulation
that with the proposed mechanism, the users are able to perceive high QoE while the
energy-efficiency of the network is preserved. Further, the social cost, which is the total
cost that the users pay in order to perceive a certain QoE, is shown to be reduced by
the proposed algorithm.
7.2 Outlook
In this dissertation, the focus is on the energy efficiency of data dissemination in a
single-source multi-hop wireless network. The results in this dissertation are based
on several assumptions which can be relaxed or generalized. In the following, several
possible extensions are presented.
In this dissertation, we assume that there exists one source in the network and based
on such an assumption, we find an energy efficient BT for data dissemination. The
problem can be extended to the case with multiple sources. For instance, in an IoT
scenario where every node may have data for all other nodes, minimum-power data
dissemination is challenging. One approach is to have a dedicated BT for every single
node and use the corresponding BT for data dissemination when a node has a message
for others. This approach results in a high amount of overhead. Another approach is
to have only one BT shared by all the nodes. In fact, a single tree-graph is used by
all the nodes in which each of the nodes could be a source. By the latter approach,
construction of the BT and its maintenance may be easier than the former one, however,
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finding a proper cost function and designing a game that leads to a low-power BT is
not straightforward. More precisely, the flow of the message dissemination depends
on the node that acts as the source. Hence, even if the broadcast-tree is fixed, a
transmitting node may need to transmit in unicast or multicast depending on the flow
of the message. Further, designing a MAC scheme in such a multi-source network,
especially in case of concurrent transmissions from multiple sources, is challenging and
needs further investigations.
In our work, we assume that the nodes use a fixed MCS. Based on the employed MCS,
the minimum SNR required at the receiving users, for decoding the data successfully,
is found. Although using a lower order of MCS increases the reliability of transmission,
it increases the delay in the network. An interesting problem here is to evaluate the
trade-off between the end-to-end delay and the power of the BT, which is specifically
important in delay sensitive applications.
Uncertainty is an inherent property of dynamic wireless networks. In a dynamic
network, a node can join a network, download the content it wants to receive and
then leave the network at a random point in time. So far, we assumed that the nodes
in the network are static, however, since the algorithm that we propose is decentralized,
the nodes can adapt themselves to the changes in the network. In fact, when required,
the nodes can change their PN. In a dynamic network, frequently changing the PN
imposes additional power on the network. Moreover, in applications in which the
nodes download a file, the incomplete downloaded file may be lost if the receiving
node loses its connection to the transmitting node and thus, it may need to start
downloading the content again. This increases the energy consumption imposed on the
network and hence, the algorithm needs to be generalized in order to cope with network
dynamics. In other words, when the network is static, using multi-hop communication
may be in favor of the network power, while in a dynamic network, in which the
transmitting nodes may leave at some point in time, transmitting over a large number
of hops increases the chance of failure. Hence, in a highly dynamic network, having a
single-hop broadcast might be a better policy for the network energy efficiency in the
long run. Reinforcement learning is a suitable approach by which the nodes can learn
their optimal policy in choosing the node that they prefer to download the content
from. The receiving nodes, depending on network status, decide to either receive their
content from a centralized server or from a relay so as their decision will be in favor of
the network power. The network status here includes environmental information such
as the number of nodes, their velocity, and the buffer status of the other nodes.
Millimeter-wave (mmWave) communication is a promising technique for the future
generation of communication networks for data dissemination. One of the main benefits
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of mmWave is the capability of precise beamforming by which the signal transmitted
by a transmitter can be steered into a certain direction. Since by such a technique
the signal can be precisely transmitted toward the intended receiver, the interference is
avoided on the other nodes. Hence, unlike the traditional omnidirectional transmission,
multiple transmitters can use the same shared time and frequency resources while
the interference on unintended receivers is avoided. Although beamforming can
reduces the network power, designing a decentralized algorithm for beamforming-based
data dissemination and ensuring its convergence are challenging and need further
investigations.
In the proposed MAC scheme in Chapter 3, every PN reserves a time-slot in the
scheduled section for its transmission. Since the number of nodes in the network
and consequently the number of PNs are not known in advance, having a fixed
number of time-slots in the scheduled section may lead to either over-provisioning or
under-provisioning. Designing an efficient MAC scheme in such networks is essential,
especially in the case of a multi-source network. Reinforcement learning can also
be employed for tackling this problem by which the number of slots required in the
scheduled section can be learned over time.
In the proposed video streaming framework in Chapter 6, if the video layer that a given
user, say user i, wishes to receive is available at her neighboring users, she obtains it
from them directly. Otherwise, she asks one of its neighboring users, say user j, to
receive the video layer from another user and forward it to her (user i). User j accepts
such a request from user i if doing so improves her own utility. In fact, the decision
of user j depends on her local information which is not available at user i. Hence,
requesting a video layer from user j may not be the best decision by user i, as user i
only considers her own local information. A more sophisticated mechanism here can
be employed for further improvement. For instance, a mechanism can be designed in
a way to provide the information from multiple-hops at a user. By doing so, user i
can make a better decision in the first place and increase the chance of receiving the
intended video quality.
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List of Acronyms
BDP Broadcast decremental power
BIP Broadcast incremental power
BIPSW Broadcast incremental power with sweeping
BT Broadcast-tree
CN Child node
CSG Cost sharing game
ES Equal share
HC Highest cost allocation
IoT Internet of things
NE Nash equilibrium
MC Marginal contribution
MCS Modulation and coding scheme
MFPBT Minimum fixed-power broadcast-tree
MPBT Minimum-power broadcast-tree
MRC Maximal-ratio combining
MTBT Minimum-transmission broadcast-tree
M2M Machine to machine
PN Parent node
QoE Quality of Experience
QoS Quality of Service
RACH Random access channel
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SC Social cost
SV Shapley value
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SW Social welfare
SVC Scalable video coding
UCN User-centric network
VQM Video quality metric
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List of Symbols
ai Action of node i
a
i→ a′ Update in the action of player i from ai to a′i
a
(l)
i Action of user (player) i for video layer l
Ai Action set of node i
A(l)i Action set of user i for video layer l, a(l)i ∈ A(l)i
A Joint action set of a game
b
(l)
i Binary variable, b
(l)
i = 1 if user i receives video layer l
bi Vector of size 1× L containing the values of b(l)i
c
(l)
i Cost of video layer l for user i
ci Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of c(l)i
d(l) Data rate of the video layer l
e
(l)
i Energy spend by user i for forwarding video layer l
ei Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of e(l)i
e
(l),uni
i,j Energy spend by PN j for unicast transmission of video layer l to CN i
∆
a
i→a′
f(.) Change in the function f(.) when a
i→ a′
hi Number of hops from source to node i
L Total number of video layers
L
(r)
i Number of video layers received by user i
L The set of video layers
Mj Number of CNs of PN j
M
(l)
j Number of CNs of PN j for layer l of the video
Mj Set of CNs of PN j
M(l)j The set of CNs of PN j
pmaxj Maximum transmit power of node j
pcj Circuitry power of node j
pcrj Reception circuitry power of node j
pctj Transmission circuitry power of node j
preqi,j Transmit power requested from PN j by node i
preqi Set of transmit powers requested by node i from its PNs
prcvj Set of power requests received by node j from its CNs
prcv−i,j Set of power requests received by node j from its CNs except the CN i
PTxj Total transmission power of node j including the transmit circuitry power
PRxj Total reception power with MRC technique
142 List of Symbols
P totnet Network total power including the radio link power and the circuitry power
for transmission and reception
PTxnet Network transmit power including the radio link power and the circuitry
power for transmission
P Set of players or receiving nodes
Q Set of all the nodes in the network, Q = P ∪ {S}
q(l) VQM value of video layer l
q Vector of size 1× L containing the values of q(l)
Qi QoE of user i, Qi =
∑
l∈L b
(l)
i q
(l)
r
(l)
i Direct reward received by user i in exchange for re-transmission of video
layer l
ri Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of r(l)i
Ri Total reward received by user i in exchange for re-transmission of video
Ri The set of the nodes on the path from the source to node i
Rli The set of the nodes on the path from the source to node i for video layer l
◦
r
(l)
i The indirect reward received by user i in exchange for transmission of video
layer l
◦
ri Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of ◦r(l)i
◦
Ri The indirect reward received by user i in exchange for transmission of video
S Source node
t
(l)
i Binary variable, t
(l)
i = 1 if user i transmits video layer l
ti Vector of size 1× L containing the values of t(l)i
Ti The time-slot in which node i transmits
u
(l)
i Utility of user i for video layer l
ui Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of u(l)i
Ui Total utility of user i in network
v
(l)
i Virtual income of user i for forwarding video layer l
vi Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of v(l)i
Vi Total virtual income of user i in exchange for re-transmission of video
Wi Number of PNs chosen by CN i in case of using MRC technique
Wi Set of PNs of CN i, i ∈ P
x
(l)
i Tax paid by user i for video layer l
x
(l)
j,i Tax paid by CN i to PN j for video layer l
xi Vector of size L× 1 containing the values of x(l)i
Xi Total tax paid by user i
αi Interest of user i in receiving high-quality video
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βi Willingness of user i for contribution to the network
θ Tax rate
γi,j SNR of the signal received at node i transmitted by node j via unicast
γreqi,j (p
req
i,j ) SNR of the signal received by node i from transmitter j with p
req
i,j
γreqi|MRC(p
req
i ) SNR received at node i using MRC technique given its requested power
preqi
γth Minimum SNR required at a receiver for decoding the message successfully
ζ Number of tokens to be received per unit of energy spend for forwarding
the video
(.)ᵀ Transpose operator
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